.
| From his speech
delivered at the Progressive Challenge, an educational forum
featuring progressive thinkers and activists, held on Capital Hill
on January 9, 1997 |
Background issues are worth attention, because it's important, I think,
to recognize how sharply contemporary ideology has departed from
traditions and values which are quite important and significant and
which it claims it upholds. That divergence is worth understanding and I
think it carries a lot of direct lessons about the current scene.
Let's begin with the common good. We can trace that concept
back to the earliest foundations of political theory. Anyone who went to
a good college knows that it all comes from Aristotle's Politics which
is surprisingly timely in many ways. In Politics, which is pretty subtle
and complex, the main problem is how to achieve what Aristotle calls, "the
Common Good of All." Per Aristotle, "the state is a community
of equals." It's aiming at the best life possible for all of them.
The people must be supreme and they must participate fully and equally.
(A qualification: "people" is a narrow category for Aristotle.
We've at least learned something in 2,000 years.) But among those he
considered the people, they have to be equal, free, participatory. And
the government must not only be democratic and participatory, but also a
welfare state, which provides, as he put it, "lasting prosperity to
the poor by distribution of public revenues" in a variety of ways
that he discusses.
The point being that an essential feature of a decent society,
and an almost defining feature of a democratic society, is relative
equality of outcome-not opportunity, but outcome. Without that you can't
seriously talk about a democratic state.
These concepts of the common good have a long life. They lie
right at the core of classical liberalism, of enlightenment thinking.
Adam Smith, as everyone knows, advocated free markets, but if you look
at the argument for free markets, it was based on his belief that free
markets ought to lead to a perfect equality, which is a desideratum in a
decent society. Like Aristotle, Smith understood that the common good
will require substantial intervention to assure lasting prosperity of
the poor by distribution of public revenues.
So Adam Smith's praise of the division of labor is well known,
but less known is his condemnation of the division of labor for its
inhuman effects which, as he said, "will turn working people into
objects as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to
be" and there fore must be prevented in any improved or civilized
society by government action to overcome the devastating market forces.
Other leading contributors to classical liberalism went much
further than this, condemning wage labor itself, for the reason that it
deprives people of their humanity. When the laborer works under external
control, we may admire what he does but we despise what he is-a classic
liberal slogan. deToqueville said that the art advances, the artisan
declines. He was, of course, also a great figure of the classical
liberal pantheon and he agreed with Smith, Thomas Jefferson and many
others, that equality of outcome is an important feature-a crucial
feature in fact-of a free and just society. And he warned of the dangers
of a permanent inequality of condition and an end to democracy if the
manufacturing aristocracy (which is growing up under our eyes in the
United States in the 1830s, remember, one of the harshest that has ever
existed in the world) should escape its confines, as it later did beyond
his worst nightmares.
That's classical liberalism, way back to Aristotle.
Similar ideas run through the independent working class press
from the very origins of the industrial revolution. There was a lively
press, say in eastern Massachusetts-Lowell, Lawrence and places like
that-back in the 1840s and 1850s. It was run by working people, "factory
girls" as they were called, artisans and so on. They bitterly
condemned what they called "the new spirit of the age"- "gain
wealth forgetting all but self" which they regarded as a demeaning
and degrading doctrine that sweeps aside any concern for the common
good, and also was destroying their culture, the rights that they'd felt
they'd won in the American Revolution, later the Civil War. They
bitterly condemned the tyranny of rising industrial capitalism, much as
deToqueville had, insisting, in their words, "that those who work
in the mills should own them," and that people should run their own
affairs, certainly in the political arena, but beyond as well. Well, I
don't think the mill hands of Lowell and Lawrence would have been much
surprised by the views of America's leading Twentieth Century social
philosopher, John Dewey, who like them was as American as apple pie. He
describes politics as "the shadow cast over society by big business"
and he-the leading philosopher of democracy in this century- goes on to
say, "talk of democracy has little content when big business rules
the life of the country through its control of the means of production,
exchange, the press and other means of publicity, propaganda and
communication." Like the working people in eastern Massachusetts
almost a century earlier, he held that in a free and democratic society,
workers must be masters of their industrial fate and private power must
be changed from a feudalistic to a democratic order.
These are ideas that trace back to the Enlightenment and
classical liberalism and they've reappeared constantly in popular
struggle in the United State and elsewhere. I don't think they have lost
their significance, or relevance or, for that matter, appeal. Some of
the concerns of working people had been expressed by James Madison years
earlier. By 1792, shortly after the Constitution was established, he was
already expressing deep concerns over the fate of the democratic
experiment that he had crafted. He warned that the rising developmental
capitalistic state was leading to a real domination by the few under an
apparent liberty of the many. He deplored what he called, "the
daring depravity of the times, as private powers become tools and
tyrants of government, bribed by its largesses and overawing it with
their powers and combinations, casting over society the shadow that we
call politics." Madison's words, but not the values, can easily be
translated into a description of the contemporary scene, and you can
read them in current writings. For example, Business Week in late 1995,
reported with wonder that the new Congress "represents a milestone
for business. Never before have so many goodies been showered so
enthusiastically on America's entrepreneurs." Though they go on to
say that's not enough-the lobbyists are called to go back to the
trenches to demand more. Another accompanying headline reads, "The
Problem Now: What To Do With All That Cash"-as surging profits are
overflowing the coffers of Corporate America and dividends are booming,
while wages are stagnating or declining, along with security and work
conditions. In large measure, that's an effect of policy decisions which
were directed to these ends, including the criminal assault-criminal in
the technical sense-on labor rights in the '80s which happens to be
reviewed rather well in the same journal.
Let me turn to another contemporary issue that traces back to
Aristotle's Politics and took an interesting turn along the way.
Aristotle recognizes that democratic systems can come in many different
forms. The best functioning of them, even the best, most properly
functioning democracy would be flawed, he felt, as long as the goal of
equality is not reached. And the reason was that if you had sharp
inequality, but perfect democracy, the poor majority would seek the
interest of the needy, and not the common good of all. That can be
safeguarded only to the extent that people generally have moderate and
sufficient property-that is, neither great wealth, nor poverty.
Similar concerns actually entered into our own Constitution,
but in a somewhat different form, and not without a lot of tension-which
continues right to the present. In the constitutional debates, Madison
raised the same problem. He warned that "democracy would undermine
the responsibility of government to protect the minority of the opulent
against the majority," that is, to keep them from plundering the
rich, as John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower described the great
problem of international affairs in secret some years later.
Madison expected the threat of democracy to become more severe
over time because he expected an increase in the proportion of those who
"will labor under all the hardships of life and secretly sigh for a
more equal distribution of its blessings." He was concerned by what
he called, "the symptoms of a leveling spirit" that he already
discerned, and he warned of the future danger "if the right to vote
were to place power over property in hands without a share in it.
That problem confronting Madison-the same as Aristotle's
problem-could be solved in one of two ways. One is by reducing poverty.
The other is by reducing democracy. Aristotle's choice was the first.
Madison's was the second. He recognized the problem, but since the prime
responsibility of government is to protect the minority of the opulent
against the majority, he therefore urged that political power be put in
the hands of the more capable set of men, those who represent the wealth
of the nation, with the public fragmented and disorganized.
And that's the Madisonian system, which has remained fairly
stable over two centuries-although with outcomes that he very soon
deplored, as I've indicated. The reason for his surprise, I think, is
that Madison, like the rest of classical liberalism, was pre-capitalist
and anti-capitalist in spirit. And he expected the leadership to be
benevolent and enlightened and so on.
He learned differently very fast.
There is no reason now-anymore than there ever has been-to
accept the doctrines that sustain power and privilege. Or to believe
that we are somehow constrained by mysterious and unknown social
laws-not simply decisions made within institutions that are subject to
human will. They are human institutions and they have to face the test
of legitimacy. And if they do not, they can be replaced by others that
are more free and more just, as has often happened in the past.
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