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Farm Subsidies Hurt Most Farmers |
| [Reprinted from GroundSwell,
March-April 1996] |
The 1996 farm bill may have spelled the beginning of the end for
agricultural subsidies, but the battle to end farm welfare is far from
over. Congress has agreed to stop price support payments for all crops
with the exception of sugar and peanuts. For most crops, the government
will make lump sum payments that will be phased out over seven years.
But one of the compromises necessary to gain passage of this farm bill
was a provision that will cause the old subsidies to be reinstated
automatically in seven years if another farm bill is not passed then.
The defenders of the old subsidies presumably hope the political
landscape will change again by then.
Whether or not the specter of price supports comes back to haunt
American politics, those of us who seek to eliminate all unfair taxes
and subsidies would do well to reflect on the history of this program
for the lessons we might glean for future conflicts.
Background
Subsidies for farmers were first begun under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933. It has been frequently modified since then, but
the basic structure has remained intact. If this monument to the welfare
state is ever to be disassembled, we must begin by understanding its
architecture.
The 1933 Act, like many of Franklin Roosevelt's policies, was
politically brilliant and economically bankrupt. The basic idea was that
farmers should receive a "fair" price for what they produce.
Specifically, the federal government guaranteed farmers a price for
their program crops such as grains, sugar, tobaccco, and other
commodities. The price was based on "parity" - the ratio of
industrial to agricultural prices that existed from 1910 to 1914. In
fact, the parity formula has been modified in various farm bills over
the past half century, but the concept that there is a "fair"
price other than the market price remains conventional wisdom among
farmers.
One subsidy method involves setting a "target price" (based
on some parity formula) and providing "deficiency payments" to
farmers based on the difference between market price and the target. The
other method involves offering fanners a "loan," for which the
farmer provides the federal Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) with the
program crop. If the market price falls below the "loan"
price, the fanner simply pockets the loan and the government is stuck
with the grain in its silo. In both subsidy programs, fanners are
required to idle a certain amount of acreage. Yet, in both cases, the
subsidy is paid per unit of output, so the farmer has an incentive to
maximize output per acre on the remaining land.
Initially, many Americans probably saw the principle of "fair"
prices for agricultural goods based on parity as being reasonable. In
1933, the families living on a farm (about one-fourth of the population)
had an income of only one-third that of their urban cousins. From the
beginning, however, the principle that urban taxpayers should subsidize
rural farmers was based on the misconceived notion that rural poverty
was caused by unfair commodity prices. Instead, the problem lay in a tax
code that promoted concentration of land ownership and extremes of
inequality by allowing private collection of rent.
Even if economic rents rather than income had been the basis of
taxation, technical change would have driven millions of farmers off the
land. The idea that farmers should receive parity assumes that all of
the benefits of technical change in agriculture should be captured by
farmers, none by society in the form of lower prices. (If computer
manufacturers could have made that argument work for them, we would all
be paying $3,000 for 1985 technology computers and $50,000 or more for
those with Pentium chips.)
Agricultural productivity has increased far faster than industrial
productivity in this century, which is why commodity prices have fallen
despite increases in demand. A bushel of wheat might not buy as much as
it once did, but an acre of wheat probably comes close. Only those
farmers who were able to invest and expand were able to make a
sufficient return to stay in business. As a result, fewer and fewer
farmers have been required to produce the commodities required to meet
the national and global demand for American agricultural goods.
The farmers who feared the inexorable forces of the market would drive
them out of business have fought back. Arguing that preservation of
family fanning is essential to American culture, they have claimed that
the government should provide them with subsidies to stay in business.
This clearly conflicts with the ideology of self-sufficiency, which is
prevalent among farmers, but they resolve the conflict in their own
minds by claiming the market is fundamentally unfair if it fails to
provide them with parity.
Developing a Strategy
Perhaps the issue of farm subsidies is now moot. Perhaps not, if farm
prices fall again in the next few years and the demands for farm aid are
heard again. Given the longevity of these subsidies, we should assume
that there are many battles still to be fought on this issue and that
subsidies will persist in some form until the 1933 act is overturned.
Opposition to subsidies on the grounds that they are inefficient and
costly to taxpayers were generally unsuccessful, at least until this
year. The inefficiency ignores the emotional appeal of the family farm,
which has served as political cover to support a program that primarily
benefits the owners of mega-farms. (Farms with gross sales over $250,000
received 32% of the price support payments in 1992, though they
comprised only 6% of farms. This pattern follows from subsidies being
based on total output of the program crops and from a farm operator
having to leave some land idle to qualify for payments.)
Small operators are given enough crumbs to keep most of them from
fighting the system. The strategy of pointing to the unfairness of the
system has not worked. A more productive approach would be to take
seriously the concerns of small- and medium-scale fanners who see
themselves as stewards of the land and seek ways to accommodate them.
The key point to emphasize is that farm subsidies have NOT helped to
preserve the "family farm;" instead they have accelerated its
demise. If this central fact could be demonstrated conclusively to the
millions of small- and medium-scale farmers who support policies that
are contrary to their interests, it might be possible to break apart the
political coalition that supports continued price supports.
The Effect of Subsidies on Agricultural Decisions
Disrupting the coalition that has maintained the price support system
for over sixty years will require understanding the differential effects
on farm operations of different sizes. Analyzing these effects could
prove far more politically significant than repeating the obvious fact
that subsidies to large operators are greater than payments to small
operators. The key hidden benefit of price supports is the virtual
elimination of down-side risk, without any cost to the recipient. A
farmer who plants a program crop can be assured of a minimum price for
it, with the possibility that the market price will be much higher. In
the absence of guaranteed prices for certain crops, a farmer would face
the prospect of some good years and some bad years, depending largely on
weather patterns in one region relative to others. A farmer does not
benefit from a good production year if all producers of the same crop
are highly productive that year. Overproduction may push the market
price so low that the crop is not worth shipping to market. In order to
avoid the risk of having a worthless crop, a farmer must diversify.
Before the advent of price supports, a large proportion of fanners in
the Midwest raised both livestock and rotated their grain crops. That
way, if the price of the grain was low, they could feed the surplus to
the livestock and reduce the financial loss. On the other hand, when the
price of grain was high, their profits were not as high as they would
have been with specialized fanning because they had to feed part of
their profits to the livestock.
With price supports and no risk of bad financial years, farmers were
able to specialize. Now entire counties, not just individual farms, grow
almost nothing but wheat or a com/soybean combination or raise nothing
but pigs or dairy cows. By specializing, farm operators have been able
to increase total output. But since overproduction was the original
source of the financial problems faced by farmers, increased output is
nothing to be proud of.
As a result of price guarantees and specialization, fanners have gone
deeper and deeper into debt to buy capital and land. In a competitive
market, a price decline for a couple of years might cause highly
leveraged farmers to go bankrupt. Although farm size may grow as a
result of technological innovation, the rate of growth is limited by the
need to reduce risk of failure. By contrast, in a protected price
environment, the same forces cease to function. Price supports reduce
the price fluctuations experienced by fanners and thus make debt less
risky.
Price Supports and Land Prices
In addition to reducing risk, price supports also raise the price of
farmland. This occurs because the price supports raise the average
annual returns per acre of farmland. This added rent is then capitalized
in higher land prices. A theoretical 1985 study by the Economic Research
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture found that removal of
price supports would have cut the mean price of an acre of agricultural
land from $730 per acre in 1985 to $510 in 1986. Thus, the price was
inflated more than 40% above its value in a subsidy-free condition.
However, according to a more empirical 1972 USDA study by Robert
Reinsel and Ronald Krenz, "Capitalization of Farm Program Benefits
into Land Values", subsidies are seldom folly capitalized. For
crops such as cotton, wheat, and feed grains, the uncertainty of future
government support prices cut the expected capitalized value in half
compared to peanuts, rice, and other crops with more stable support
programs. The authors calculated the total capitalized value of crop
supports in 1970 to be around 8% of total farm real estate values.
(Another factor also reduces the capitalization of price supports in
land values. Some of the added income from price supports is extracted
as monopoly rents by suppliers of farm equipment, seed grain, chemicals,
and fertilizer. Robert Leidenluft, in a 1981 analysis for the Federal
Trade Commission, found that none of these industries were competitive,
as measured both by the small number of companies dominating each market
and by above-average rate of return on equity of those companies. That
high degree of market concentration can be partly explained by the
excessive specialization that a subsidy policy has promoted.)
Boom-bust Cycle in Farmland
Farmland prices follow a boom-bust cycle similar to, but not
necessarily in conjunction with, rising and falling urban land prices.
From 1972 to 1981, the sale of American agricultural commodities rose
rapidly in world markets from $8 billion to $44 billion, in part due to
the decline in the value of the dollar. Some commodity prices doubled.
The price of farmland rose from$184 billion in 1970 to $737 billion in
1981. This was even faster than the growth of net farm income, because
rising land values capitalized not only current income but expectations
of even higher income in the future.
In 1977, commodity prices began to decline. The American Agriculture
Movement arose in defense of high prices to avoid foreclosure on heavily
indebted farms. (Farm debt rose from $49 billion to $182 billion between
l970 and l981.)The federal government propped up the farmers and their
land values (and the banks that had lent to them) for a few years. But
even though the CCC bought crops and increased its storage of them by a
factor of five, it was unable to prevent the down side of the cycle from
occurring.
How Price Supports Hurt Small Farmers
The system of price supports did not completely protect fanners from
the fluctuations of market demand, but it did provide a cushion. It
would seem at first blush that all farmers who were growing program
crops benefited. However, large farms benefited from price supports
relatively more than small farms. In the long run, that translated into
an absolute advantage. Price supports accelerated the process of
increasing farm size from an average of around 300 acres in 1960 to 450
today. Instead of helping small farms, subsidies have concentrated
production and assets in the largest farms.
The key to the differential effect of subsidies lies in the higher
leveraging and lower profit margins in large operations. During boom
times, large farms, simply by virtue of their size, have better access
to credit, despite the fact that smaller operators often generate higher
net income per acre. That gives large units the chance to expand and
take over smaller operations. Large farms thus tend to be more heavily
indebted than smaller ones. In l993, the debt-asset ratio of small farms
(sales of $20,000 to $100,000) was around 12%, whereas for the largest
farms (over $500,000), the ratio was around 23%. During the mid-1980s,
when farms were under severe financial stress, around twice as many
large farms as medium-sized farms were very highly leveraged (debt-asset
ratio over 70%.)
In addition, large farms spend more money than smaller farms on
purchased inputs in proportion to their sales, In 1978, for example,
farms with sales under $100,000 spent around 71% of their sales income
on production expenses, while farms with sales over $100,000 spent an
average of 85% on those purchases. (See David Lins and Peter Barry in
U.S. Senate, Committee on Agriculture, "Farm Structure: A
Historical Perspective on Changes in the Number and Size of Farms.")
Combined with the high level of indebtedness, this thin margin has made
large farms more profitable in good times and more prone to bankruptcy
in bad times.
hi the absence of price supports and other subsidies, operators of
large farms would incur much greater risk and failure rates than smaller
ones. But because the large farms do not have to face ordinary market
risks, they are able to survive and grow beyond their natural size.
Thus, a system that protects all farmers from down side risk
differentially helps the largest farmers, hi short, subsidies are
contributing to the demise of the very "family farms" they
were intended to protect.
Foreign Consequences of Domestic Farm Policies
As if the damage to family farms in the United States were not enough,
crop subsidies here also destroy the livelihoods of farmers in other
countries as well, hi order to guarantee prices, the federal government
buys surplus agricultural commodities and places them in storage. Since
the early 1950s, the U.S. government has effectively forced Third World
countries to accept these surplus American commodities as part of "aid"
packages under Public Law 480. The result was the dumping of grain on
those countries at prices so low that local farmers could not compete.
Not only did this contribute to rural poverty, it contributed to the
swelling migration of people from the country to the shanty towns near
cities. All of these were the effects - intended or unintended - of
American "aid" policy. Had the U.S. government not held
massive amounts of grain and other commodities in storage, this policy
of making recipient countries dependent on American exports could not
have succeeded. Thus, farm subsidies have not only made the U.S. economy
less efficient and cost taxpayers billions of dollars, they have also
been the instrument of a most vicious form of imperialism.
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