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History as it Might Have Been
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| [Reprinted from the
pamphlet titled, "The Effective Answer to Communism,"
published by the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1958] |
THE MARXJST-LENINIST-STAL1NIST ECONOMJC PHILOSOPHY is to the effect
that labor produces all that is produced. Income from property is
'surplus value." It is robbery of the workers. It is "exploitation
of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie." Adherents of this
philosophy manifest, in general, little or no interest in
differentiating between the capital that, by working and saving, men
produce to aid them in further production and, on the other hand,
natural resources, urban sites, and tracts of land usable for
agriculture, forestry and grazing. All income from material property is
equally "surplus value" and is equally robbery of the workers.
Whatever this philosophy may lack in sophistication, it has the appeal
of simplicity. It can be -- in large degree it has been- "sold"
to discontented workers and to considerable numbers of the "intelligentsia"
in many parts of the world. Its contemporary supporters "explain"
the "class struggle," the recurrence of business depression,
and the "inevitability" of socialism, all on the basis of this
two-fold division of the product of industry between owners and workers.
A few simple formulas or dogmas, and the injustices and inadequacies of
"capitalism" have been accounted for!
But those opponents of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist philosophy who
receive the most publicity and seem to have the most support among
conservatives -- including some who call themselves "libertarians"
-- are also prone to a similar simplicity. They, too, make no
distinction between capital and land, as such. They, also, see no
essential distinction between private enjoyment of income from the one
and private enjoyment of income from the other. They do not, like the
Marxists, denounce these incomes as exploitative but, on the contrary,
defend them both, and are usually found favoring lighter tax burdens on
both. Insofar as they are willing to concede that property or the income
from property should be taxed, they favor taxing capital and land at the
same rate.
There is, however, a third economic philosophy, a philosophy that does
distinguish between capital and land and between the incomes yielded by
the one and by the other. Adherents of this philosophy stress the
thought that, since man-made capital can come into existence only as
there is work and saving, and since capital adds to the productiveness
of industry, the private enjoyment of income from capital is a
desirable-and a deserved-incentive to bringing capital into existence.
But adherents of this philosophy look with less kindly eyes on the
private enjoyment of income from land, purely as such, and favor having
an increasing amount of such income taxed into the public treasury. For
the private enjoyment of such income appears, to those of this
philosophy, as a requirement from landowners that others pay them for
permission to use the earth. More specifically, they think of land rent
as a required payment to landowners for the latter's permitting the
payers to work on, to live on and to draw subsoil deposits from the
earth -- or, at any rate, on and from those parts of the earth which
geological forces and community development have made relatively
productive and livable.
Is there in fact, or is there not, significant reason for
distinguishing between the capital that, by working and saving, men
produce to aid them in further production and, on the other hand,
natural resources, sites and tracts? Is there, in short, good reason for
distinguishing between capital and land?
Among the professional economists who seem to feel that there is no
such distinction of any real consequence, is Professor Frank H. Knight
of the University of Chicago. Here is the way he has expressed this
view:[1]
"It is of the very conception of economic behavior
that, in so far as the individual knows what he is doing, the 'return'
from any activity, as estimated by himself, will be equal to the
outgo, in terms of the individual's own estimate of the next best
alternative of the resources employed. Any return amounting to more or
less than 'cost,' in this sense (which is the only sense having any
intelligible meaning), is due to accident or miscalculation -- i.e.,
to the speculative element in the activity. There is no evidence, a
priori or empirical, either (a) that speculative activity yields a
larger return, in any representative sample of cases, than does
activity where the results are actually in accord with expectations,
or (b) that land acquisition or holding presents anything peculiar in
comparison with other economic activities. Every type of speculative
element is familiar in connection with land and also in other
connections."
Probably most people, other than economists, are so habituated to
classing land with capital and to regarding income from the one as
similar to income from the other, that it practically never occurs to
them to attempt making any significant distinction.
Nevertheless, it may help to bring home the distinction between manmade
capital and land, to some who are thus habituated and to some of those
who are inclined to go along with Professor Knight, if I venture to use
what may appear, superficially, to be a far-fetched illustration. For
though superficially the illustration may appear far-fetched, it is in
fact closely analogous to, if not almost identical with, the case
regarding land. Indeed, though this illustration is not history, it is
what history might easily have been.[2]
Let us suppose, then, that navigable rivers and lakes have long been
recognized as subject to private ownership, as well as land, and that
large personal incomes have been securable from charging ships for
permission to sail on them. This would indeed be exploitative and would
certainly not be to the general advantage. Yet here, too, the rate of
return over "cost1" to the owners, might well be not more
than-might even be less than-the ordinary return on the capital that men
make. And if we cannot assume a return greater than the ordinary per
cent on 'cost" for those who may have bought out the first owners
or the descendants of these owners, neither can we assume a greater
return to these owners (or their descendants) themselves. For however
the first owners acquired their ownership, whether by force, by bribery,
or through some legally sanctioned method, there was presumably some
sort of "cost" involved. (Conceivably, in certain
circumstances where public sentiment was not wholly approving, a
troubled conscience might have been. a considerable part of this "cost.")
And the prospective owner would have been ready to meet this cost
whenever or as soon as it was justified by the anticipated returns.
More specifically, let us now suppose that, some hundreds of years ago,
legal sanction regularly attached to perpetual control of a lake --
e.g., Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, Lake Huron, Lake Michigan or Lake
Superior -- provided only that certain formalities were first attended
to, and that these formalities included rowing three times around the
lake and performing certain incantations at the end of every third mile.
This would certainly mean, so far as any would-be owner was concerned, a
"cost" of acquisition.
Now let us assume the future income from such ownership, of millions of
dollars a year, to be confidently anticipated by two or more aspirants
for ownership. Then each of these would be ready to do the rowing,
bearing all the incident toil and danger, and to perform the required
incantations, on the earliest date when it could be said to pay. In
other words, they would be willing to do this as soon as the present
capitalized value of the future income such ownership was expected to
yield, became equal to the cost of so acquiring ownership.
Then Dr. Knight could piously pronounce with regard to such ownership
of Lake Erie or Lake Huron, as with regard to ownership in land -- or in
slaves! -- that "there is no evidence, a priori or empirical, . . .
that the acquisition or holding of a lake -- or of slaves -- presents
anything peculiar in comparison with other economic activities. Every
type of speculative activity is familiar in connection with lakes -- or
slaves -- and also in other connections."
But such pronouncement would have no bearing on the question whether
deriving private income from charging men to use (say) Lake Michigan --
or any other navigable lake or river -- was socially desirable or was in
any significant way analogous to deriving private income from productive
capital the construction of which private saving has made possible.
Whatever the cost of acquiring title to Lake Michigan, there has been no
service to the community from this acquisition, nor any service to
future users of the lake who must now pay large annual sums for
permission to use it. Whatever the advantages to commerce of Lake
Michigan and its harbors, these advantages are not services rendered by
the owner (or owners) of the lake. They are not due to his effort. They
are not the consequence of his construction of capital. They do not
result from and are not enhanced by the fact of his having rowed three
times around the lake nor of his having performed the specified
incantations nor by any such action on the part of any ancestor or other
previous holder of title. The difference between receiving private
income from such "property" and from capital which his own
productive labor and saving have made possible, is fundamental and
profound. It is this sort of difference on which the land-value-taxation
theory is based.
The man who acquired title several hundred years back may have
realized-through his heirs-no more than or even less than the ordinary
rate of return on cost, the return which he could normally have
realized, in the average case, by bringing into existence new and useful
capital. The important point is that, though the per cent return thus
received may be, on the average, no greater, and may sometimes be less,
nevertheless this return cannot be justified on the basis of equivalent
contribution to those who must pay it; whereas the return on capital can
normally be so justified.
If now, at some date say fifty or a hundred years or more after title
has been gained by means of the prescribed rowing and incantations, the
property is sold to a new purchaser, the price paid will presumably be
fixed on the basis of the then anticipated future yield. The new owner,
therefore, having purchased the lake at a price fixed by capitalization
of this anticipated income, will also make, unless calculations have
been inaccurate, only the ordinary rate of return. But anything he so
receives, be it only one tenth of one per cent on his investment, or
even much less than the investment, is at the expense of the common' run
of folks irom whom it is really drawn and who gain absolutely nothing
from the fact that the new exploiter may have paid a substantial amount
to the previous exploiter whom he has thus bought out.
Just because the dominant influences in government some hundreds of
years back had established such a system and just because the exploited
common folks -- whether from intellectual confusion furthered by
interested propaganda, or other cause -- had allowed the system to
continue until the present, it would be argued by apologists of the
system that those exploited by it must let it continue forever. Or it
would be contended -- in effect -- that those who were being exploited
by it must do nothing to change the system unless they first fully
compensated their exploiters for henceforth giving up the privilege of
thus exploiting them. The victims of the system must remain victims
forever or must themselves pay for their own relief -- as slaves might
be expected, if they were to go free, to pay their owners what the
slaves had been worth as slaves! And so the only method or methods of
terminating the system which could be regarded as in any sense
politically feasible or practicable, would be ruled out at the start.
The parallelism with the present land system and the private enjoyment
of the geologically-produced and community-produced rent of land is, in
all essential respects, complete.
Time was when the American Declaration of Independence and the struggle
of the American states for freedom from political domination by Great
Britain, stirred the imaginations of liberty loving people in many other
countries. Today we seek allies and sympathizers in our ideological
struggle against the socialistically regimented countries of the
communist bloc. Will it help us in this ideological struggle, will it
stir enthusiasm for capitalism, if in the "capitalism" that we
practice and that we urge upon others, there must be included vast
private income derived from charging (1) for permission to use -- and
history might have been such as to make it so -- navigable lakes and
streams, or (2) for permission -- and this is the way history really has
made it -- to work on and to live on the earth?
FOOTNOTES
1. In a review of George Raymond
Geiger's book, "The Philosophy of Henry George," Journal
of Political Economy, October, 1933.
2. The next nine paragraphs are taken, but with some change in wording,
from my Basic Principles of Economics, 3rd edition, Columbia,
Mo. (Lucas Bros.), 1955, Vol. II, Ch. VII, pp. 86-89.
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