.
| [Excerpts from
Chamberlain's remarkable record of the era of Progressive reform in
the United States, with introductory and critical comments by Edward
J. Dodson - October, 2002. This excerpt highlights, in particular,
Chamberlain's evaluation of the activities of Henry George and the "Single
Taxers" who carried his ideas and work in the 20th century.] |
John Chamberlain is another in a long line
of largely-forgotten figures who dedicated themselves to the long
struggle to preserve and expand the extent to which people live
under just law. He was broadly educated in the literature of
Western Civilization. Farewell To Reform was Chamberlain's
first book, and here he detailed the history of the reform efforts
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Chamberlain's writing career took him to the New York Times,
where he contributed book reviews. The hardships caused by the
Great Depression drew him toward the interventionist and even
socialist perspective. However, in the late 1930s, Chamberlain
came under the influence of the writing of the great individualist
writer Albert Jay Nock. The story he documents in Farewell To
Reform demonstrates he was already very familiar with the
philosophical perspectives of Henry George.
He joined the editorial staff of Fortune in 1936, then
moved on to Life in 1941. In 1950, Chamberlain joined the
editorial staff of The Freeman, dormant since 1924. Nock
had run the original Freeman; now, Chamberlain combined
with Suzanne La Follette and Henry Hazlitt. In 1959 his next book,
The Roots of Capitalism, was published and found a
receptive audience. A book of articles he wrote for Fortune
was published in 1963 under the title, The Enterprising
Americans.
In Farewell To Reform Chamberlain documents what others
thought and how they acted upon their beliefs. He also adds
historical context and - from time to time - provides his own
insights and views for us to consider. A second printing of the
book occurred shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the
office of the U.S. Presidency, and, upon advice from Raymond Moley
and the so-called "brain trust" announced his plans for
a New Deal. In a forward to this new edition, Chamberlain declares
his skepticism:
|
The "reforms" of the New Deal will not lead to
reform as it is carefully defined in this book; they will not help to
maintain "freedom of contract," freedom from monopoly,
freedom of competition. Rather do they bear out the thesis; they tend
to congeal capitalism.
[pp. vii-viii]
A really free market demands roller-bearing movement of all its
variables. And when the next inevitable depression is upon us,
business men will have more difficulty in getting out from under. They
will find the system more congealed than ever.[p. viii]
[I]ndividual monopolies in different fields must lead to pressure for
trading advantages abroad - with what effect on the economic
organization of other countries also pressing for trading advantages,
or striving to maintain favorable balances of trade?[p. x]
With hours set at a maximum, wages at a minimum, and prices kept
level, the only way of cutting costs within an industry will be by the
road of technological improvement, i.e., by labor-saving devices.
Labor will have to remain constantly awake if it is to seize the
advantage of technology for itself. In other words, for every
improvement in processes, labor must strike for shorter hours and
increased pay. Can labor do it?[p. x]
However we look at it, Franklin D. Roosevelt is caught in the act of
gambling on a "return to prosperity." And, as the savior of
a nation from the vices of capitalism, it may be predicted that he
will not be able to stand prosperity. For prosperity is a concomitant,
given the psychology of capitalism, of a rising market. And what goes
up, as credit is created by the banks, must come down, as credit is
withdrawn by the banks.[p. xi]
CHAPTER ONE
A Pattern of the Nineties
The nineties saw the last full-throated attempt of the American dirt
farmer to seize a government he had not wholly owned since Jackson's
day, and had owned not at all since the Civil War had ended. It was an
attempt rendered the more desperate because of the sudden and confusing
transformation of American economic life.[p.3]
[T]he nineties, in spite of all the Populist clamor for the righting of
a deranged balance, witnessed, toward their close, the final steps in
the unchecked burgeoning of a flushed business enterprise. This
enterprise had swept across the continent in the pioneer's wake, or even
before him. It had, quite early, gobbled up choice sections of land to
be held out of use for speculative purposes. It had corrupted
legislatures in the interests of its railroad and traction lines, and
had monopolized coal, copper and the oil of Pennsylvania, Ohio and
California.[p.4]
[Grover] Cleveland, in the eighties and nineties, was the spearhead of
a thrust that was less Democratic, in the Jacksonian sense, than it was
of the Manchester liberal brand. Modern critics like to stress the
alliance between Republicanism and
laissez fair, but in truth the Republican Party is only for the
free workings of Adam Smith's eighteenth-century, mercantile and
hypothetically just God under circumstances that are favorable to the
most wealthy segments of the population. The true apostles of laissez
faire
were the American disciples of Herbert Spencer, men
like William Graham Sumner of Yale. [p.9]
[William Graham] Sumner, whose own political philosophy was firmly
grounded in Spencer, came to cross lances with men who themselves
flaunted the banner of the synthetic philosopher. A storm raged about
him at Yale; he was continually annoying the "Pittsburgh
millionaires" who made New Haven an educational stamping ground for
their sons in the early years of the twentieth century;
Sumner's
libertarianism, his championship of complete laissez faire as
against the status economy of the guild system of the Middle Ages, with
no governmental interference whatsoever with natural laws of
competition, was seen to have little grounding in the reality of 1890,
no matter how desirable it may have been in the realm of the
abstract.[pp.10-11]
We have called Sumner a libertarian. Yet he did not believe in the "natural
rights" of man, in the sense that Rousseau did. These rights - the
right to a living, the right to the paternal care of the state - were,
he argued, a hardship upon the "Forgotten Man" who was the
good citizen, who paid his taxes, kept his house and business in order,
exercised a due frugality, and raised his children to go in Roman ways
of staunchness, decency and sobriety. Abandon laissez faire,
said Sumner, and you force the superior man, the "forgotten man"
who has not need of legislation, to shoulder "duties" when the
logical time has come for him to enjoy rightfully the fruits of his
labor and care. You penalize thrift and diligence, and ultimately make
poverty desirable - since, by having nothing and expending no energy,
the shiftless man can call upon the thrifty to "support"
him.[p.12]
All this sounds completely rational on the face of it. But as it must
seem to a disillusioned world, there is more trust in Sumner than in all
of Rousseau. For the nature of power - the power of the "superior"
man - is that it becomes corrupt; it seeks to entrench itself by fair
means and foul; it will not observe the rules laid down by the
libertarian rationalist. It obeys its own inner compulsion; it has laws
of its own.[p.12]
What balked Sumner as a political scientist was his inadequate
definition of the State.
Government, he failed adequately to see,
is a fulcrum, not an entity - a fulcrum by which mean in organized
groups get predatory leverages which enable them to better themselves at
the expense of the less powerful, the less wary, the less worldly
sagacious.[pp.12-13]
The protective tariff
was simply another flagrant example of
using the government as fulcrum for a predacious wrench. In brief, the "ins"
were "in" through politics, through original grants in
colonial days, through preempting sites that were destined to become
valuable and making their claims good under the law, through
monopolizing natural resources, and so forth.[pp.13-14]
He did not believe in "the politics of acquisition and enjoyment"
when the rules were voided. He considered that labor should take care of
itself by organizing; "Industrial war," Sumner said
,
"is, in fact, an incident of liberty
a sign of vigor in
society. It contains the promise of a sound solution." What he did
not see was that labor, if it were to cope with court decisions, and
with the "government by injunction" that was shortly to be
employed
, must perforce interfere by political pressure with the
sacred "freedom of contract" that prevented minimum-wage
legislation, fixed hours of labor, and so on.[p.14]
The
disinherited could, by combining, force a disgorging of the natural
resources which the possessors had gone into politics originally to get;
[p.15]
He did not see that the inevitable result of competition was
combination by means of jobbery.
He failed to realize that
if you posit "the right to property" (and by this I do not
mean to call into question the right of every man to his toothbrush) as
the basis of society, you posit incentives to getting property, and
jobbery is at once unleashed. The two are inseparable, now and
forever.[p.15]
In one way, Sumner was a forerunner of the muckrakers of the next
generation. His diagnosis of society agreed with theirs; his
prescriptions did not.[p.16]
Frederick Jackson Turner
It was on January 12, 1893, that a certain paper by Frederick [Jackson]
turner was read before the American Historical Association in Chicago.
..and probably few historians paid any attention to it. But the paper
has been compared, in cultural significance, to Emerson's notable
address on "The American Scholar,"
The Turner paper, called "The Significance of the Frontier in
American History," contained in its title, no less than in its
body, the suggestion of one of those fertilizing concepts that have so
much to do with the way we dramatize ourselves. It meant simply that
there was a shortage of free land, except in arid districts, in sight.
The mobile, wayfaring American of the westward push would have to settle
down, if not in 1893, at least by 1910 or 1920.
The American of
extension was dying; the America of intension, symbolized by the
swelling civic spirit that moved through perverted Graeco-Roman channels
into the creation of the synthetic marvels of the Exposition, was born
on a national scale - but hardly in a form that would have pleased the
philosophers of the eighteenth-century enlightenment.[pp.21-22]
The Homestead Act, passed in the sixties, portioned out to every
willing Union soldier a homestead of one hundred and sixty acres. With
the rush to the plains went a crying need for capital and no sooner had
a young man gained clear title to his acres than he was forced to
mortgage them to Eastern and foreign creditors. Industry boomed after
the war; the railroads became earth-hungry monsters: expansion was in
the air. The floods of money which the war had loosed upon the country
went into the building of the new West; and the important thing was that
the money was cheap.[p.26]
The debtor class, the farmers of the Missouri Valley and
elsewhere, who had stocked their lands, built homes and planted orchards
on borrowed money, found itself ground between two millstones: that of
the pressing creditor and that of the disappearing dollar bill. Never
was there more need of an "elastic" currency. As the mortgages
fell due, and as the productivity of the silver mines of the Western
country increased, and as gold dwindled to the tune of a mounting
population, the farmers began to work out the equation. The answer,
logical enough in terms of the given situation, was free silver, "the
dollar of our daddies," the "honest dollar."[p.27]
CHAPTER TWO
Windows on the New Century
[W]here free silver had been the "cowbird" of 1896
,
imperialism became the cowbird of 1900. Albert J. Beveridge, not yet a
Progressive, not yet a historian with a true understanding of Lincoln,
looked with immense, cocky and portentous satisfaction upon the scene as
the new century opened. He glowed with the thought that Manifest
Destiny,
our Manifest Destiny, had crossed the Pacific with the
acquisition of the Philippines; the twentieth century, he remarked,
would be distinctively American.[pp.39-40]
It was true enough, as James B. Dill said, that trusts were inevitable,
that competition was the mother of combination, and that all a "sovereign"
people could do was to bring combinations into social use. But the real
thinking to be done was, and is, along the lines of social use; and the
realists of the industrial world of 1900 were concerned not at all with
any such thinking.[p.41]
There were men, however, who tried to solve the problem as the
nineteenth century merged into the twentieth. Their discontent took
queer forms; it cut across many philosophical lines. Very often it made
no sense at all except as pure protest. It looked back to Jefferson and
Jackson; it looked across the ocean to the primitive communism of
Tolstoi.
It even looked forward to no government at all, following
Kropotkin and the anarchists. Altogether, discontent at the opening of
the new century made a crazy-quilt pattern.[p.42]
And the largest, most vocal, element in this discontent had been
schooled in the theories of the farm border of the nineties. As
Professor Turner had suggested, we were a nation that was not only in
one transitional stage, but in many simultaneous transitional stages.
Class distinctions had not been drawn in hard and fast lines; because of
this the prophets of discontent sounded a Babel of conflicting
tongues.[p.42]
But in spite of its lack of common objectives, the movement that was
generated in the nineties, only to broaden and deepen under pressure of
the business concentration of 1900, can at least be summed up as
neo-democratic. Behind this movement were three American theorists of
the nineteenth century, Henry George, Henry Demarest Lloyd and Edward
Bellamy. There were, of course
the foreign factors -- Marxian
socialism, brought to America by the German immigrants; the agitation of
the anarchists, which had been domesticated in the New World by Johann
Most, Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman; but these importations from
abroad merely gave minor twists to the forces running towards the La
Follettian conception of social democracy. They failed, in themselves,
to capture very much of the national imagination. Nor did the spectacle
of the Fabian Society, founded in London in 1884, achieve anything more
definite in the way of American influence than to open a few liberal
minds to the programs offered, respectively, by Bryan, Roosevelt, La
Follette and Wilson. The writings. of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, of
Graham Wallas, the Utopian novels of Wells, and the play-polemics of
Shaw did help promote leagues for industrial democracy and agitation for
the use of the Best Minds in politics, but the ground had been prepared
for the English seed by the Populists of the nineties.[pp.42-43]
Henry George, however, did capture the imagination of an impressive
group. His Progress and Poverty, published in 1879, offered a
startling, deep-searching analysis of the processes of preemption and
exploitation under a system that was incongruously combining a conquest
of the frontier with an industrial revolution. Given its definitions,
this book seems to me a matter of incontrovertible logic. It became the
Bible of an able and vociferous lot of men: Joseph Fels, the millionaire
manufacturer of Fels Naphtha soap; Tom L. Johnson, the traction
monopolist who became an enemy of the very process by which he had
amassed his own fortune; Peter Witt, the Populist who came under the
spell of Johnson; Brand Whitlock, humanitarian and artist; U'Ren, the
shy Cornishman of Oregon, and many others. Out of it the Single Tax
movement grew to dignified proportions in the stirring years before the
World War. Even to-day the Single Tax has its adherents who cling to
Progress and Poverty as the Christian Scientists cling to the
canon of Mrs. Eddy.[p.43]
Henry George was born in Philadelphia in 1839 of English and Scotch
antecedents. Tiring of school at the age of 15, he shipped on a schooner
bound for Melbourne and Calcutta. The conditions in British India were
among the first examples of the results of landlordism to prey upon his
fundamentally idealistic and religious mind; but the germ of Progress
and Poverty may be traced more definitely to a conversation George
had with an old miner aboard a schooner off the Pacific Coast. The miner
was uneasy about the growing problem of Chinese labor. But what harm
could it do, George asked, if the Chinese working men were herded off to
the cheap diggings? "No harm now," said the miner, "but
wages will not always be as high as they are to-day in California. As
the country grows, as people come in, wages will go down, and some day
or other white men will be glad to get those diggings the Chinamen are
now working." [pp.43-44]
In his lifetime George was to see the California of the splendid idle
forties transformed much as the miner had predicted. Ten years after the
death of the evangel of the Single Tax, which occurred in October of
1897, California had notoriously become the worst labor State in the
country. And before George's eyes, as he lived, was enacted the drama of
the Southern Pacific in State politics -- a drama that Frank Norris
later packed into The Octopus. Before the completion of the
first transcontinental railroad, when demand for space around the
Oakland terminus ran high, George witnessed the skyrocketing of land
values. All over California, wherever people congregated in the Eldorado
of the forty-niners, land was being held out of use for speculative
purposes, while the unfortunate late arrivals suffered from lack of
ability to get a foothold on productive acreage. Putting two and two
together, correlating the predictions of the old miner aboard the
schooner with the glaring fact of the monopolization of land and natural
resources that followed the free-for-all of forty-nine, George wrote a
preliminary article on the land question.[p.44]
George had had a good preliminary schooling (his father was a book
publisher), but his real Alma Mater, so his son wrote, was the
forecastle and the printing office. He first took up the trade of
typesetter on his return from India. On a later trip West he became a
prospector; he did farm work and itinerant manual labor; and he joined
the printer's union. Returning East, in 1869, he set up a telegraph news
bureau in New York for a struggling paper in San Francisco, but the
bigger news monopolies forced him into bankruptcy. So Henry George took
to walking the streets of New York, from aristocratic Murray Hill to the
shabby East Side. It was the New York of Tweed's day, and of Jay
Gould's, a New York in which, "
side by side with the palaces
of the princely rich ..." went a degradation, "a want and a
shame, such as made the young man from the open West sick it heart."[pp.44-45]
The immense chasm that opened between rich and poor in New York
confirmed the suspicions he had set forth in his preliminary article.
So, back in San Francisco again, George commenced to gather material for
Progress and Poverty. In 1877 he started work on it, and after a
year and seven months of struggle, during which period he had often to
pawn his own personal belongings, the book was finished. Publishers were
not anxious to take the risk of issuing such a theoretical work; but
finally D. Appleton undertook to market it on condition that George
himself would pay for the plates. George agreed, and in January of 1880
the first trade edition was in the stalls -- and Progress and
Poverty commenced to outsell the most popular fiction of the
day.[p.45]
George brought considerable passion and insight to the writing of Progress
and Poverty; so much was his heart in his work, as his son tells the
story, that he wept upon its completion. As an economist, George was
lucky to make his start with no inherited paraphernalia of classical
terms; his eyesight. was not blinded by the apologetics of the members
of the Manchester School, with their rationalization of the industrial
revolution. His work did not take the turn of Das Kapital, we
may be sure, because of the American conditions out of which it grew;
George did not despair of a competitive society. He had seen relatively
happy times on the frontier, when there was room for everybody to
compete. If you go to a new community, he wrote, where the Anglo-Saxon
(that prince of competitors) is just commencing the race of progress,
you will find an absence of wealth, but no beggars; no luxury, but no
destitution. But as the community realizes the conditions which all
civilized communities are striving for, poverty takes on a darker tone.
This, George argued, is directly the result of progress. Hence George
was at one with Rousseau and the philosophers of the Enlightenment in
wishing to preserve primitive conditions.*
| * Henry George "wishing to
preserve primitive conditions"? Here, Chamberlain is quite
mistaken. George understood the potency of specialization and
technological advances to improve the lives of people, if only the
socio-political arrangements and institutions of societies could be
established on the basis of just principles. |
Seeking for the all-inclusive formula -- a "formula so broad as to
admit of no exceptions" -- that governed the relationship of
poverty to progress, George found it in the Ricardian analysis of rent.
Rent was equal to the difference in value between the wealth that could
be produced on a given piece of ground, and the wealth that could be
produced on land at the lowest level of subsistence. As land is
improved, as its social value is augmented, owing to growth of cities,
proximity of markets and so on, it naturally produces more, but rent,
George noticed, tended to swallow up the whole gain, and the landlords
pocketed what really should accrue to labor, on the one hand, and to the
entrepreneur, on the other. Thus pauperization accompanies
progress. To put it another way, the reason why, in spite of increased
productive power on the worker's part, wages constantly tended toward a
minimum which gave but a bare living, was that, with the increase in
productive power, rent tended to an even greater increase, thus
compelling a constant reduction of wages. [p.46]
So George came to the conclusion that land should, through the medium
of the Single Tax on social value, be forced down toward its "use"
value. That done, George argued, both labor and capital would be able to
find plenty to do; there would be no need for any disheartening talk
about the class war, for there would be abundance for all who would
work. The tax on the social value of land would make it highly
unprofitable for the landlord to hold ground out of use; moreover, rent
on unused ground would tend to a minimum solely because of new
valuations pitched low to avoid the ravages of the tax assessor.
Speculation in land values would at once disappear, and with this would
go the inflation that leads to panics, depression and the eternal round
of the business cycle. And, of course, the income derived from the land
tax would immediately abolish the necessity for all other forms of
taxation, whether on improvements or on productive labor.
One can hardly doubt the soundness of George within his orbit, for
liberty, as soon as equal access to the land is denied, becomes, as the
population mounts, merely the right to compete for employment at
starvation wages or the right to cry for the dole. But George, in spite
of his intelligent refutation of the one-sided Malthusian doctrine, in
spite of his disposal of the classical theory that capital pays labor
its wages, was hardly perspicacious all down the line. He put Malthus to
rout by showing that as population increases human ingenuity
finds ways to support it; he demonstrated that wages come out of the
wealth created by labor itself. But he was a poor power philosopher; the
problem of controls eluded him. He failed to see that a land-owning
class, with its relation to the banking system which, in turn, is bound
up with the mortgage system, is, to all intents and purposes, synonymous
with the bourgeoisie itself. To make this bourgeoisie tractable, to take
away its sources of revenue and investment and dividends, would entail a
whole revolution, directed, to all practical purposes, against
capitalism itself. In 1913, for instance, it would have involved
separating Lee, Higginson and Company, and their Back Bay clientele,
from the Calumet and Hecla copper mines on the upper peninsula of
Michigan. Now just how could this have been done by appealing to the
Democrats or the Republicans to tax away all land and monopoly values --
to make land, mines and rights of way common property? The slush fund
would at once have precluded any such demand. When the situation is
thought through, doesn't George's minimizing of any class struggle seem
like the act of the ostrich? And how would he, once his scheme was in
operation, prevent large-scale bribery of boards of assessment? [p.47]
George's philosophy fails in that it doesn't make its appeal in terms
of the dialectical materialism that is the key to the power of
regeneration. The Single Tax can't be dramatized to interest sufficient
numbers of people. It is true that George offered, to the socialists of
his time, the distant hope that all of the values of socialism
might be achieved through the Single Tax, but he solved no problems of
the mechanics of capturing power; of seizing the fulcrum that is the
State, either through the ballot or otherwise, to bring about a desired
result. The Single Tax remains poised as a vague expectation. For a time
the theories of George were on the rise; Single Tax colonies -- such as
the one in Delaware that sheltered Upton Sinclair for a period -- sprang
up; but the demand for a solution by killing monopoly by fiscal
prestidigitation is now disappearing. However intelligent and desirable
it may be, the Single Tax offers little for marching men in the modern
world to take hold of. Soviet Russia, more than any other single factor,
has killed it -- and the voice of Bolton Hall, crying out in 1932: "It
is monopoly alone, not capitalists or capital, that George and his
followers fight. And we will go on fighting till we have taken all the
rents of the land created by the public, for public purposes, instead of
taxes. We know what we want, and we know how to get it" -- this
voice sounds like the puffed plaint of a lost soul strayed out of the
pre-war decade and calling with a querulous shrillness to a world that
has forgotten Henry George and all his works. Even such a confirmed
believer in the Single Tax diagnosis as Suzanne La Follette, when she
came to revive the Freeman at the end of the twenties, left
Henry George off the masthead of her magazine. She had come to realize,
she wrote, that the Single Taxers knew everything but how to attain
their paradise.[pp.47-48]
Henry Demarest Lloyd
More obviously in the main stream of the neo-democratic movement than
Henry. George was Henry Demarest Lloyd, the father of all the
muck-rakers that were to swarm over the social scene in the 1900's.
[p.48]
[H]e was verging on socialism in 1883 when, in an essay called "A
New Magna Charta,"
he wrote that "the unnatural
principles of the competitive economy of John Stuart Mill will be as
obsolete as the rules of war by which Caesar slaughtered the fair-haired
men, women and children of Germania."
Wealth Against Commonwealth is a book that has failed to live,
in the way Progress and Poverty or Das Kapital have
lived, because it is less an exposition of fundamental principles of
economy than it is a reporter's book of facts. But as a book of facts it
is daring and first-rate.
[pp.53-54]
The book attacked all "cornerers" - the syndicates, the
trusts, the makers of pools. The majority, he said, cannot buy enough of
anything, but the coal syndicate thinks there is too much coal, the iron
syndicate that there is too much iron, and so on.
Lloyd and Henry George supplement each other at important points - both
were agreed on the menace of monopoly. But Lloyd, the reporter, named
his companies; and Lloyd, the thinker, went through Populism and into
socialism, basing his confidence on the imminence of a cooperative
commonwealth that would reorient a status economy in a modern world that
is the product of a contract economy. Men, he argued, have become so
intelligent, so responsible, and so cooperative that they can be
entrusted in great numbers with the care of great properties owned by
others - then why can't they be entrusted with their own State, with the
mills, the mines and the stores owned in the interests of all?
Single Taxers
Working with the intellectual tools forged for them by Henry George, a
group of old-fashioned Americans, Jeffersonian in their tastes and
predilections, marched forth in the nineties and the early years of this
century to face down the hosts of predatory privilege. As Populism spent
itself, and as prosperity commenced to hum after the Spanish-American
War, the city radical came to the fore with his protests that "the
system," however productive of wealth it might be, certainly did
not diffuse its goods evenly throughout the population. Bryan had
objected to urban wickedness, but to Frederic C. Howe, who had seen the
worst sides of New York, Pittsburgh and Cleveland, the city was, in
spite of slums, graft and special privilege, the shining "hope of
Democracy." A dominant, growing municipal corruption seemed, as the
new century opened, to call forth its dialectical opposite in a group of
Reform mayors and their henchmen; and Reform spread, as a matter of
necessity, to the State capitals. The urban reformers, diverse in
personality though they were, had one thing in common: they were afraid
of regimentation, of the party discipline of the socialists, of
commitment to an articulated creed. Two of them, Clarence Darrow (who
served in the Illinois Legislature) and Brand Whitlock (who became Mayor
of Toledo), might be called philosophical anarchists, so suspicious were
they (and still are) of the repressive instrumentality of the State.
Henry George appealed to these men because the State, in
Progress and Poverty, was reduced to a gang of tax collectors
who were, periodically, to raid the landlords. The Single Tax doctrines,
either swallowed whole or in part, provided gunpowder for some excellent
mayors at the turn of the century -- mayors in Detroit, in Toledo, in
Cleveland and in Chicago. Good government in the American cities
received enormous impetus from Progress and Poverty.[pp.56-57]
The predecessor of Whitlock as Mayor of Toledo was, perhaps, the first
of the Henry George mayors. He was Samuel M. Jones, a sucker-rod
manufacturer and factory owner, who believed, quite literally, in the
Golden Rule and the Declaration of Independence. A noble-hearted
Welshman, he became, among other things, a literal Tolstoyan anarchist.
Nobody, he said, had a right to "rule" anybody else; the
exception to this blanket dismissal of "rule" being, of
course, the Golden Rule, which was matter of persuasion, not of blood
and iron. This "Golden-Rule" Jones, as he came to be called,
was a self-made man. He had been brought to America at the age of three,
and had made his money as an oil pioneer and as a manufacturer of
apparatus for oil wells. By going through the competitive mill he came
to understand the processes of industrialism as well as either Tom
Johnson of Cleveland or Altgeld of Illinois.[pp.57-58]
Jones became Mayor of Toledo in 1897, and held office until his death
in 1904, when Brand Whitlock, his Single-Tax secretary, stepped into the
breach.[p.58]
The most prominent Henry George mayor of the pre-war decade came into
office in Cleveland in 1901. He was Tom L. Johnson, fat and
pleasant-faced, a reformer with a bubbling sense of humor, and a delight
in battling at the drop of the hat. For ten years as mayor he carried on
a resourceful, high-hearted, running fight against the Cleveland
traction ring of Mark Hanna and Horace Andrews, and eventually got his
desire - but only for a short period.
The spectacle of a rich man
-- for Johnson was rich --battling to rid the land of the sources of his
own easy wealth was something that other rich men could not understand;
a Chicago newspaper, thinking there was some nigger in the woodpile,
called him "the fat casuist of Cleveland." But Johnson was in
earnest.[pp.59-60]
He knew the methods of monopoly, for he had been a first-rate
monopolist himself. Born in Kentucky, the son of an impoverished
Confederate Army officer, he had come to maturity in the harsh
atmosphere of the Gilded Age. He was a believer in privilege because he
had never seen anything else; privilege was the way of the world. His
training as a monopolist came when he was very young: when he was living
in Virginia, just after Lee's surrender, he struck up a friendship with
a conductor on a train that ran into Staunton, and the conductor gave
him permission to sell papers on the train. Johnson got fifteen cents
apiece for the Richmond and Petersburg papers, and twenty-five cents for
the illustrated weeklies. For five weeks he held the monopoly; then,
with a change in railroad management, went a change in the conductor,
and Tom lost his graft. But the lesson remained.[p.60]
When the Johnsons moved back to Kentucky, Tom entered the
street-railway business, going to work for the du Ponts, friends of his
father who had bought the Louisville franchise. He was successively
bookkeeper, cashier and superintendent of this mule-power transportation
system. His first sizable amount of money was made by the invention of a
fare box, which netted him twenty to thirty thousand dollars. This, too,
was based on a monopoly right -- the exclusive right to a patent. He
used the money to buy, at the age of twenty-two, a majority interest in
a street-railway franchise in Indianapolis, where he got his first
insight into the connection between banking and monopoly. "The
people's money," he wrote, "goes into the banks in the form of
deposits. The banker uses this money to capitalize public service
corporations which are operated for private profit instead of for the
benefit of the people." But the connection between politics and
monopoly still eluded him; it was not until he had gone into the
traction business in Cleveland that he discovered, from Mark Hanna, the
relation between political jobbery and the original granting of
franchises.[pp.60-61]
Mark Hanna completed Johnson's education, but the young monopolist was
still on the side of privilege. His own particular road to Damascus was
the railroad between Indianapolis and Cleveland, and his conversion was
much like Paul's, or Rousseau's; it came in a seemingly blinding flash.
A train-butcher offered Johnson a book called Social Problems,
by Henry George. Johnson thought it was about the "social evil,"
and said he wasn't interested. But the train-butcher persisted; he
offered to return the half-dollar purchase price if Johnson did not like
the book. Johnson read it, and decided he was in for a prolonged
exploration. Progress and Poverty followed. He didn't want to
believe the George doctrine, but its influence was too strong; it seemed
to have no loopholes. Still fighting off his salvation, he took Progress
and Poverty to his Cleveland lawyer, with a supplication: "You
made a free trader out of me; now I want you to read this book and point
out its errors to me to save me from becoming an advocate of the system
of taxation it describes."[p.61]
He also took the book to his Johnstown, Pennsylvania, partner in the
business of manufacturing steel rails. Both the lawyer and the
manufacturer wrestled with the book, made objections, read the book
again, and ended by succumbing, along with Johnson. Johnson knew from
his own experience that the basic facts of the book were right, and the
conclusions, as George put them, were irresistible. To think, with
Johnson, was to act; he sought out Henry George in Brooklyn. In 1886 he
helped Father McGlynn, William McCabe, Louis F. Post and Daniel De Leon
in the George campaign for Mayor of New York, and in 1897 he managed
George's second campaign for the same office. The first fight resulted
in a coalition between Tammany Hall and the County Democracy, who united
on Abram S. Hewitt as a candidate to beat George and the young
Republican nominee, Theodore Roosevelt. Hewitt won, although it is an
old newspaper legend that George was counted out at the polls. In 1897
George died on the eve of the election. Meanwhile Johnson, at George's
behest, had gone to Congress, had fought the high tariff men, had gotten
George's "Protection or Free Trade" read into the
Congressional Record, so that he might send it out to voters at
governmental expense during the campaign of 1892, and had started a
lifelong agitation for the Single Tax.[pp.61-62]
Johnson's greatest service to the neo-democratic movement was as Mayor
of Cleveland, where, in Newton Baker's words, he "set new standards
of city government" for the whole nation. Lincoln Steffens called
Johnson "the best mayor of the best-governed city in America."
As was the case with Jones in Toledo, Johnson found himself with pulpit
and press and Chamber of Commerce arrayed against him. He got some help
from E. W. Scripps's paper, the Cleveland Press, but the other
journals knew their masters' voices, and the masters spoke for private
ownership of public utilities and the five-cent fare.[p.62]
The fight for the three-cent fare was carried on against all the odds
which the American legal system can throw up. Injunction followed
injunction; if ever there was a clear example of the use of the
judiciary in maintaining the status quo, "government by injunction,"
it was in Cleveland in the early years of this century. Taxation
prevented another problem that was almost impossible of correction --
but with the aid of Peter Witt's Tax School, which smelled out
inequalities in the rates, and by means of a continuous, factual attack
in both State and local campaigns, Johnson managed to bring Cleveland to
a point where his followers were able to commence application of the
Single Tax principles to the property of the entire city. Johnson was
beaten for Mayor in 1909 just before his death, but the election of
Baker, two years later, saved a good deal of the Johnson program -- a
program which, however, Baker was later to foreswear by his actions on
his return to Cleveland after serving as Secretary of War under
Wilson.[pp..62-63]
But city ownership, which Johnson advocated, and the three-cent fare
have fought a losing fight. Even while Johnson was campaigning for
municipal operation of traction lines, the theory of regulation of
public utilities by commissions set up by the States was spreading over
the country. The rising cost of living and labor was making the
three-cent fare equivalent to a demand that trolleys be operated at a
loss. The coming of the "jitney" bus, and, later, the large
passenger bus, made even the five-cent fare too small to be profitable
in many cities. And improvement in the transmission of electricity made
local electric light plants too expensive; the problem of power control
became State wide -- a matter for State and national action, as it
remains to this day.[p.64]
With the fight on the public utility monopolies waged by the Henry
George mayors went a persistent, organized and bold propaganda for the
Single Tax, spread by such disciples as only George could attract. The
Single Tax protagonists included Thomas G. Shearman of New York, Colonel
Josiah C. Wedgwood, M.P., of London, Surgeon General W. C. Gorgas of the
United States Army, Lawson Purdy of New York, Herbert Quick, the
novelist, Frederic C. Howe, even Sun Yat-sen and Leo Tolstoi. The most
indefatigable, earnest, unremitting Single Taxer of them all, however,
was Joseph Fels, maker of Pels Naphtha Soap, a little twinkling man, as
Steffens called him, who had an excess income of $250,000 a year which
he could not use himself. Fels became interested in the land question by
himself when he went to England from Philadelphia to organize a British
branch of his soap industry. England being further advanced along the
industrial road than the United States at the end of the nineteenth
century, Fels could not help but observe the glut on the British labor
market. He sought his own reason for this glut; it derived, he saw, from
the process of taking land out of use to form the great estates. Return
the land to the people, he said, and the labor glut would disappear,
wages would rise, and prosperity would diffuse itself with some evenness
throughout the island. This was Henry Gorge, pure and simple, although
Fels did not know it until later.[pp.64-65]
After a few experiments with colonies in England, with gardening the
waste spaces in London for the benefit of the poor and at trying to
persuade British liberals to take up his ideas (and Henry George's),
Fels returned to America, with the notion of the Fels Fund Commission in
mind. This Commission was organized in 1909, with Daniel Kiefer, "the
most successful mendicant in America," as chairman, and with
Frederic C. Howe, Lincoln Steffens, George A. Briggs and Jackson C.
Ralston on the committee Bolton Hall and Fels himself were advisers
without votes. The Fels Fund sought to back men, not institutions.
Besides centralizing the Single Tax efforts, and relieving advocates
from the burden of collecting money, the Fels Fund made up the annual
deficit of Louis Post's Single Tax magazine, The Public,
published in Chicago. But the Fund, whether because of the World War or
the psychological impossibility of getting a sufficient human force
behind it, failed to accomplish much.[p.65]
The Single Tax has been called the only positive contribution made by
an American toward solving the perhaps insoluble problem of economic
democracy. As a matter of fact it was of eighteenth-century origin, a
scheme of the French physiocrats headed by Quesnay and Turgot. But
George gave it a new impress and a new force. When Quesnay "invented"
the impot unique, the fury of the industrial revolution had not
broken upon the Continent, and when George came to similar conclusions,
he, too was thinking in terms of a non-industrialized community:
California of the pioneers. A lingering afterglow of the great Age of
the Enlightenment, the Single Tax was drenched, as George would have
been the first to admit, in all the hopeful colors of the language of "natural
rights." Making as it does a shrewd compromise between our
traditional pioneer individualism and our vaunted equal opportunity for
all, the Single Tax was well calculated to attract dynamic individuals
who wished to preserve freedom of economic activity in a situation that
was coming to defy freedom. Although George and Joseph Fels both
insisted that all the benefits of socialism would flower in time from
the success of the Single Tax, this eighteenth-century doctrine made its
strongest bid for support among people who would sooner be caught
stealing than be found with the Communist Manifesto of 1848 in their
pockets.[pp.65-66]
The Single Tax is deceptively simple, deceptively perfect. On paper it
hasn't a flaw; all its implications flow directly from George's own
splendid definitions. But its definitions are just definitions; one is
not compelled to use George's geometry, for there are other axioms in an
Einsteinian world. George, for example, failed to explore the whole
question of the ownership of surplus value and whether or not creative
brains are as much a "natural" resource as a gold mine or a
prairie.[p.66]
And George, as I have said, had no effective approach to the problem of
power, a problem that must always remain central in any political and
economic discussion. This objection must have seemed paramount to
Clarence Darrow, one of the libertarians who was, at a certain stage, a
believer in the Single Tax. In the end Darrow came to feel that its
cock-sureness, its insistence on "natural rights," were
evidence of a Utopianism that could never be brought into relationship
with the here-and-now. Socialism, he came to believe, was much more
logical and profound --although, with his temperamental anarchic
leanings, this Chicago lawyer who deserted corporation work to defend
the underdog was never able to achieve more than passive interest in an
organized Socialist Party. He fought for Debs in 1894, defending him on
the "contempt" charge, and he was the attorney for "Big
Bill" Haywood and the other members of the Western Federation of
Miners in the Steunenberg trial at Boise in 1907, but that was his
limit. Even a "logical and profound" socialism was not in
accord with human psychology, in Darrow's ultimate belief. As for the
doctrine of Henry George, it placed too small a value upon human
selfishness (which cannot be said of Mr. Stalin); it was a hangover from
the days when philosophers believed that nature was good, not
indifferent, that only civilization corrupts.[pp.66-67]
And so the hard-boiled yet tender Darrow tossed the "Problem
Solved" chapters of Progress and Poverty aside, and
followed John Peter Altgeld in the political struggles that convulsed
Chicago and Illinois as a whole in the nineties. Altgeld was like Darrow
in his unwillingness to be deluded. He expected the worst; he was
conscious of the fate of the Jeffersonian Democrat in a monopolistic age
built on the Great Technology.[p.67]
William S. U'Ren
William S. U'Ren was born in Wisconsin
He studied law in Denver,
and went to Oregon in search of both health and opportunity. A reading
of Henry George's
Progress and Poverty led him, like so many others, to political
reform.[p.73]
Lincoln Steffens
The implications of Mr. Steffens's confession are that his generation
tried valiantly, throughout the fifteen-year period of the quest for
social justice, to understand plutocratic, industrial, monopolistic
America by means of Jeffersonian, agrarian, individualistic shibboleths.
It was like trying to stay the tides. The answer to trusts was "trust-busting";
the answer to corrupt government was "throw the rascals out"'
the answer to a banking and business oligarchy of a few men was Woodrow
Wilson's "New Freedom" for the small business man.[p.77]
Frederic C. Howe
Frederic Howe, confessing his defeat in 1925, at least saved himself
from jumping aboard the New Era bandwagon. He had not learned, he said,
to pursue the truth to its ultimate lair - at bottom he was a moralist,
not a realist or a scientist. He had not gotten rid of the
classifications ground into him in his youth; he still believed,
subconsciously, in "good" and "bad" people - the "good"
folk being those of Anglo-Saxon stock, country-club membership and the
amenities of Howe's own boyhood. At Johns Hopkins, from Richard T. Ely,
Albert Shaw, Lord Bryce and Woodrow Wilson, he had learned that
democracy must be "saved." The "best minds" could
save it - minds like Ely's or Wilson's. But the War and the peace taught
him, in the upper reaches of his consciousness, that only economic
stabilization could build a stable - that is, a "saved" -
world, and he came to realize that "liberals," such as
himself, could do nothing to bring this about.[p.79]
These liberal Americans - Steffens, Howe, Brand Whitlock - have all
been tremendously afraid of doctrine, of commitment to party or program,
even after they have been shown the feebleness of disembodied ideas.
This is, of course, in the spirit of pragmatism, the dominant philosophy
of the age; it runs all through William James; it is the key to Dewey's
indecision, his refusal to formulate ends. Steffens became, at one time,
a Single Taxer with no interest in Henry George; he became, later, a
socialist with no interest in Karl Marx. He had no Pope. Brand Whitlock
was even less interested than Steffens in doctrine; an artist, a lover
of beauty, he could not, and cannot, abide a formula that may be
quintessentialized in the phrase, "economic determinism." "I
have gone through every political philosophy," he said after the
War. "I can see nothing in socialism. The philosophy of Henry
George of a free state in which the resources of the earth will be
opened up to use is the only political philosophy that has ever
commanded my adherence. But the world is not interested in such a simple
reform. It wants too much government, too much regulation, too much
policing. And it may never change."[p.81]
CHAPTER SIX
The Economic Man
Free capitalism results, inevitably, in a larger and larger class of
unemployed, yes, but the dole, forced at the polls, and cannily
administered, can put off the evil day of necessary uprising.
The
fact that revolution is a long, devious, often undramatic process in
most cases, with ultimate success depending on a varied attack, both on
the positive and negative sides, [escapes orthodox Marxists to-day].
There is no need to minimize the nature of the class struggle in saying
this; the class struggle is basic. But positive recourse to physical
attack is not the whole of force. Revolutionary France was, in good
measure, already a bourgeois nation before 1789 - the comedies of
Moliere prove as much.[p.191]
CHAPTER SEVEN
Philosophical Progressivism
Every movement of any vitality reaches a point where it brings forth,
as if by law, its philosophers, those who systematize its thought; and
the years of the quest for social justice were no exception.
J.
Allen Smith published his
The Spirit of American Government in 1907 - and the "economic
interpretation of the Constitution" was henceforth to be reckoned
with. Herbert Croly dropped his The Promise of American Life
into the controversy about a nation's future in 1909 - and both
Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" and the New Republic
were born, as strange a pair of brothers as ever came in the same
little. John Dewey's School and Society, a product of 1899, was
followed with an increasing number of papers dealing with democratic
education, education for active serve as against the education for "conspicuous
leisure" which Thorstein Veblen had so elaborately spoofed in his
chapter on "The Higher Learning" in The Theory of the
Leisure Class (1899).[p.199]
A broad social movement always has a deep continuity, which, though it
may often go underground for a time, must inevitably be present for the
tapping if the imaginations of men are to be touched. And the men who
provided the philosophical systematization of the 1912 progressivism,
whether Rooseveltian or Wilsonian, were, each in his own way, integers
in a broad movement that had reached America in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and had come to any early efforescence in
Jefferson, Patrick Henry and Tom Paine. With the growth of the
plutocracy after the Civil War this movement had been channeled off to
the farm border, where it was manifest in a series of periodic revolts
which culminated, as we have seen, in the Populism of the nineties, and
which had seeped through to the twentieth century by way of certain key
figures who kept alive the spirit of Jefferson, the Grange and Henry
George during the Spanish-American War and its aftermath of what Veblen
called "conspicuous waste."
The rise of the Left in
America, which had been made possible by a half century of immigration
from the congested centers of Europe where Marx's predictions of the
class war seemed all too sane, inevitably conditioned, to a small extent
at least, even those Progressives who presumed to speak for the
Jeffersonian state.[p.201]
The early industrial developments, "as exemplified by mills,
factories and shops," which followed the seizure of land in the
East and which preceded the construction of the great American
railroads, led to no swollen fortunes - a fact which Henry George might
have made much of if he had been disposed to implement his defense of
non-monopolistic capitalism.
But land was a different matter, as
John Jacob Astor had demonstrated, and land for railroads, to be stolen
or cajoled from the government along with subsidies for building,
offered a juicy opportunity for those who had observed the methods of
attaining to inordinate wealth. It was simply a matter of persuading or
packing a legislature, by bribery, "community of interest" or
the offer of stock, as the builders of the canals and the capitalists of
the great Western land companies in the Mississippi and the Ohio
territories had shown.[p.206]
CHAPTER TEN
Foray
As for Progressive government, the results of the three decades of
strife antecedent to 1919 are, perhaps, minimal. Oswald Garrison Villard
thinks we are no further along the road than we were in 1900. This, I
think, is susceptible of proof - and, to boot, we are on the wrong road.
If you think the tariff is at the bottom of our troubles, it is to be
noted that the tariff is still sky-high. But even if we had a low
tariff, it is doubtful that it could have stemmed the down-thrust of
depression.
Free trade, in the long run, cannot prevent a dynamic
capitalistic industrial machine from glutting markets as the upcurve of
greed succeeds the downcurve of fear in the psychological cycle that is
the concomitant of the business cycle.[pp.307-308]
The pet political solutions of the Progressives, designed to make
government more responsible to the will of the electorate, have
notoriously been weak reeds. The initiative and the referendum have
produced nothing. Women suffrage has only added, in direct proportion,
to Republican and Democratic totals. Direct primaries have proved not
even a palliative; they have worked against strong labor and independent
party organization, which is the only hope of labor and the consumer in
the political field.[p.308]
This brings us to the definition of "reform," and its
alternative, revolution. Now, revolution (change of structure and aims)
inevitably carries with it connotations of untoward happenings, of
barricades or whatever may be their twentieth-century equivalent, of
whatever modern ingenuity can devise as substitute for the guillotine,
of the reign of terror induced by the menace of
counter-revolution.[p.309]
The curbing of the "money power," the abolition of "privilege,"
the opening up of opportunity by the Single Tax, the redemption of the
promises of the New Freedom, all of these have been made the basis for a
"return" demand - a demand for the evocation and
reestablishment of a vanished, and somehow more "moral" and "honest"
status quo. And all economic reforms that have been undertaken
in the spirit of Bryan, of La Follette, of Wilson, have worked in a way
precisely against the grain of Progressive or neo-democratic hopes;
instead of "freeing" the common man within the capitalistic
system, these reforms have made the system, as a long-run proposition,
more difficult of operation; and this, in turn, has reacted upon the
common man as employee, as small bond-holder, as savings-account
depositor, as insurance-policy owner. The value of reforms, as I see it,
is that they fail to achieve what they are sanguinely intended to
achieve; and in so failing they help make the system which they are
intended to patch up only the more unpatchable. In other words, every
vote for reform, entered upon intelligently, is a Jesuitical vote for
revolution.[p.311]
The "economic planners" start from the wrong end. They are
fond of demolishing the "Utopians," including the Marxists,
and then they proceed to create economists' Utopias. They "ends in
view" imply the prior existence of a radical party, dominated by
labor (including the white-collar worker) and the mortgage-ridden small
farmer, to say nothing of the 11,000,000 unemployed, which would be
compelled to put a majority in Congress before the creation of any "board
at the top" is undertaken. Otherwise, planning will go on as at
present. And it will be capitalist planning, done piecemeal, depending
on the Sixteenth Amendment and ultimately invoking the dole on a broad
scale.[pp.317-318]
So planned capitalism, being a contradiction in terms, seems no
permanent way out.
Political organization looking towards a
socialist America, or an "industrial democracy,"
is the
sine qua non of any alternative to the present chaotic order.
This does not mean a reliance upon strict Marxist doctrine; for
the group of men whom the Marxians are in the habit of regarding as the
"industrial proletariat" (those who work with their hands and
receive wages) is tending to decrease. The advance of industrial
technique means more and more products turned out with less and less
physical labor. Workers in factories, mills, railroads and mines fail to
keep pace with the increase in population, or even decrease in relation
to a static population.
As direct labor goes down, overhead rises.
In good times, amusement occupations increase. And the result is that a
group of human material which is not good "revolutionary"
material in the original Marxist sense tends to grow up at the base of
society. The increase in unemployment, too, is not material for the
classic Marxist revolution. Marx expected as little from the "rotting"
masses of the unemployed as he did from employees with a petty bourgeois
psychology. The unemployed man is usually a potential scab. And a dole
buys him.[p.321]
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