.
| Fairness
and the Compromise of John Stuart Mill |
| [Reprinted from Land
& Liberty, September-October 1981] |
There are countless examples throughout history where the forces of
logical thought and clearly perceived moral principles have suffered at
the hands of political expediency or entrenched interests.
Herbert Spencer's views on the injustice of private property in land[1]
at first so clearly and logically stated, as to leave no doubt
whatsoever as to his meaning, were many years later retracted - with
less logic and clarity.[2]
It is arguable that this retraction was the result of self-deception
rather than self-interest. John Stuart Mill, however, a logician of some
renown. presented his logical contradiction in one volume.[3] In the
battle of logic and principle versus appeasement of the land-owning
interest (based on a misguided idea of "fairness"). logic and
principle lost the battle.
Let us first take some examples of Mill's views on private property in
land. After defining the rights of property in the products of man as
being ownership vested in the producer, Mill makes the exception that
the passage of time might preclude such rights being established because
of lack of historical evidence of original ownership. This, however,
cannot apply, he says, to the requirement not to disturb "acts of
injustice of old date. unjust systems or institutions, since a bad law
or usage is not one bad act, in the remote past. but a perpetual
repetition of bad acts, as long as the law or usage lasts."[4]
This principle applies perfectly to the question of the injustice of
the private ownership of land. As Herbert Spencer. Henry George. Thomas
Paine and others have emphasized, the passage of time cannot turn a
wrong into a right. and thus the continuing robbery of land rights of
successive generations is a violation of natural justice.
Here, Mill is explicit on property rights in land:
The essential principle of property being to assure to all
persons what they have produced by their labour and accumulated by
their abstinence, this principle cannot apply to what is not the
produce of labour, the raw material of the earth. If the land derived
its productive power wholly from nature, and not at all from industry,
or if there were any means of discriminating what is derived from each
source, it not only would not be necessary, but it would be the height
of injustice, to let the gift of nature be engrossed by a few.[5]
Mill adds that while the cultivator must be permitted to reap his crop
for the time being and the land occupied for just one season, the State
might then "be the universal landlord and the cultivators tenants
under it."[6] Mill again makes his point:
When the sacredness of property is talked of, it should
always be remembered that this sacredness does not belong in the same
degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original
inheritance of the whole species... It is some hardship to be born
into the world and to find all nature's gifts previously engrossed,
and no place left for the newcomer."[7]
Similar observations by Dove, George and others led them to the
conclusion that. in order to establish equal rights without infringing
upon the liberty of the individual. it was necessary to cornmunalise the
rent of land. Mill, however. arrived at a different conclusion. Out of
concern for the land-owner. he proposed to tax only the increase in
value which accrued between the date of the first necessary valuation
and subsequent valuations. This became known as the "increment tax."
Clearly the proposal of a mere increment tax on land values does not
square with his statement that "it would be the height of injustice
to let the gift of nature be engrossed by a few," and "no man
made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species."
Mill, in defending land owners rights to all existing values. makes
this curious statement: "The principle of property gives them (the
land owners) no right to the land. but only a right to compensation for
whatever portion of their interest in land it may be the policy of the
state to deprive them of . . . or an annual income equal to what they
derived from it."[8]
Henry George in Progress & Poverty, commenting on Mill's
proposal for an increment tax. Says:
To say nothing of the practical difficulties which such
cumbrous plans involve, in the extension of the functions of
government which they would require and the corruption they would
beget. their inherent and essential defect lies in the impossibility
of bridging over by any compromise the radical difference between
wrong and right. Just in proportion as the interests of the land
holders are conserved, just in that proportion must general interests
and general rights be disregarded. and if land holders are to lose
nothing of their special privileges. the people at large can gain
nothing. To buy up individual property rights would merely be to give
the land holders in another form a claim to the same kind and amount
that their possession of land now gives them; it would be to raise for
them by taxation the same proportion of the earnings of labour and
capital that they are now enabled to appropriate in rent. Their unjust
advantage would be preserved and the unjust disadvantage of the
non-landholders would be continued.
George adds that while Mill's proposal would not add to the injustice
of the present distribution of wealth. it would not remedy it but he has
no time for expediency and compromise in matters of justice: "Justice
in men's mouths is cringingly humble when she first begins a protest
against a time-honoured wrong. and we of the English-speaking nations
still wear the collar of the Saxon thrall, and have been educated to
look upon the 'vested rights' of land owners with all the superstitious
reverence that ancient Egyptians looked upon the crocodile."[10]
George spells it out thus:
"If the land of any country belong to the people of
that country. what right. in morality and justice, have the
individuals called land owners to the rent?"[11]
To implement John Stuart Mill's increment tax on land values instead of
instituting justice is to pull out the top of a bad tooth and leave the
root to fester and poison the system.
REFERENCES
1. Social Statics, 1850, Robert
Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, and Land & Liberty Press, London.
2. A Perplexed Philosopher, Henry George, Land & Liberty
Press.
3. Principles of Political Economy, full edition, London:
George Routledge.
4. Ibid, p.156.
5. Ibid, p.162.
6. Itid.p.163.
7. Ibid,p.165.
8. Ibid.
9. Progress and Poverty. Robert Scbalkenback Foundation, 15th
edition, p.362.
10. Ibid, p.362.
11. Ibid,p.363.
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