Ideology and Redistribution of Wealth

Cliff Cobb

[Reprinted from the Land-Theory discussion group, 13 August 2000]

I just skimmed a book by Randall Bartlett entitled Economic Foundations of Political Power. The intellectual puzzle he is trying to solve is this: Why don't "poor" people (those with net worth below the median) use the vote to dispossess the "rich" (those with high net worth)? This was the fear of property owners in the 19th century when expansion of the franchise was being debated. Yet, their fears have not been realized to any significant extent. [Evidence, from economic historian Lee Soltow, not from Bartlett: the Gini coeffient of wealth concentration was almost exactly the same in 1798, 1860, and 1995. The word "wealth" here is not used according to its peculiar Georgist meaning, but in its more normal meaning of all real assets, including land.] Why, historically, hasn't the franchise led to the dispersion of wealth? Please note: Bartlett is not advocating the transfer. He is wondering why it hasn't happened to a greater extent than it has.

The chief barrier that stands in the way of a program of redistribution through legal channels, according to Bartlett, is ideology. Elites (those representing, say, the top 10% of wealth holders who possess about 70% of total wealth) have managed to convince the masses (everyone else) that the current system is basically fair. Again, Bartlett is not making judgments about whether it is fair or not. He is just pointing out how ideology works.

From p. 184: "An ideology is a system of thought underlying a society which justifies the rules by which that society operates and hence also justifies the outcome of that operation. It provides a rationale for the status quo and its perpetuation." "All [ideologies] provide an explanation . . . of inequality in distribution." "An ideology is the cheapest way of insuring the dominance of the elite over the long run. This is particularly true since the acculturation of new generations is essentially costless to the elite once the ideology has been accepted. The costs of enforcing dominance by coercion are substantially higher." "The acceptance of the ideology by both the mass and the elite is the end result of rational attempts to reduce uncertainty as to the nature of the world at a minimal cost."

The last sentence is the key to the general theory behind Bartlett's analysis. His model is based on the premise that information is costly to acquire and that rational actors will not devote time and energy to learning about a new ideological framework (such as Georgist thought) unless the marginal benefits will exceed the marginal costs. Propaganda is the method by which ideologically-motivated groups "subsidize" the acquisition of information and convince some people to change their ideology.

Bartlett, who draws heavily on Harold Lasswell here, seems to argue that the subsidy of ideological information is not primarily a function of the *quantity* of propaganda produced. (In other words, it could not be measured simply by calculating purchases of media time, for example.) A subsidy must be understood from the demand side, as something that reduces the cost of acquiring information. The most effective subsidies, therefore, are symbols that condense and crystallize patterns of feeling and reduce the "cost" of thinking. Thus, for example, political parties have at times subsidized ideological information by using simple concepts like "peace through strength" or "compassionate government" or some other simplifying slogan that captures or evokes positive feelings. Or a party may gather celebrities (particularly movie stars) in a visible show of support, thereby drawing on the feelings people have about the characters they have played. A voter can then respond to those symbols in choosing candidates. No further search for information about policies and platform statements is required, and contradictory information (e.g., about a candidate's actions that harm the voter's interests) will be deeply discounted because taking such charges seriously would require a large expenditure on information gathering.

A revolution, in Bartlett's terms, is the substitution of one dominant ideology within a culture for another. He says that revolutionary ideas are generally aimed at the young. Older people tend to be more locked into an ideology, and revolutionary regimes tend to coerce (or kill) older people, even as they provide new symbols for the young.

Obviously, political change is much "cheaper" if it is not revolutionary, which is to say, if it can be shown to conform to the existing ideology. For the outsider or challenger to the status quo, the obstacles to changing the reigning ideology are formidable. In fact, change rarely happens except during periods of crisis, such as war or famine. Even then, a shift of ideology is rare.


What is the relevance of this?

A fundamental question for anyone who is trying to achieve political change is whether the change involves an ideological shift or not. If a group's policy allows change to occur *within* the boundaries of the dominant ideology, a winning strategy may not demand large expenditures on information subsidies. If, on the other hand, a group promotes ideas that require a change of ideology, then a large part of strategic planning needs to be devoted to methods of subsidizing the relevant information.

Most of the political activities of Georgists are predicated on the assumption that we are not challenging a dominant ideology with a new one. Since ordinary politics, as opposed to revolution, is oriented toward marginal change, the assumption that we are "inside the tent" of the dominant ideology is absolutely necessary.

If, however, Georgism is a revolutionary ideology that is distinct from the dominant one, then it can succeed only through information subsidies. To engage in ordinary incrementalist politics, when the real goal is ideological change, is pointless.

Thus, one crucial question that remains in dispute about the Georgist movement is whether we represent a new ideology or simply new policies within the existing one. I personally assume that the movement would have made much more progress in the last century if it were not a new ideology. Yet, I also recognize that not many other Georgists see matters that way.