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How the Railroads Got Us on the Wrong Economic Track
H. William Batt
[1998 / Part One]
William Batt holds an A.B. from the
University of Massachusetts and a Ph.D. in Political Science from
the State University of New York in Albany. He was a Peace Corps
volunteer in Thailand fiom 1962 to 1965. Following service in the
Peace Corps, he taught at several colleges. He was staff political
scientist for the New York Legislative Commission on Critical
Choices and the Tax Study Commission. Since 1992 he has been a
senior consulting associate engaged in policy research in
transportation and fiscal policy under government contract. He is
also engaged in research on public finance and sustainable
development.
Mr. Batt is a member of the Albany Torch club and presented this
paper there October 7, 1996. Readers may contact Mr. Batt via email
at: EMAIL
Defining Real Property Historically
Just over a week from now, right here in Albany, the Property Rights
Foundation of America will hold its second annual conference. These
are the people who are the core of the so-called "wise use"
movement, that is those who believe that the rights of ownership of
real property stand above just about all other values in political
negotiation, and that rights to private property are gravely
threatened by a government that today seeks to encroach on the
foundations of our forefathers' vision of society. In the American
west it is better known as the "sagebrush rebellion." I
won't talk much about whether or not these rights are soundly framed
or well grounded. I will talk, however, about some changes that took
place about a century ago that have had profound consequences for the
directions of American society in the interim. Had those changes not
taken place, it is doubtful whether the groundswell of anger over the
place of private landownership would be as intense as it is today.
One must start by looking at how the meaning of the word property has
changed over the course of centuries. In most societies of the world,
as was true in classic western thought, property typically meant
personal property clothing, household goods, bodily adornments and
armor, and similar such items. Land was typically owned by society in
common, or perhaps belonged to God or nature. Roman law made some
effort to allot land titles to private individuals and families, but
it was honored more in theory than in fact. Indeed, it was not until
the now well-documented "enclosure movement" in early Tudor
England that land titles began their long transformation from what has
been termed "leasehold" to "freehold." Against the
will of the King and his Council, noblemen seized the land for
themselves, marking it into defined units, fenced off in their names
only, even when they had no use for it. Karl Polanyi noted that:
Enclosures have appropriately been called a revolution
of the rich against the poor. The lords and nobles were upsetting
the social order, breaking down ancient law and custom, sometimes by
means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They were
literally robbing the poor of their share in the common, tearing
down the houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom,
the poor had long regarded as theirs and their heirs'. The fabric of
society was being disrupted; desolate villages and the ruins of
human dwellings testified to the fierceness with which the
revolution raged, endangering the defenses of the country, wasting
its town, decimating its population, turning its overburdened soil
into dust, harassing its people and turning them from decent
husbandmen into a mob of beggars and thieves.
Rutgers Professor of Urban Planning Donald Krueckeberg more recently
explained how real property became for the first time a "commodity,"
much as the market gives personal property exchange value. Native
Americans tied the concept of property not to ownership but to use. "One
used it, one moved on, and use was shared with others." But the
colonists took their notion of real property from evolving British
legal tradition, defined largely in terms of what its owners could
subdue and control against challengers. John Locke's conception of
property was, in one sense, more akin to the Indian notion in as much
as one owned it only to the extent that one "mixed one's labor"
with it.
Indeed the most widespread notion of property ownership, especially
in realms where Roman law had left no legacy, was title in usufruct,
meaning title to use. But that meaning has gradually given way to the
prevailing conception of title in fee simple, even though legal
constraints have grown to curtail abuses of such ownership and are
even seen sometimes as assaults on it. Krueckeberg notes that as many
as nine kinds of property rights have been distinguished: possession,
use, alienation (the power to give away), consumption, modification,
destruction, management, exchange, and profit taking. From the first
application of the land law of the New England settlers there has been
a gradual extension of private control over land titles first to
simple use, then the right to benefit, and ultimately "to the
idea of gain made by selling. Land speculation, which was to spread
across the continent, radically transformed New England's democratic
town pattern." Concurrent with this spreading application of
titles in fee simple has come changes in the meaning of the word
property, a term which, although employed in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, was amplified only during the
second half of the 19th century. The notion of land as a commodity has
had pernicious effects on the course of our whole civilization.
As recently as a century ago classical economic thought still
regarded land for the most part as the common heritage of mankind.
From Adam Smith, through Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and finally
with John Stuart Mill economic productivity was regarded as a function
of three interacting factors: land, labor, and capital. John Locke
also accepted these premises. To achieve optimal economic
productivity, one had to exact the appropriate price from each of
those factors. The price of labor was in wages; the price of capital
was interest; and the price of land, particularly following the
thinking of David Ricardo, was rent. Rent in its classical sense means
payment for the use of something in fixed supply, or, more generally,
payments above the costs incurred for its creation. Disequilibriums
and inefficiencies in economic development resulted if the appropriate
prices were not paid for each factor. But, as we shall see, there were
powerful interests in this country, bent on not seeing any rent
extracted from land use, that persuaded the nascent economics
profession at the end of the 19th century no longer to regard land as
a separate factor and to redefine the terms of production instead in
two-factor theory. This was concurrent with the inclusion of land as
property, since called "real property."
As land came to be transferred to other nobility and usurped under
title in fee simple rather than in usufruct, it came to be regarded as
a private financial asset. Earlier it was regarded as part of nature,
much like air, water, wind and weather. Accounting practices now
listed land as an asset "owned" in fee simple, and as a
liability on the other side of balance sheets in money "owed"
to banks. This tendency has been extended today so that we have
privatized much of our air, water, wind, and even sunlight. Land came
to be simply one special kind of capital, nothing special, nothing
requiring further treatment. Ricardo's Law of Rent became an artifact
of intellectual history. The conflation of land into capital to create
two-factor economics is one of the greatest paradigm shifts in the
evolution of social philosophy. How the premises and terms of economic
discourse have been changed has been documented for the first time in
a new book by a California professor of economics, Mason Gaffney. The
account is put forth in fascinating detail entitled, The Corruption of
Economics. It was indeed a corruption of a discipline, a deliberate
putsch by powerful economic forces with an interest in seeing such
definitions changed, and we have all been paying the price since that
time. This revealing thesis is what I really want to relate to you,
and to explain the dire consequences it has had for us in our
contemporary world. I have come to believe it; it makes sense to me,
both historically and in contemporary analysis, from several
perspectives.
The Corruption of Economics
As I explained, classical economics emerged from a school of thinkers
known as the Scottish moralists in the latter part of the 18th
century. There ultimately evolved three major schools of economic
thought a century later, one continuing tradition of Adam Smith
through J.S. Mill, a second being the aggressive and emerging school
of Marxism, and the third a proposal for two-factor economics being
pressed largely by interests in America. Marxism was never a major
force in United States; the primary challenge to the classical
tradition came from what has since come to be known as neo-classical
economics.
Professor Gaffney has for the first time shown how powerful economic
interests in American society essentially bought the leading figures
of the newly-established American Economics Association with all the
blandishments that can be used to influence academicians. Leading
scholars were induced to change definitions of terms so that special
interests would be advantaged. What were those interests? Primarily
the railroad industry, which at the time was probably the most
powerful political force in America. By changing definitions and
conflating the land factor into capital, it was no longer essential
for land rent to be paid in taxes, and the railroads, holders of some
of the most valuable land in the nation, were thereby able to escape
their full duty. This is an astonishing story, one never fully spelled
out until now, and it explains both how the academic community was
beholden to powerful interests and how many of the social problems we
see today could have been avoided.
The classical tradition of economic thought was ably synthesized and
represented by one dominant figure of the age: Henry George. All but
forgotten today, perhaps in good part due to the assiduous
disparagement of his economic foes, one should note that he was more
widely known in his time in America than anyone except Thomas Edison.
His 1879 book,
Progress and Poverty, sold more copies throughout the world
than any book till that time except the Bible. Born in
Philadelphia the son of a publisher of religious books, he travelled
to California as a young man to make his fortune as a journalist. But
what he saw in land speculation and the exploitation of labor soon led
him to study the classical economists and to write his ideas down.
Upon publication of his book he shortly became known throughout the
world, and travelled and lectured widely as a social reformer for the
rest of his life. By the time he died he had become so famous that he
almost won the mayoralty of the city of New York. He ran twice, losing
to Tammany Hall the first time in what was probably a corrupt election
(but beating the third-place finisher, Theodore Roosevelt) in 1886,
and died four days before a second election he might have won in 1897.
As a spellbinding orator and lucid writer, he captivated the world
with his vision of societies made more just by a proper understanding
of economics. Gaffney shows that it was George, not Marx, that was the
primary threat to dominant interests in end-of-century United States.
He had to be stopped, and he was.
In classical economics, the definition of capital grew out of labor
mixed with earlier capital. Land, by conventional definition, was not
capital, nor was it a component of wealth. Rather land was its own
category. Conflating land into capital allowed land rent to be hidden
and diluted in ways so that the unearned increment arising from social
improvements fell to speculators rather thabeing returned to society
in rent. The failure of society to recapture the appropriate level of
land rent from titleholders led also to depression of labor wages at
the margin, creating poverty and artificial scarcity of labor where
otherwise it could be relieved. Hence the title of George's book, Progress
and Poverty. George recognized that the value of any land parcel
arose out of its social activity, not from anything which a
titleholder might have done to it. He recognized that many, perhaps
most, titleholders in land were speculators, reaping the benefit of
others' investments, and selling out at last when their price was met.
Hence it made sense that society had a right to a return on what it
had brought about, as well as from the fact that those titles could
never be other than leaseholds. That land rent, shortly confused by
use of the words "single tax," was, to George, the rightful
return to society.
The railroad barons of the 19th century were not just coincidentally
the land barons. They also had strong holds on the founding and growth
of the major American universities of the period, some of which carry
their names. Johns Hopkins, Andrew Dickson White, Daniel Gilman, John
D. Rockefeller, George Leland Stanford, Nicholas Murray Butler were
all as attached to various universities in the country as they were to
powerful railroad interests. They were able, through their control of
universities either as actual presidents or as benefactors to
influence the dominant figures responsible for establishing the
American Economic Association in 1885. The actual intrigue is too
complex to be recounted here: who got appointed and promoted, who was
funded in research, which were given endowed chairs, who got stock
options, and so on. The preoccupation with defeating Henry George,
Gaffney shows, was a paramount preoccupation of all of these figures.
The central figures were:
- Francis Walker, first president of the AEA, then President of
MIT and Director of the Census Bureau.
- Richard Ely, also founder of the AEA, and professor of
economics at University of Wisconsin and later Northwestern, there
granted his own Institute with railroad money.
- John Bates Clark, Professor of Economics at Columbia
University, and whose patron was Julius Seelye, President of
Amherst College and then Smith College.
- E.R.A. Seligman, Chairman of the Economics Department at
Columbia University and scion of a wealthy banking family.
These figures are even today the honored founders of an esteemed
profession. So great was their victory over rival schools of thought
that they are a century later seen as paragons of clear thinking and
virtue. The intrigue and the inside deals are long forgotten. The
lineage to contemporary scholarship continues in a "chain
unbroken from Seelye to Clark to Johnson to Knight to Stigler,
Friedman, Harberger and now thousands of Chicago-oriented economists."
Indeed, when Henry George ran for mayor of New York in 1897, it was
against the wealthy patrician Seth Low, President of Columbia
University, who had recently recruited Clark to come to Columbia. To
really understand the academic tension of the period, one must look at
the published papers, the speeches and debates, the newspaper
articles, and the citations at the end of those articles. These, even
more than the interlocking directorates of faculty appointments,
explain how much George was opposed, perhaps more feared. Was it for
the falsity of his views? Clearly not, as few critics then or since
then have managed to strike a knock-out blow against his theories.
Rather, it was the threat George represented to powerful interests
that required him to be defeated, and in doing so they succeeded but
only in the short run, as they were within decades victims of their
very successes. Today we see that the railroads have failed in this
country for lack of traffic. It will soon be evident why.
There were many arguments to be made for the classical tradition the
result of which would be to rely upon payment of rent of land
according to its value to society. George recognized that land value
is largely a function of how society has elected to invest in any
general neighborhood; there is no argument for any one titleholder to
reap the reward of what others have invested. Gaffney points out that,
from the standpoint of economic theory, the framework had the
following virtues:
- It reconciled common land rights with private tenure, free
markets and modern capitalism, a growing and persistent problem as
the industrial society took hold.
- It enabled the lowering of taxes on labor without raising taxes
on capital.
- It reconciled equity and efficiency. It constituted a
progressive tax because land is concentrated so much among the
wealthy and because the tax cannot be shifted. It was efficient
because it is neutral among different land-use options.
- It constituted no disincentive to business location or
population settlement. In this way it encouraged the most
efficient land use and discouraged sprawl.
- It created jobs without inflation, and raised government
revenue without any penalty upon its base.
- It strengthened public revenues and at the same time promotes
economy in government.
Those economists who today still persistently hold to the view that
there is something special about land that make it unwise to treat as
a form of capital are known as Georgists. They represent a
small minority of the economics profession, but, little known as they
are, they are among its most esteemed members.
Two-factor economics, however, had advantages to influential
individuals and special interests. Land speculators who were
positioned to profit from knowing where locational values would
increase, or were in a position to cause those increases, could
quickly and easily reap a private gain. Simply by holding title to
parcels of real property, without doing anything at all to increase
their value, one could quickly turn a profit. This is because the
increment of unearned increases resulting from social investments were
left for owners to reap rather than recovered by society. In
three-factor economics, land rent reverted to society in an automatic
and efficient manner. When a railroad magnate like George Leland
Stanford extended the Southern Pacific track to the east of Los
Angeles on land that he was granted by the government, all he then
needed to do was to sit back and wait for the land sales to give him a
return on that which was made more valuable by his investment in the
line. All across America, land speculators learned that capturing
monopoly titles to tracts of land allowed them to quickly and easily
turn a "profit" on their investment yet hardly raising a
finger.
Assessing Sound Taxation
What David Ricardo called the "law of rent," and which
Henry George integrated to a comprehensive economic theory, can be
made the basis of a perfect tax measured by contemporary principles of
tax theory. Public finance textbooks typically list them as economic
neutrality, efficiency, equity, administrability, simplicity,
stability, and sufficiency. Each of these words embodies an important
virtue of sound of taxation going back to the insights of Adam Smith
two centuries ago. And now you know a bit of where I'm headed.
Tax neutrality refers to the influence (or absence of such) that any
particular design has on economic behavior. Typically taxes are
perceived as a damp on economic activity taxing income reduces the
incentive to work, taxing sales discourages retail transactions, and
taxing savings reduces the propensity to save. The more a tax is
perceived to be neutral the less the identifiable distortions it
imposes on the economy. The common assumption of most tax theorists is
that all taxes impose distortions; it's simply a matter of which ones
are least burdensome to economic health. A tax which imposes no
distortions is ideally best.
Tax efficiency is much like tax neutrality, and is the measure of how
much shifting of behavior it imposes, resulting in what is called "excess
burden," or "deadweight loss" on the economy. Tax
economists usually hold that the best taxes are those that are shifted
little if at all. Using a tax base that has little or zero elasticity
is the best way of assuring that taxes are not shifted. Zero
elasticity is another way of saying fixed supply, as, earlier noted,
land is.
The principle of equity is central to any discussion of tax design.
Tax design requires concern with both what is fair and the extent to
which it must sometimes be compromised to satisfy the other principal
criteria. Fairness can be evaluated according to what is termed "horizontal
equity" the extent to which those in similar circumstances will
pay similar tax burdens, and "vertical equity" how well
those in different classes bear different burdens in the tax
structure. It is this latter perspective that leads to the use of
terms like "proportional," "progressive," and "regressive"
in referring to tax structures. A tax is progressive with respect to
income if the ratio of tax revenue to income rises when moving up the
income scale, proportional if the ratio is constant, and regressive if
the ratio declines. There is an ancillary question of whether taxing
to reach greater equity should employ measures of income or of wealth,
difficult as this is to measure. Such questions of equity are a matter
particularly central when discussing the property tax. This is because
people capitalize their income in the course of a lifetime frequently
in property. Although claims are often made to the contrary and really
comprehensive studies have yet to be done, available studies suggest
that the property tax is really highly progressive, especially for the
land component.
Administrability refers to the ease with which a tax can be
administered and collected. Taxes which distort the economy are
inefficient but so are taxes that cost lots to administer. This is
measured not only in the direct costs of tax avoidance and accounting
expenses, but in the level of evasion and cheating, and by the cost of
government auditing and policing. When the taxpaying public perceives
that a tax is easily evaded, cumbersome, and unfair, it loses its
legitimacy and calls government itself into question.
This is why the principle of simplicity is important: the more
complex the tax design, the more lawyers and accountants will find
loopholes, encourage the appearance of unfairness, and drive up the
cost of its administration. People know that with simple taxes other
parties are also paying their fair share, and all this enhances the
legitimacy and therefore the compliance of the tax system. Whatever
you think of the current income tax, Steve Forbes certainly pointed
out its problems recently.
Stability refers to the ability of a tax to produce revenue in the
face of changing economic circumstances. Income and sales taxes, for
example, vary greatly according to phases in the economic cycle; the
property tax, in contrast, is highly stable regardless of the state of
the economy. Followers of economist John Maynard Keynes believe that
revenues should be inverse to the cycles of the economy; i.e., that
the government should be used to stabilize or boost the economy as
occasions require. I should add as an aside that there are some
theorists who believe that, were revenue sources completely based on
land value, economic cycles would disappear.
In assessing the value of a tax it is also important, of course, to
understand its potential to bring in revenue for the purposes of
government. This is usually deemed revenue sufficiency. Income, sales
and property taxes, along with corporation taxes to a lesser extent,
have come to be regarded as the workhorses of the American revenue
structure. But, as anti-tax politicians are quick to note, the higher
these taxes are, the more they impose a drag on the economy. This is
why one should ponder whether to consider raising taxes which have
demonstrable distorting effects. In contrast, if you take the time to
look at a tax on land value alone, it measures up so well that it
looks like the perfect tax!
The Costs of Poor Taxes
Society pays a price for not adopting taxes which follow the
principles developed over the centuries. Here I want only to show how
the resulting distortions that arose in the use of land ultimately
caused the railroads to fail in being able to serve society. While in
the short term the railroads certainly saved themselves from having to
pay taxes on their vast land holdings the most valuable of which were
right around their own investment in tracks and stations they
ultimately lost the frequency of traffic which that tax structure
would have induced. This is because the population and improvement
densities needed to make public transit traffic economically viable
did not come about. Taking the long view of society, George Kennen
notes in one of his books that:
The railway. . . was capable of accepting and disgorging
its loads, whether of passengers or freight, only at fixed points.
This being the case, it tended to gather together, and to
concentrate around its urban terminus and railhead, all activity
that was in any way related to movements of freight or passengers
into or out of the city. It was in this quality that it had made
major and in some ways decisive contributions to the development not
only of the great railway metropolises of the Victorian age
particularly of such inland cities as Moscow, Berlin, Paris, and
Chicago but even certain of the great maritime turnover ports, such
as London and New York.
The automobile, on the other hand, had precisely the opposite
qualities. Incapable, in view of its own cumbersomeness and
requirements for space, of accepting or releasing large loads at any
concentrated points anywhere, but peculiarly capable of accepting
and releasing them at multitudes of unconcentrated points anywhere
else, the automobile tended to disintegrate and to explode all that
the railway had brought together. It was, in fact, the enemy of the
concentrated city. Thus it was destined to destroy the great densely
populated urban centers of the nineteenth century, with all the
glories of economic and cultural life that had flowed from their
very unity and compactness.
Failure to recapture publicly-created land rents through the tax
mechanism provided the incentive to speculators to buy land, not to
use it in production but to hold it for the rise. In this way, choice
parcels remain undeveloped or underdeveloped relative to the full
extent that their values warrant and development occurs instead in
remote areas where opportunity for profit is more immediate. The
result was low density development what we know as sprawl.
To some people this may be counter-intuitive. It may not be obvious
that increasing taxes on a parcel of land will foster its improvement.
Consider, however, the possibility that there are two parcels of land
in roughly the same location and of equal size. You own a vacant
parcel and another next to it has a twenty-story building. If only the
land-value is taxed you will be paying the same tax revenue as your
neighbor. What are you likely to do with your parcel? If you are
rational, you will either build a twenty-story building or else sell
the land to someone who will. In this way improvements tend to be
clustered in high-land-value areas except where it is prohibited,
perhaps for a park.
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