.
Land Value Taxation and the Rights
of Property
|
| [Reprinted from the
pamphlet, "The Effective Answer to Communism," published
by the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1958] |
HIGH LAND VALUE TAXATION tends to force good land into use and thus to
make the rent of land lower. It offers more incentive to saving and to
investment in the production of useful capital. It encourages increase
of capital in the land-value-tax communities. It thus better provides
labor with both land and capital, thereby makes labor more productive
and tends toward higher wages. It lowers the expense of housing for
those who must be tenants and lowers the sale prices of homes for
would-be home owners. It makes easier, because less expensive, the
providing of children's playgrounds and public parks. Why do our
teachers and textbook writers in economics, with relatively few
exceptions, either attempt to discredit the theoretical case for this
reform while ignoring the impressive supporting data from Australia,[1]
or else completely ignore the theory, the data and the subject?
In this connection it may be especially appropriate to examine an
objection to the land-value-tax policy, which seems to have been the one
most stressed by the textbooks. The objection in question to introducing
additional taxes on land values or to increasing taxes on land values
relatively to other taxes2 is that to do so would be 'unjust. A common
way of putting the thought, has been to say that for a state or
community to retain the rent of land might have been right and proper if
this had been done from the very beginning. It could have been right, in
this view, only if the policy had been begun when there was no land rent
and when no one had paid for any land a sum based on any future
expectations which the introduction of such a tax would-or might-prevent
him from realizing. But, it is said, when men have purchased land on the
assumption-based on custom and perhaps on very long custom-that it will
not be taxed more heavily in relation to other property values or
incomes in the future than it has been in the past, then the
introduction of a land value tax system or of any relative increase of
taxation of land values is "unjust" and, therefore,
inadmissible.
In general, teachers and writers of textbooks in economics seem to have
followed in this matter the lead of Francis A. Walker who was a
contemporary of Henry George. Walker referred to Henry George's proposal
as "this precious of villainy"[2] and added: "I will not
insult my readers by discussing a project so steeped in infamy."
Contemporary textbook writers who are, in practical effect, seeking to
indoctrinate their student readers with the Walker viewpoint -- or to
assure their conservatively-minded fellow professors of their own safely
conservative attitude? -- are indeed, as a rule, somewhat less truculent
in their phraseology. But the essential thought is still there. Thus,
Professor Shorey Peterson says:[3] a "Confiscating rent would
destroy the value of land; and its present owners, for the most part,
are not the ones who held it when it acquired its value." What is
meant by this statement if there is not at least an implication that it
is wrong to adopt a land value tax policy alter early owners have sold
land at a profit to later owners? And is there not the same implication
when Professor Ralph H. Blodgett, after noting the contention that many
landowners "have managed to escape with the booty," concludes
his discussion by asserting that "a number of ethical and practical
obstacles would stand in the way of a program for socializing economic
rent."[4] Certainly there is nothing in Professor Blodgett's
presentation to suggest to his student readers that he could
effectively, or would wish to, defend the land value tax policy. The
view of objectors -- really the Walker view -- has "the last word."
So far as one can judge, neither Walker nor the many teachers and
writers of economics who are his present-day prototypes, would be
willing to concede that any increases in any other tax or taxes, or any
other changes in public policy, weaken in the slightest the case for
their presumption that taxes on land valises will not be and must not be
increased relatively to taxes on real estate improvements and other
capital. To them the frequent and, often, considerable relative changes
in other taxes, do not create a reasonable presumption that land value
taxes might sometime be relatively increased. These changes do not
suggest to them that buyers of land should be regarded as having bought
it on any such presumption. Instead they retain the firm conviction that
no other change in taxation policy or in any other public policy,
creates the slightest presumption that this particular change will ever
be made or that it can, justifiably, ever be made.
In 1913 the Pennsylvania legislature established the Pittsburgh and
Scranton graded tax system, providing that the city tax rate on
buildings should become, in 1914, only 90 per cent of the tax rate on
land; that in 1916 it should become 80 per cent; in 1919, 70 per cent;
in 1922, 60 per cent, and in 1925, 50 per cent In the view of those
economists who follow the lead of Walker, the Pennsylvania legislature
thus committed a sinful act. Will they now say that this law itself
created no presumption that further laws of the same sort might sometime
he passed and could reasonably be passed?
In the view of Walker's contemporary followers-who seem to be the
dominant group among economics teachers and textbook writers -- buyers
of land purchase it with an implied "pledge" that the
particular change to a very heavy land value tax will never be made
either suddenly or gradually. The followers of Walker hold this view
regardless of the multiplicity and magnitude of other tax and policy
changes. And they hold this view even though there are some cases of
increase of land value taxation itself, as in the cases of Pittsburgh
and Scranton. They do not seriously entertain the idea, whatever risks
are taken by others in our economic set-up, that any buyer of land can
be fairly regarded as "taking a risk" of his future net rent
or the future price of his land being lowered by an increase,
relatively, of the tax rate on land. To subject him to such a risk, they
feel, is "unjust," is "a precious piece of villainy"
or, as one widely known economics teacher and writer expressed it to me
in a private letter, "pretty raw."
II
DESCRIBING "Pittsburgh's Graded Tax in Full Operation,"[5]
Percy R. Williams (later chief assessor of Pittsburgh) said that, in "a
typical residential district," this plan of taxing the land more
heavily than the buildings involved a lower tax burden for 99.2 per cent
of the homes than if the city had raised the same revenue by taxing at
the same rate both buildings and land. The owners of homes in this
district were, it appears, definitely benefited. Ought they to have
received, also, "compensation" because of the higher tax on
their land? Or was the lower tax on their improvements a sort of
compensation?
A land value tax system does operate in the direction of lowering the
sale price of land. Hence a home owner, even though his annual tax
burden has been reduced, might argue that if he were to sell his land,
he would have to accept a lower price for it. But on the other hand, if
he sold his home in order to buy another home, also in the land value
tax jurisdiction, he would be able to buy at a lower price than if land
value taxation were not in effect.
Should the evidence from Australian experience begin to influence
American opinion toward a similar policy, we can be very sure that such
a policy would not be put into effect completely and at once all over
the United States. It would be tried sooner in some cities, counties and
states, not so soon in others; also, the policy might be applied in much
or all of some states before it was applied in any parts of other
states. And this probability may have a bearing on our problem. For the
rather extensive data from Australia seem to indicate that capital
investment flows into -- and it certainly increases in -- the cities,
districts and states where land values are taxed rather than buildings,
machinery, orchards (the extra value over that of the bare land),
trucks, fertilization of land, and other man-made capital. In those
cities, districts and states, the total value of improvements for (on an
average) each land taxpayer is vastly greater. In those cities,
districts and states there has been a great deal more construction of
dwellings and of buildings in general and less land held from use.
Of course landowners, purely as landowners, have to pay higher taxes in
the jurisdictions where land value is taxed more heavily and where the
capital that men make is not taxed. But those among them -- the majority
-- who own capital as well as land, are largely compensated and may, in
many cases, enjoy a sizable net advantage, because their improvements
and other capital are not taxed at all.
If it is contended that the owners of vacant land would, in general,
suffer a net loss from the adoption of a land value tax system, it can
also be said that the holding of good land out of use brings increased
cost of housing, increased congestion and economic loss to the
community. Can we effectively prevent the waste and loss from this
speculative holding, if we insist that neither through our tax system
nor in any other way must we visit upon those who thus hold land from
use, any significant penalty?
It is possible, however, that advantage will sometimes accrue from the
adoption of a land value tax policy in a city, county or state, even to
an owner of a vacant lot who has no improvements on it at; all and has
been hitherto impeding the growth and development of the community by
holding it out of use. For the removal of taxation from improvements and
all other capital means that the net per cent income from improvements
and other capital in that community compared with the net income they
yield in communities still operating under the old system, will be, at
least for a time, definitely higher.
To illustrate, suppose that the yield from capital (before subtracting
taxes) has been averaging 8 per cent and that the tax on it has taken 3
per cent, leaving only 5 per cent to the investor. But now capital in
the land value tax community is no longer taxed and owners who improve
their land can hope to receive the entire 8 per cent. But investors in
communities where capital is still being taxed as before, can hope to
make only 3 per cent after taxes; and for the most part they are not
likely to recognize quickly the better opportunities suddenly opened in
the land value tax community. (How can they be expected to recognize
such facts quickly if their economists have never called attention to
the probabilities and if they have heard mostly the propaganda against
this tax reform? A young graduate student at a mid-west university whom
I met only recently, told me of his being warned by one of his economics
professors to give up his sym pathetic interest in it or "you'll
only blackball yourself.") Hence our vacant landowner in the
community which has now adopted the land value tax policy, if he cannot
himself save enough to improve his land, may borrow at 5 per cent or not
much over 5 per cent, from someone living where the old tax system is
still in effect and to whom anything over 5 per cent looks really good.
Throughout Queensland and New South Wales in Australia, all local
governments must follow a land value tax policy, which means that
improvements and other capital are not taxed. In South Australia and
Victoria some districts follow a land value tax policy and some do not.
It is interesting to note that the local adoption of a land value tax
policy in South Australia requires a poll of landowners. Only landowners
can vote on the matter.[6] The system cannot be introduced unless (1)
three-fifths of the landowners voting favor it and unless (2) one-half
of the total number of landowners including those who do not choose to
vote, favor adoption. Nevertheless nearly a third of the population of
South Australia live in jurisdictions having this system. It would seem,
therefore, that very many of the landowners themselves in South
Australia definitely prefer that their local governments raise from
taxes on land values alone, as much revenue as would, under the old
system, be raised by taxing both land and capital. Of course this is not
to say how many of them would prefer a system -- if they had the choice
-- that would entirely exempt them from all taxes and put the tax burden
on persons who owned no property!
Would those who contend that any change in the direction of a land
value tax system is "unjust" to landowners and an infringement
on their "vested rights," insist that if a majority of
landowners prefer a tax on land to a tax on all property, any dissenting
minority among them must be protected from the majority by (say) some
sort of constitutional prohibition?
But if the introduction of a land value tax policy in a particular
community -- or communities -- might be advantageous even to most of the
landowners in that community or those communities, it could still be
disadvantageous to many -- or perhaps all -- landowners in adjacent
communities. For capital would flow -- if other conditions were equally
satisfactory -- from the non-land-value-tax communities into the land
value tax communities. Industrial concerns would prefer-other things
equal-to build new plants in the land value tax communities rather than
in the others. The opportunities for workers, thus better supplied with
capital-and land, too, since the holding of good land out of use would
be substantially penalized -- would be better. Demand for land in the
non-land-value-tax communities would be less. Landowners in the
non-land-value-tax communities would be poorer than if the land value
tax communities had not adopted the new system. It might be appreciably
more difficult for (say) even owners of improved residential land to
find tenants.
Shall we say, therefore, that the communities which have adopted the
land value tax policy have infringed on the vested rights of landowners
in non-land-value-tax communities and have thereby been guilty of
injustice? If we do say this, must we not, to be consistent, say that it
is wrong or unjust for the people of any community to seek in any other
way to make their community so productive and prosperous, or so clean,
well landscaped and beautifully shaded in the summers, that it attracts
residents from other communities and thus lowers the demand for and the
value of land in those other communities?
Could it be, perhaps, that with an increasing number of jurisdictions
abolishing their taxation of improvements and other capital and,
instead, taxing land values much more heavily, many of the landowners in
the other jurisdictions would indeed become increasingly interested in
having their own cities and counties do likewise? For industrial plant
construction and increase of capital of other kinds would probably, as
Australian experience indicates, take place in the land value tax
jurisdictions. Workers, therefore, would be likely to find themselves
better equipped with capital -- as well as with land -- in those
jurisdictions, and hence more productive and able to earn more there.
This could make it increasingly difficult for owners of land in nearby
non-land-value-tax jurisdictions, to find tenants for their houses and
their store buildings.
III
BUT IT IS PERHAPS HIGH TIME for us to turn from these various side
issues (as they may be called) and concentrate on the logical
implications of the Francis A. Walker viewpoint. Let us examine this
viewpoint carefully, seeking a really tenable ethics, a really tenable
philosophy of society and of individual rights and duties in society in
so far as they relate to the justice of substantial increase of land
value taxation. In making such an examination, we must raise a number of
rather fundamental questions:
1. If "society" is under an obligation -- a "pledge"
-- to make no changes in tax policy which would be detrimental to
landowners as such, just what is the precise nature of this "pledge
?" It does not seem to be contended, in general, that "society"
has made any formal pledge that the tax system will never be changed in
this direction, although there may conceivably have been, at one time or
another and at some place oi other, some group or "bloc"
temporarily in power which has assumed thus to speak for the entire
society. The thought of those who hold to the doctrine of an obligation
or "pledge" appears rather to be that the long continuance of
a system of leaving to private owners the major part of the rent of
land, has somehow created a presumption -- an irrebuttable presumption?
-- of its permanent continuance. "Society" has allowed the
system to continue for generations; men have purchased land, supposedly
on the assumption that no change would be made (ever?) and at higher
prices than they might otherwise have been willing to give; "society"
has, thus, "encouraged" such purchase of land, by the very
fact of not having changed the system over a "long" period;
and by "its" silence as regards "its" intention to
change, has conveyed the implication that "it" will never
change, even by the most gradual steps, to the system of taking land
rent in taxation for public needs. Hence, for "society" to
institute such a change and thus be false to this implied "pledge"
would mean that "society" would be guilty of "a violation
of good faith," -- of a "precious piece of villainy." Is
not this the view to which Walker adhered and to which a good many
contemporary economists adhere?[7]
2. Does this principle that "society" is bound by an implied "pledge"
not to change "its" policy, apply to other matters than the
increase, relatively, of taxes on land values? Does it mean, for
example, that after having followed for years a protectionist policy, "society"
is under an implied "pledge" to continue that policy and that,
therefore, any substantial reduction of tariff duties -- unless with "compensation"
by subsidies or other privileged income-would be "a violation of
good faith" and an action "steeped in infamy?" Does it
mean that if a particular state in the United States has, because of
political pressure, bribery or mere carelessness and neglect, allowed
its public utilities to go unregulated or ineffectively regulated for
years or for decades, the final institution of effective regulation
would be "a violation of good faith?" Would it be fair to
citizens using the service, for the courts (e.g., the United States
Supreme Court) to forbid such effective regulation, on the ground that
it might "deprive of their property without due process of law"
purchasers of stock in such a monopoly who had bought this stock at
higher prices than they would have been willing to pay had they
anticipated later effective regulation? And is there a difference in the
extent to which any such implied "pledge" is a real
obligation, based on whether it is a custom of fifteen years, fifty
years or a hundred and ninety years? And just how long must a system
have continued in order that any change ought to be regarded as utterly
inadmissible?
3. Since we are told, in effect, that "society" has made an
implied "pledge," may we not fairly ask just who -- or what --
constitute "society" and whether all members of a "society"
can properly be held responsible for this "pledge?" Often --
perhaps one could properly say almost always -- some members of a "society"
disapprove of institutions and policies that others support. Can it,
then, be reasonably contended that, if those who in the past have
disapproved of slavery, of monopolistic extortion, or tariff
restrictions on exchange, or of allowing private enjoyment of the rent
of land, have long been in the minority and thus forced to accept these
institutions and policies, they cannot rightly abolish them even if and
when they get into power, without violating an implied "pledge?"
In other words, shall we say that, since "society" must not
violate this "pledge," therefore those members of society who
in the past disapproved and even, perhaps, fought against these (as they
believed) evils, but without success, are committing a sin if, when they
have the power, they abolish or partially abolish them? And if it is
truly "a violation of good faith" and, therefore, wrong, for "society"
to abolish them, is it not necessarily wrong-a "sinful act,"
an act "steeped in infamy" -- for a minority to urge the
majority thus to do wrong? Must not contemporary Walkerites logically
insist that there can be no obligation on "society" without a
similar obligation on each and all of "its" component parts?
4. Assuming a time honored system of exploitation of some by
others-whether by monopolists, by slave owners, or by owners of the
earth who can charge others for permission to work on it and to live on
it -- just how can such exploitation be ended except by taking something
away from somebody and thereby causing "society" to be guilty
of "a violation of good faith?" Consider, for example, the
abolition of slavery. If the slaves are freed by an emancipation
proclamation, has not "society" violated "its"
implied "pledge" to their owners? And if these owners are
fully compensated, must not others be taxed extra to provide the
compensation; and could not these others fairly contend that "society"
has violated "its" implied "pledge" -- based also on
long custom -- not to take income or property from them in order to
compensate slave owners? Or should the slave owners be, indeed,
compensated, but only by making the slaves pay them the compensation, --
i. e., by making the slaves buy their freedom?
Analogously, how about compensation to owners of the earth who are in a
strategic position to make others pay them for their permission to work
on and to live on the earth, in those locations made desirable by
geological forces and by community growth and development, and to draw
from the earth subsoil deposits? If this condition is ended by the
adoption of a land value tax policy, those who argue for "compensation"
to the to-be-henceforth more heavily taxed landowners, certainly do not
get to the heart of the question when they assert that "society"
should provide such compensation. Inquiry is needed as regards just who
should or would provide it. Insofar as landowners do not themselves
provide for their own compensation by (collectively) paying from one
pocket into another, the compensation must be provided by the victims of
the landlord system. Victims? Why? Because this system has reduced their
net income from capital the existence of which their thrift has made
possible, lowered their' wages, made harder the transition from tenancy
to ownership, and increased rents and congestion. To say glibly that "society"
must provide compensation is to avoid facing the question of just who
would have to provide it and whether the victims of the landlord system
would have to provide much, or most, or all of it. If the victims
provided less than all, would not the Walker view have to be that there
had been "injustice," "villainy," and "a
violation of good faith" towards landowners? Why do so many of the
teachers of economics and the authors of economics textbooks completely
ignore such considerations?
5. Are the victims of an evil economic or social institution under an
ethically binding "pledge" -- because they are a part of a
society which is assumed to be under an implied "pledge' -- even
though they never consented to such an institution understandingly but
only through the misleading propaganda of its beneficiaries? And are
those also under "pledge" who never consented to it at all but
consistently opposed and protested against it? Is it not, indeed, a fact
that, throughout the history of landlordism, the rich and influential
have mostly favored it, that arguments against it and in favor of the
land value taxation policy have but rarely appeared in the public press,
and that most teachers and textbook writers in economics have either
ignored the land value tax policy or have attempted to discredit this
policy while giving but superficial consideration to the really
impressive case for it? Is it not a fact, therefore, that the victims of
the present land and tax system have had very little chance to know the
basic cause of their unhappy predicament? And shall we conclude that if
interested groups and "blocs," with the aid of ignorance,
prejudice and propaganda, succeed in establishing an exploitative
institution, then the longer its victims have suffered, the more they
are under an ethical obligation or "pledge" to continue to
suffer?
6. Are the victims of a socially undesirable institution or set-up,
under an implied "pledge" not to abolish or essentially change
it without contributing to the "compensation" of its
beneficiaries, even though this institution was established before they
were born and even though it was ignorantly -- and perhaps only tacitly
-- consented to by some of their ancestors? Does such vicarious "consent"
morally bind the present victims not to support any change that will
lower/the incomes or the property values of any of those who own the
property in question?
7. On the Walker assumption, and that of all those economics teachers
and textbook writers who contend that when a particular kind of property
has long been "sanctioned" by "society," those who
have bought such property with their "honestly earned savings"
have "an indefeasible right" to its future income and sale
value, undiminished by any change in public policy -- on this assumption
would it not be sinful a "precious piece of villainy," for
slaves to run away without reimbursing their owners? Would it not be, on
the Walker assumption, especially sinful if the slaveowners had indeed
bought their slaves with "honestly earned wealth"? And would
it not be a sin for the slaves to abolish slavery and their own
servitude without giving compensation to those whose slaves they
formerly were? Could it not even be argued that, in some parts of the
world, the slaves have -- or have had -- a vicarious responsibility for
the existence of slavery, because their ancestors approved of it and,
possibly, sold their own children -- or some of them, perhaps to obtain
food for the rest of them -- into slavery? And, to repeat a suggestion
of four paragraphs back, if the funds for compensating the slaveowners
were to be taken from others than the slaves themselves or their owners,
would this not be an "injustice," i.e., "a violation of
good faith," towards these others, who presumably acquired their
non-slave property on the basis of an implied "pledge" that
none of it would be taken from them for the purpose of abolishing a long
established system of slavery and abolishing it at the expense, wholly
or in any part, of innocent owners of non-slave property who bought this
property with their "honestly earned savings?" Is it an
evidence of intellectual penetration when economics teachers and
textbook writers ignore such considerations?
Surely the Francis A. Walker type of argument is not philosophically
tenable. It is not part of a tenable ethics. And yet it has long served,
together with a variegated lot of economic confusions and fallacies,[8]
to block serious consideration by the majority of economics teachers and
writers, of one of the most promising of economic reforms, a reform
consistent with, and tending to promote the incentives of, the free
private enterprise system.
IV
BUT NOW LET US TURN from this discussion of logical implications and
philosophical fundamentals, as such, and inquire regarding their
relevancy to the practical situation. And first, in this connection, is
there really any implied "pledge" by government or by "society"
not to change the tax system or not to change it in the particular
direction of a heavier tax on land values? The fact is that taxation has
changed so often and in so many ways as to suggest, not a long continued
and "hallowed" custom but the lack of any consistent pattern
or policy of taxation. Thus the notion of an implied "pledge"
takes on very much the appearance of a myth. And this is true even with
regard to the introduction of a land value tax policy.
Higher taxation of land than of improvements has not only had for
decades the active support of a considerable number of persons; it has
been actually introduced in a large part of Australia, in New Zealand,
in parts of Northwestern Canada, in Denmark, in South Africa, and
(through state legislation) in Pittsburgh and Scranton, Pennsylvania,
and legislation looking to the possible extension of a similar policy to
smaller cities has been passed in this state. Surely, too, despite the
usual silence on the matter -- when there is not definite antagonism-in
academic circles, there have been voices raised elsewhere to protest
vigorously against the land and taxation system of the past, a system
substantially and fundamentally wrong.
Then why is it not common sense to say that a purchaser of land does
not purchase with any "pledge" that there will be no relative
increase in the taxation of land, but that in purchasing he must be
presumed to know that this particular type of tax reform is possible as
well as other tax changes and that he assumes this risk when he
purchases?
Again, though it is indeed unreasonable to ask the victims of a bad
economic system to "compensate" those by whom they are
victimized (however innocently and even though the exploiter of Smith
has purchased from Jones the latter's position as Smith's exploiter),
the change to a land value tax system does, of itself, naturally and
justly give to many landowners in higher returns on their capital or in
greater productivity of their labor or both, substantial compensation
for their loss of land rent. Even if they do lose as landowners, some of
them will actually be more prosperous than before.
Let us again notice, here, the point raised earlier in this paper, that
in a considerable number of local jurisdictions in South Australia where
only landowners can vote on any proposal to substitute land value
taxation for taxes on land and capital both, landowners have themselves
voted to do this. Let us note again the considerable advantage to many
landowners in doing away not only with taxation of their present
improvements and other capital but also with taxation of any future
additions to their capital. Let us note again, too, how the adoption of
this system in some communities may draw investment and labor away from
other communities and thus keep down the demand for land and the price
of land in those other communities. And let us ask again whether a
policy the adoption of which furthers the development of industry and
promotes the prosperity of the communities which adopt it -- even,
perhaps, of most of the landowners in it -- must be frowned upon if it
could reduce the income of (and the value of the land owned by)
landowners in adjacent communities which continue to follow the old
system and which thus cannot offer equal inducement to industry and to
workers?
It appears from the comments they have made, that opponents of the
adoption of a land value tax system often greatly exaggerate the extent
and suddenness of loss to some landowners, likely to follow adoption of
such a system. Such opponents have, it would seem, pictured in their
imaginations, widows, orphans, and aged persons no longer able to work,
who own nothing at all but some vacant and unimproved land -- or land
the improvements on or in which belong to others -- and who are made
suddenly and unexpectedly penniless (not even social security ?) by a
sudden and country-wide adoption of this reform.
That a large number of landowners would become poorer than if the
reform were never put into effect is of course to be expected. But to
say this is quite different from saying that any class or, necessarily,
any individual will become suddenly penniless. For even if the actual
and complete adoption of the land value tax system were almost
instantaneous over (say) the entire United States-and this is utterly
improbable short of a violent revolution, which would almost certainly
go in an entirely different direction -- there could be no beginning of
the reform prior to there being a widespread demand for it. And during
all the years while this demand was growing, owners whose land was in
use by themselves or others, would continue to draw their accustomed
rents. And though, as the reform came to be nearer and more certain, the
sale value of land would presumably fall, yet until near the time of its
complete adoption there would still be some value remaining, even of a
good deal of vacant and unused land, which could be realized by sale.[9]
Surely, most objectors must know very well that any adoption which is
both sudden and nation wide, is ridiculously unlikely. Though many
proponents may work ardently for this, adoption will come - if it does
come -- now here and now there, in some places relatively soon and in
others more slowly. There is no practical justification, even if there
could be a theoretical justification, for worry about the distressful
state to which widowed, orphaned and aged landowners might be reduced.
There is far more practical justification for worry about the widows,
the orphans and the aged who have been and are handicapped by the
current form of landlordism. There is little or no need to be concerned
les the reform come too fast. There is much reason for concern lest it
never come at all.
There is cogent theoretical analysis relative to the effects of a land
value tax system on housing, on tenancy, on wages and on the economy in
general. There are impressive inductive (statistical) data on much of
this, comparable to the evidence from a controlled experiment in
medicine, such as the recent experiment to test the efficacy of the Salk
vaccine. A change in tax policy which would tax land values at an
increasing rate and reduce -- -perhaps, ultimately, abolish -- taxation
of real estate il other capital, would clearly be favorable to
capitalist incentives. It would, as we have noted, tend to increase the
productivity of 1abor and to raise wages. It would both lower the rents
charged tenants and make easier the transition from tenancy to
ownership. It would strengthen and tend to perpetuate the system of free
private enterprise.
But these advantages of increased reliance on land value taxation are
not obvious even to those who would gain the most from them. The
investor seldom thinks of a distinction between capital and land as of
any importance relative to tax policy. The worker who has no income at
all except from his labor is never -- or almost never -- aware that,
within the limit of what a land value tax will yield, it is better for
him than the most drastically graduated income tax even though he is
himself completely exempt from the latter. Indeed, his prejudices are
likely to lead him to prefer the income tax. The dweller in a tenement
seldom if ever has the slightest idea that a high land value tax with no
tax on improvements and other capital would be of any advantage to him.
The tenant who is eager to acquire ownership of a home, a farm or other
real estate, does not in the least understand that such a change in tax
policy would in any way help him. The child of the slums, starved for a
place to play, certainly does not understand that -- or why -- the
current tax system tends to restrict the number and size of playgrounds
by keeping the price of land high.
There is need of leaders who can and do understand, or else these
advantages will never be realized. Without such understanding, whatever
changes do come are likely to be in a wrong direction, as has happened
during this century over a considerable part of the world. And where
shall we get these leaders if the colleges will not help? Where shall we
get them if some of the textbooks most widely adopted and which are
recommended by professors whom the publishers quote in their advertising
circulars, as "distinguished," "superb," etc., fail
to mention that anyone, anywhere, at any time has even suggested any
steps in this direction?[10] And where shall we get our leaders if other
widely used textbooks continue to impress on the minds of the students
who read them, the idea that any plan or proposal to work for this
really promising reform must be rejected as "unethical"-yet
never so much as hint at a single one of the objections to this view
which have been presented herein?
FOOTNOTES
1. For a summary of the data, first
presented by A.R. Hutchinson of the Land Values Research Group of
Melbourne, Australia, see my pamphlet, "The Challenge of Australian
Tax Policy," obtainable from the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 50
East 69th Street, New York 21, N.Y.
2. Political Economy, New York, Holt, 1887, p.418. (The text
reads "
price of villainy," obviously a typographical
error.)
3. Economics, revised edition, New York, Holt, 1954, p..674.
4. Our Expanding Economy, New York, Rinehart, 1955, pp.439-40.
5. National Municipal Review, 14 (December, 1925).
6. Land Value Taxation Around the World, New York, Robert
Schalkenbach Foundation, 1955, pp. 10-11.
7. For a critical analysis of this view as it was expressed in various
textbooks of a generation ago, see my book on The Economic Basis of
Tax Reform, Columbia, Mo., Lucas Brothers, 1932, pp. 288-308.
8. Ibid., pp. 253-88. See also, "The Challenge of
Australian Tax Policy," op. cit., pp. 9 and 15.
9. A proposal which has, apparently, intrigued a few economists is that
no tax subtraction be made from the rent of land during the lives of
present owners, but that all or nearly all the rent be appropriated
by government after the present owners have died. Such a plan would be
no means silence those who consider any increase of land value taxation
"unjust" or "a violation of good faith." On the
contrary, those defenders of the status quo would - and must, if
consistent - protest that the plan would make it impossible for an aging
owner to sell his land, however good and well located, for anything like
the price it would sell for if the private enjoyment of rent from it
were not to cease with his death.
Furthermore, such a plan overlooks the important fact that corporations
own much of our most valuable land, -- and corporations do not die.
10. Among very recent textbooks to which this comment is applicable are
George Leland Bach, Economics, an Introduction to Analysis and
Policy, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1954, -- also second
edition, 1957; and Burns Neal and Watson, Modern Economics,
second ed., New York, Harcourt, 1953.
In contrast with these -- as also with the other textbooks referred to
in this chapter -- is the presentation by Mitchell, Murad, Berkowitz and
Bagley in Economics: Experience & Analysis, New York,
William Sloane Associates, 1950 pp 457 65. Cf. Bye and Hewett, The
Economic Process, its Principles and Problems, New York,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952, pp. 684-7.
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