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Fumes of the Yellow [Sulphur] Monopoly
Helen Bernstein
[Reprinted from The Freeman, September, 1940]
The rate of profit of a monopoly far outstrips the average rate of
profit; the cost of production of a monopolized product seldom bears a
relation to the price, whereas in the competitive field the two are
seldom far apart; a monopoly price usually pits tight while other
prices are falling.
One of the neatest, most profitable and least conspicuous monopolies
under which workers throughout the world suffer is the sulphur
monopoly. It is a small but perfect specimen. Dr. Montgomery of the
University of Texas tells its exciting story in a little book called
The Brimstone Game.
Sulphur is most important as a raw material in the manufacture of
sulphuric acid. This magical reagent is indispensable in the
preparation of fertilizers, illuminating gas, soap, storage batteries,
paper, ink, lead pencils, and celluloid. It is used in the manufacture
of steel, dynamite, dyestuffs, medicinals, in the ceramic arts, the
packing industry, in the purification of gasoline, kerosene and other
petroleum products. The rubber and rayon industries depend upon it. It
is used in electroplating and electro-deposition without which tin
cans, galvanized iron, and chromium surfacing could not be. But
because the basic raw material, sulphur, is monopolized, every
commodity dependent upon its remarkable properties will bear some
price taint of the original sin of monopoly rent.
From the Middle Ages down to the end of the nineteenth century,
Sicily was the main source of sulphur to the world. In the 1890's the
mining methods were the same as those described by the prophet Isaiah
three thousand years ago. There were over 700 small independent mines
in Sicily out of which 25,000 workmen earned a degraded living.
Competition was severe and the price was unstable. In the depression
of the 1890's, the price fell from $23 a ton in 1891 to $12 a ton in
1895.
The conditions resulting from this economic disaster brought the
threat of revolution to Sicily and considerable alarm to British
interests which controlled the sulphur-using industries in Europe.
These interests succeeded in 1896 in doing for the sulphur producers
what they had been unable to do for themselves, namely, organize them.
The new Anglo-Sicilian Company contracted to handle the sales of
sulphur for ten years and guaranteed a minimum price of $15 per ton at
the mine, provided production were stringently limited. As sulphur was
then selling for $10, the company managed to secure options on 85% of
the output. This was the first sulphur monopoly.
Within a year, at the very bottom of the depression prices rose by
more than 50% and were maintained at an average of $18 per ton for
almost 10 years.
This state of affairs might have gone on indefinitely had it not been
for the work of an obscure Standard Oil chemist, Herman Frasch. In
1865 oil prospects discovered huge deposits of almost pure sulphur in
Louisiana, Three attempts to mine the yellow substance failed because
the deposit was overlaid by a blanket of bard limestone and gypsum,
which was in turn covered by quicksand and sea mud, Engineers had
declared the mining hopeless -- when Frasch came out with a technique
peculiarly adapted to these very conditions. He secured a patent, and
after the discovery of a vast oil-fuel field near the sulphur beds,
organized the Union Sulphur Company and began operations in 1901.
Doubly protected by a patent and the possession of a natural
resource, the new company proceeded to rid itself of the
Anglo-Sicilian Company. It slashed prices from $22 per ton to $16; by
1906 it had captured the American and North European markets. Over one
hundred Sicilian mines closed down. The Anglo-Sicilian Company did not
renew its contracts. In despair, the Italian government sent a royal
commission to Louisiana to investigate this destroying rival. To their
even greater despair, they discovered that Union was producing at a
cost of $3.48 a ton and could sell anywhere in America at $7.72 a ton
-- less than one-half the cost of production of the best Sicilian
mines.
The Italians attempted to reach an agreement but refused to meet all
of Union's terms. Union slashed the price to $14. Whereupon the
Italians played their last card. A compulsory sales pool was organized
and backed by a ten million lire government subsidy. It was relieved
of taxes and its freight rates were reduced. The pool, the Consorizio
Obligatorio Per I'lndustria Solfifera Siciliana, rashly cut to $12 per
ton, disastrously low despite the subsidies.
In 1907 Frasch went to Rome and reached an agreement with a badly
frightened Consorzio. Union was allotted the North American market and
one-third of the north European. Italy was reserved for the Italians.
A minimum price was set at $18.50, to be reached by 1908, to be
boosted to $22.50 by June 1, 1909.
On a public occasion Frasch commented on this deal in these words: "Fortunately
the (Union) Company is owned by a few broad-minded and big-hearted men
who could not be induced to tiring starvation and ruin upon 25,000
people dependent upon the mining of sulphur in Sicily." This is
small consolation to millions of farmers who pay more than 10% of
their gross income for fertilizer, (to say nothing of the rest of the
consumers, of sulphur products), putting millions of dollars of
monopoly rent into the pockets of -- not the Sicilian miners -- but
certain interested parties in the United States.
Through its patents Union had complete mastery of the American
industry from 1903 to 1913. The value of this monopoly is hidden in
obscure and indefinite data. Some obtainable figures are indicative.
The Italian Commission reported costs to be $3.48, but did not list
the items included. Mining Industry calculated costs at $3.75 a ton,
which included depreciation of the plant and equipment but not of the
deposit itself. The company's own reports in Moody's Manual show that
costs in 1907-13 fluctuated between $3.75-$4.50, which included all
costs except interest on the investment. Throughout this period the
price stayed at $18 f. o. b. the mine, which would indicate a profit
of $13.50-14.25 per ton. In 1913 -- Dr. Montgomery furnishes this data
-- 491,000 tons were produced at a profit of $13.85 per ton;
indicating that the above figures were not far off.
Dr. Thurmond L. Morrison in his Economics of the Sulphur Industry
(University of Texas, 1938) expresses the belief that during this
period "
annual profits, expressed as a percentage of total
investment, made by Union Sulphur Company fluctuated between 150% and
400%"! Another indication of the huge profits made by Union is
the fact that, though it began operations with a capital stock of only
$200,000, by 1913 it had accumulated in leases, townsites, plant and
equipment, properties worth about $1,900,000, apparently the product
of reinvested profits.
However, Union was unable to maintain its hegemony in the sulphur
world. In 1906 an attempt had been made to work a large sulphur dome
in Texas by the Frasch process. Union sued for patent infringement and
after years of litigation the Federal Circuit Court of Philadelphia
held that the techniques originally covered by the patent were
unpatentable. The Freeport Sulphur Company was organized in 1913; but
during the World War the tremendous demand for explosives for which
sulphur is essential prevented any outbreak of competition, and the
price was maintained at $18 per ton until 1917. After our entry into
the war the price of sulphur was fixed at $22.50, informally at first
by the Chemical Committee of the Council of National Defense and then
by the War Industries Board. The Federal Trade Commission at this time
reported that the cost of production to Freeport was $6.15 per ton and
to Union $5.75. Conscripts may be sacrificed; but not profits.
The supply of sulphur, great as it was, could not fully meet the
requirements of warfare and so a new giant entered into the sulphur
field, the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company. Theodore J. Krepa, an
outstanding authority on the subject, asserts in his "Economics
of the Sulphuric Acid Industry" that "
the War
Industries Board marshalled the resources of the United States
government behind the effort to develop a reliable and sufficient
supply of domestic sulphur," and indeed it is generally believed
that some form of government subsidy acted as midwife at the birth of
Texas Gulf, although the company itself has always denied the charge.
At any rate, it constructed the largest and most efficient
Frasch-process plant the industry had ever known.
The War -Industries Board released its price control in 1919, war
orders were no more, the industry was left with tremendously over -
expanded plants and a huge accumulation of stock over-ground. A period
of competition among giants set in and for several years after the war
the average price varied from $15.11 to $19.76 a ton. In 1922 peace
was declared. The Sulphur Export Company (Sulexo) was formed under the
Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, which permitted American corporations in
any line of industry to combine their export businesses. Exports were
allocated among Union, Texas and Freeport. However, the formation of
this combination served also in some mysterious way to prevent price
competition not only in foreign markets but in domestic markets. The
following year, Sulexo and Consorzio formed a new alliance, which
constituted a virtual world monopoly. Prices rose to a minimum of $18
a ton and there they have remained through wars, revolutions and
depressions.
How profitable has Texas Gulf Sulphur been since its formation? The
figures are almost beyond belief. Professor Montgomery, using the
company's reports in Moody's Manual, shows that about four million had
been invested in plant and equipment during the first ten years of
active operations. Originally 635,-000 shares of common stock were
issued, having a total par value of $6,350,000, During the past
eighteen years Texas has paid a total of $124,117,500 in cash
dividends on this stock, which amounts to 95.46% per year on the basis
of the original value of the stock! In addition to this concrete
evidence, the company has spent $15,613,000 in leases, in exploration
work, in buildings and equipment -- all expenditures coming out of
profit. The company has eighteen other deposits which are not being
worked at the present time. It has reserves of recoverable sulphur at
Boling Dome alone valued at $45,000,000. It has had enough left over
to pay vast sums to landowners, leaseholders and other
tribute-collecters. On January 1, 1939 the company had 3,289,728 tons
of sulphur in its stock piles above ground; with a market value of
more than $52,000,000. E. D. Kennedy in "Dividends to Pay"
points out that the Texas Gulf Company now makes $1 profit on every $2
of sales. In the period between 1926 and 1935, its sales totalled
$206,000,000 out of which it made a net profit of $103,-000,000.
Monopoly privilege enabled it to net during the worst depression
America has ever experienced a mere 50% on its gross!
The evil effects of this monopoly are almost self-evident. Labor and
capital are shut off from the opportunity to produce sulphur in that
plentiful supply that a healthy market would demand. This in turn is
felt in all the industries which require sulphur in their
manufacturing processes and which must consequently raise their prices
and cut down demand. Labor and capital are pressed into service in
sadly over-exploited fields, like agriculture, where returns are at
best precarious and poor, while a few pockets the fruits of privilege
on the sunnier side of the vicious circle.
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