.
| Excerpted from
Charles Beard's "Framing the Constitution," in Peter Woll,
ed., American Government: Readings and Cases, 11th ed. (New York:
Harper Collins, 1993) |
In the following essay, which is adapted from The Supreme Court and the
Constitution (1912), Charles Beard presents evidence that the framers of
the Constitution were less interested in furthering democratic
principles than in protecting private property and the interests of the
wealthy class. Since this work was written over eighty years ago, there
are a few anachronisms you may want to keep in mind. First, when Beard
speaks of the "Confederacy," he is referring to the government
that existed under the Articles of Confederation -- not to the
Confederate states that seceded from the Union during the Civil War.
Also, it is important to remember that the Senate was still not elected
by popular vote when Beard was writing -- although that was changed in
1913 by the Seventeenth Amendment. Finally, when Beard speaks of "republican"
or "democratic" tendencies, he is not referring to the
Republican or Democratic parties, but is instead using the words in
their more generic sense.
...The reason and spirit of a law are to be understood only by an
inquiry into the circumstances of its enactment. The underlying purposes
of the Constitution, therefore, are to be revealed only by a study of
the conditions and events which led to formation and adoption.
At the outset it must be remembered that there were two great parties
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution -- one laying emphasis
on strength and efficiency in government and the other on its popular
aspects. Quite naturally the men who led in stirring up the revolt
against Great Britain and in keeping the fighting temper of the
Revolutionaries at the proper heat were the boldest and most radical
thinkers -- men like Samuel Adams, Thomas Paine, Patrick Henry, and
Thomas Jefferson.
They were not, generally speaking, men of large property interests or
of much practical business experience. In a time of disorder, they could
consistently lay more stress upon personal liberty than upon social
control; and they pushed to the extreme limits those doctrines of
individual rights which had been evolved in England during the struggles
of the small landed proprietors and commercial classes against royal
prerogative, and which corresponded to the economic conditions
prevailing in America at the close of the eighteenth century. They
associated strong government with monarchy, and came to believe that the
best political system was one which governed least. A majority of the
radicals viewed all government, especially if highly centralized, as a
species of evil, tolerable only because necessary and always to be kept
down to an irreducible minimum by a jealous vigilance.
Jefferson put the doctrine in concrete form when he declared that he
preferred newspapers without government to government without
newspapers. The Declaration of Independence, the first state
Constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation bore the impress of
this philosophy. In their anxiety to defend the individual against all
federal interference and to preserve to the states a large sphere of
local autonomy, these Revolutionists had set up a system too weak to
accomplish the accepted objects of government; namely, national defense,
the protection of property, and the advancement of commerce. They were
not unaware of the character of their handiwork, but they believed with
Jefferson that "man was a rational animal endowed by nature with
rights and with an innate sense of justice and that he could be
restrained from wrong and protected in right by moderate powers confided
to persons of his own choice." Occasional riots and disorders, they
held, were preferable to too much government.
The new American political system based on these doctrines had scarcely
gone into effect before it began to incur opposition from many sources.
The close of the Revolutionary struggle removed the prime cause for
radical agitation and brought a new group of thinkers into prominence.
When independence had been gained, the practical work to be done was the
maintenance of social order, the payment of the public debt, the
provision of a sound financial system, and the establishment of
conditions favorable to the development of the economic resources of the
new country. The men who were principally concerned in this work of
peaceful enterprise were not the philosophers, but men of business and
property and the holders of public securities. For the most part, they
had had no quarrel with the system of class rule and the strong
centralization of government which had existed in England. It was on the
question of policy, not of governmental structure, that they had broken
with the British authorities. By no means all of them, in fact, had even
resisted the policy of the mother country, for within the ranks of the
conservatives were large numbers of Loyalists who had remained in
America, and, as was to have been expected, cherished a bitter feeling
against the Revolutionists, especially the radical section which had
been boldest in denouncing the English system root and branch. In other
words, after the heat and excitement of the War of Independence were
over and the new government, state and national, was tested by the
ordinary experiences of traders, financiers, and manufacturers, it was
found inadequate, and these groups accordingly grew more and more
determined to reconstruct the political system in such a fashion as to
make it subserve their permanent interests.
Under the state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation
established during the Revolution, every powerful economic class in the
nation suffered either immediate losses or from impediments placed in
the way of the development of their enterprises. The holders of the
securities of the [government established by the Articles of
Confederation] did not receive the interest on their loans. Those who
owned Western lands or looked with longing eyes upon the rich
opportunities for speculation there chaffed at the weakness of the
government and its delays in establishing order on the frontiers.
Traders and commercial men found their plans for commerce on a national
scale impeded by local interference with interstate commerce. The
currency of the states and the nation was hopelessly muddled. Creditors
everywhere were angry about the depreciated paper money which the
agrarians had made and were attempting to force upon those from whom
they had borrowed specie. In short, it was a war between business and
populism. Under the Articles of Confederation, populism had a free hand,
for majorities in the state legislatures were omnipotent. Anyone who
reads the economic history of the time will see why the solid
conservative interests of the country were weary of talk about the "rights
of the people" and bent upon establishing firm guarantees for the
rights of property.
The Congress of the Confederation was not long in discovering the true
character of the futile authority which the Articles had conferred upon
it. The necessity for new sources of revenue became apparent even while
the struggle for independence was yet undecided, and, in 1871, Congress
carried a resolution to the effect that it should be authorized to lay a
duty of five percent on certain goods. This moderate proposition was
defeated because Rhode Island rejected it on the grounds that "she
regarded it the most precious jewel of sovereignty that no state shall
be called upon to open its purse but by the authority of the state and
by her own officers." Two years later, Congress prepared another
amendment to the Articles providing for certain import duties, the
receipts from which, collected by state officers, were to be applied to
the payment of the public debt; but three years after the introduction
of the measure, four states, including New York, still held out against
its ratification, and the project was allowed to drop. At last, in 1786,
Congress in a resolution declared that the requisitions for the last
eight years had been so irregular in their operation, so uncertain in
their collection, and so evidently unproductive that a reliance on them
in the future would be no less dishonorable to the understandings of
those who entertained it than it would be dangerous to the welfare and
peace of the Union. Congress, thereupon, solemnly added that it had
become its duty "to declare most explicitly that the crisis had
arrived when the people of the United States, by whose will and for
whose benefit the federal government was instituted, must decide whether
they will support their rank as a nation by maintaining the public faith
at home and abroad, or rather for the want of a timely exertion in
establishing a general review and thereby giving strength to the
Confederacy, they will hazard not only the existence of the Union but
those great and invaluable privileges for which they have so arduously
and so honorably contended."
In fact, the Articles of Confederation had hardly gone into effect
before the leading citizens also began to feel that the powers of
Congress were wholly inadequate. In 1780, even before their adoption,
Alexander Hamilton proposed a general convention to frame a new
constitution, and from that time forward he labored with remarkable zeal
and wisdom to extend and popularize the idea of a strong national
government. Two years later, the Assembly of the State of New York
recommended a convention to revise the Articles and increase the power
of the Congress. In 1783, Washington, in a circular letter to the
governors, urged that it was indispensable to the happiness of the
individual states that there should be lodged somewhere a supreme power
to regulate and govern the general concerns of the confederation.
Shortly afterward (1785), Governor Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, suggested
to his state legislature the advisability of calling a national assembly
to settle upon and define the powers of Congress; and the legislature
resolved that the government under the Articles of Confederation was
inadequate and should be reformed; but the resolution was never laid
before Congress.
In January, 1786, Virginia invited all the other states to send
delegates to a convention at Annapolis to consider the question of
duties on imports and the commerce in general. When this convention
assembled in 1786, delegates from only five states were present, and
they were disheartened at the limitations on their powers and the lack
of interest the other states had shown in the project. With
characteristic foresight, however, Alexander Hamilton seized the
occasion to secure the adoption of a recommendation advising the states
to choose representatives for another convention to meet in Philadelphia
the following year "to consider the Articles of Confederation and
to propose such changes therein as might render them adequate to the
exigencies of the union." This recommendation was cautiously
worded, for Hamilton did not want to raise any unnecessary alarm. He
doubtless believed that a complete revolution in the old system was
desirable, but he knew that, in the existing state of popular temper, it
was not expedient to announce his complete program. Accordingly, no
general reconstruction of the political system was suggested; the
Articles of Confederation were merely to be "revised"; and the
amendments were to be approved by the state legislatures as provided by
that instrument.
The proposal of the Annapolis convention was transmitted to the state
legislatures and laid before Congress. Congress thereupon resolved in
February, 1787, that a convention should be held for the sole and
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting
to itself and the legislatures of the several states such alterations
and provisions as would when agreed to by Congress and confirmed by the
states render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of
government and the preservation of the union.
In pursuance of this call, delegates to the new convention were chosen
by the legislatures of the states or by the governors in conformity to
authority conferred by the legislative assemblies. The delegates were
given instructions of a general nature by their respective states, none
of which, apparently, contemplated any very far-reaching changes. In
fact, almost all of them expressly limited their representative to a
mere revision of the Articles of Confederation. For example,
Connecticut authorized her delegates to represent and confer for the
purpose mentioned in the resolution of Congress and to discuss such
measures "agreeable to the general principles of Republican
government" as they should think proper to render the Union
adequate. Delaware, however, went so far as to provide that none of the
proposed alterations should extend to the fifth part of the Articles of
Confederation guaranteeing that each state should be entitled to one
vote.
It was a truly remarkable assembly of men that gathered in Philadelphia
on May 17, 1787, to undertake the work of reconstructing the American
system of government. It is not merely patriotic pride that compels one
to assert that never in the history of assemblies has there been a
convention of men richer in political experience and practical
knowledge, or endowed with a profounder insight into the springs of
human action and the intimate essence of government. It is indeed an
astounding fact that at one time so many men skilled in statecraft could
be found on the very frontiers of civilization among a population
numbering about four million whites. It is no less a cause for
admiration that their instrument of government should have survived the
trials and crises of a century that saw the wreck of more than a score
of paper constitutions.[] All the members had had a practical training
in politics. Washington, as commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary
forces, had learned well the lessons and problems of war, and mastered
successfully the no less difficult problems of administration. The two
Morrises had distinguished themselves in grappling with financial
questions as trying and perplexing as any which statesmen had ever been
compelled to face. Seven of the delegates had gained political wisdom as
governors of their native states; and no less than twenty-eight had
served in Congress, either during the Revolution or under the Articles
of Confederation. These were men trained in the law, versed in finance,
skilled in administration, and learned in the political philosophy of
their own and earlier times. Moreover, they were men destined to
continue public service under the government which they had met to
construct -- Presidents, Vice-Presidents, heads of departments, Justices
of the Supreme Court were in that imposing body. ...
The makers of the Constitution represented the solid, conservative,
commercial and financial interests of the country -- not the interests
which denounced and proscribed judges in Rhode Island, New Jersey, and
North Carolina, and stoned their houses in New York. The conservative
interests, made desperate by the imbecilities of the Confederation and
harried by state legislatures, roused themselves from the lethargy, drew
together in a mighty effort to establish a government that would be
strong enough to pay the national debt, regulate interstate and foreign
commerce, provide for national defense, prevent fluctuations in the
currency created by paper emissions, and control the propensities of
legislative majorities to attack private rights...The radicals, however,
like Patrick Henry, Jefferson, and Samuel Adams, were conspicuous by
their absence from the Convention.
The Convention was convened to frame a government that would meet the
practical issues that had arisen under the Articles of Confederation.
The objections they entertained to direct popular government, and they
were undoubtedly many, were based upon their experience with popular
assemblies during the immediately preceding years. With many of the
plain lessons of history before them, they naturally feared that the
rights and privileges of the minority would be insecure if the principle
of majority rule was definitely adopted and provisions made for its
exercise. Furthermore, it will be remembered that up to that time the
right of all men, as men, to share in the government had never been
recognized in practice. Everywhere in Europe the government was in the
hands of a ruling monarch or at best a ruling class; everywhere the mass
of the people had been regarded principally as an arms-bearing and
tax-paying multitude, uneducated, and with little hope or capacity for
advancement. Two years were to elapse after the meeting of the grave
assembly at Philadelphia before the transformation of the Estates
General into the National Convention in France opened the floodgates of
revolutionary ideas on human rights before whose rising tide old
landmarks of government are still being submerged. It is small wonder,
therefore, that, under the circumstances, many members of that august
body held popular government in slight esteem and took the people into
consideration only as far as it was imperative "to inspire them
with the necessary confidence," as Mr. Gerry [one of the framers of
the Constitution] frankly put it.
Indeed, every page of the laconic record of the proceedings of the
convention, preserved to posterity by Mr. Madison, shows conclusively
that the members of that assembly were not seeking to realize any fine
notions about democracy and equality, but were striving with all the
resources of political wisdom at their command to set up a system of
government that would be stable and efficient, safeguarded on the one
hand against the possibilities of despotism and on the other against the
onslaught of majorities. In the mind of Mr. Gerry, the evils they had
experienced flowed "from the excess of democracy," and he
confessed that while he was still republican, he "had been taught
by experience the danger of the levelling spirit." Mr. Randolph, in
offering to the consideration of the convention his plan of government,
observed "that the general object was to provide a cure for the
evils under which the United States labored; that, in tracing these
evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and
follies of democracy; that some check therefore was to be sought for
against this tendency of our governments; and that a good Senate seemed
most likely to answer the purpose." Mr. Hamilton, in advocating a
life term for Senators, urged that "all communities divide
themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well
born and the other the mass of the people who seldom judge or determine
right."
Governor Morris wanted to check the "precipitancy, changeableness,
and excess" of the representatives of the people by the ability and
virtue of men" of great and established property -- aristocracy;
men who from pride will support consistency and permanency...Such an
aristocratic body will keep down the turbulence of democracy."
While these extreme doctrines were somewhat counterbalanced by the
democratic principles of Mr. Wilson, who urged that "the government
ought to possess, not only first, the force, but second, the mind or
sense of the people at large," Madison doubtless summed up in a
brief sentence the general opinion of the convention when he said that
to secure private rights against minority factions, and at the same time
to preserve the spirit and form of popular government, was the great
object to which their inquiries had been directed.
They were anxious above everything else to safeguard the rights of
private property against any leveling tendencies on the part of the
propertyless masses. Governor Morris, in speaking on the problem of
apportioning representatives, correctly stated the sound historical fact
when he declared: "Life and liberty were generally said to be of
more value than property. An accurate view of the matter, nevertheless,
would prove that property was the main object of society...If property,
then was the main object of government, certainly it ought to be one
measure of the influence due to those who were to be affected by the
government." Mr. King also agreed that "property was the
primary object of society," and Mr. Madison warned the convention
that in framing a system which they wished to last for ages they must
not lose sight of the changes which the ages would produce in the forms
and distribution of property. In advocating a long term in order to give
independence and firmness to the Senate, he described these impending
changes: "An increase in the population will of necessity increase
the proportion of those who will labor under all the hardships of life
and secretly sigh for a more equitable distribution of its blessings.
These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of
indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide
into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in
this country, but symptoms of a levelling spirit, as we have understood
have sufficiently appeared, in a certain quarter, to give notice of the
future danger." And again, in support of the argument for a
property qualification on voters, Madison urged: "In future times,
a great majority of the people will not only be without land, but
without any other sort of property. These will either combine, under the
influence of their common situation, -- in which case the rights of
property and the public liberty will not be secure in their hands, --
or, what is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence and
ambition; in which case there will be equal danger on another side."
Various projects for setting up class rule by the establishment of
property qualifications for voters and officers were advanced in the
convention, but they were defeated....
The absence of such property qualifications is certainly not due to any
belief in Jefferson's free and equal doctrine. It is due rather to the
fact that the members of the convention could not agree on the nature
and amount of the qualifications. Naturally, a landed qualification was
suggested, but for obvious reasons it was rejected. Although it was
satisfactory to the landed gentry of the South, it did not suit the
financial, commercial, and manufacturing gentry of the North. If it was
high, the latter would be excluded; if it was low, it would let in the
populistic farmers who had already made so much trouble in the state
legislatures with paper-money schemes and other devices for "relieving
agriculture." One of the chief reasons for calling the convention
and framing the Constitution was to promote commerce and industry and to
protect personal property against the depredations of Jefferson's noble
freeholders. On the other hand, a personal property qualification, high
enough to please merchant princes like Robert Morris or Nathaniel Gorham
would shut out Southern planters. Again, an alternative of land or
personal property, high enough to afford safeguards to large interests,
would doubtless bring about the rejection of the whole Constitution by
the troublemaking farmers who had to pass upon the question of
ratification.
Nevertheless, by the system of checks and balances placed in the
government, the convention safeguarded the interests of property against
attacks by majorities. The House of Representatives, Mr. Hamilton
pointed out, "was so formed as to render it particularly the
guardian of the poorer orders of citizens," while the Senate was to
preserve the rights of property and the interests of the minority
against the demands of the majority. In the tenth number of The
Federalist, Mr. Madison argued in a philosophic vein in support of the
proposition that it was necessary to base the political system on the
actual conditions of "natural inequality." Uniformity of
interests throughout the state, he contended, was impossible on account
of the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of
property originated; the protection of these faculties was the first
object of government; from the protection of different and unequal
faculties of acquiring property the possession of different degrees and
kinds of property immediately resulted; from the influence of these on
the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensued a division
of society into different interests and parties; the unequal
distribution of wealth inevitably led to a clash of interests in which
the majority was liable to carry out its policies at the expense of the
minority; hence, he added, in concluding this splendid piece of logic, "the
majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered
by their number and local situation unable to concert and carry into
effect schemes of oppression"; and in his opinion, it was the great
merit of the newly framed Constitution that it secured the rights of the
minority against "the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority."
This very system of checks and balances, which is undeniably the
essential element of the Constitution, is built upon the doctrine that
the popular branch of the government cannot be allowed full sway, and
least of all in the enactment of laws touching the rights of property.
The exclusion of the direct popular vote in the election of the
President; the creation, again by indirect election, of a Senate which
the framers hoped would represent the wealth and conservative interests
of the country, and the establishment of an independent judiciary
appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Senate -- all
these devices bear witness to the fact that the underlying purpose of
the Constitution was not the establishment of popular government by
means of parliamentary majorities.
Page after page of The Federalist is directed to that portion of the
electorate which was disgusted with the "mutability of public
councils." Writing on the presidential veto, Hamilton says: "The
propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights and
absorb the powers of other departments has already been suggested and
repeated....It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws
included the power of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one
purpose as well as the other. But this objection will have little weight
with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy
and mutability in the laws which form the greater blemish in the
character and genius of our governments. They will consider every
institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making and to keep
things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period,
as more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater
stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be
done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the
advantage of preventing a number of bad ones."
When the framers of the Constitution had completed the remarkable
instrument which was to establish a national government capable of
discharging effectively certain great functions and checking the
propensities of popular legislatures to attack the rights of private
property, a formidable task remained before them -- the task of securing
the adoption of the new frame of government by states torn with popular
dissentions. They knew very well that the state legislatures which had
been so negligent in paying their quotas [of money] under the Articles
of Confederation and which had been so jealous of their rights, would
probably stick at ratifying such a national instrument of government.
Accordingly, they cast aside that clause in the Articles requiring
amendments to be ratified by the legislatures of all of the states; and
advised that the new Constitution should be ratified by conventions in
the several states composed of delegates chosen by the voters. It was
largely because the framers of the Constitution knew the temper and
class bias of the state legislatures that they arranged that the new
Constitution should be ratified by conventions. They furthermore
declared -- and this is an fundamental matter -- that when the
conventions of nine states had ratified the Constitution the new
government should go into effect so far as those states were concerned.
The chief reason for resorting to ratifications by conventions is laid
down by Hamilton in Federalist 22:
"It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the
existing federal system that it never had a ratification by the people.
Resting on no better foundation that the consent of the several
legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions
concerning the validity of its powers; and has in some instances given
birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing
its ratification to the law of a state, it has been contended that the
same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However
gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a party to a compact has a
right to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has respectable
advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature proves the
necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper
than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American
empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people.
The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure
original foundation of all legitimate authority."
Of course, the convention did not resort to the revolutionary policy of
transmitting the Constitution directly to the conventions of the several
states. It merely laid the finished instrument before the Confederate
Congress with the suggestion that it should be submitted to "a
convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof,
under the recommendation of its legislature, for them assent and
ratification; and each convention assenting thereto and ratifying the
same should give notice thereof to the United States in Congress
assembled." The convention went on to suggest that when nine states
had ratified the Constitution, the Confederate Congress should
extinguish itself by making provisions for the elections necessary to
put the new government into effect....
After the new Constitution was published and transmitted to the states,
there began a long and bitter fight over ratification. A veritable flood
of pamphlet literature descended upon the country, and a collection of
these pamphlets by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, brought together under
the title of The Federalist -- though clearly a piece of campaign
literature -- has remained a permanent part of the contemporary sources
on the Constitution and has been regarded by many lawyers as a
commentary second in value only to the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Within a year the champions of the new government found themselves
victorious, for on June 21, 1788, the ninth state, New Hampshire,
ratified the Constitution, and accordingly the new government might go
into effect as between the agreeing states. Within a few weeks, the
nationalist party in Virginia and New York succeeded in winning these
two states, and in spite of the fact that North Carolina and Rhode
Island had not yet ratified the Constitution, Congress determined to put
the instrument into effect in accordance with the recommendations of the
convention.
|