1. Reputation of the property tax
IT WAS common practice in the 1990s to proclaim the unpopularity
of the property tax in the United States.
Unpopularity, of course, is generic with taxes. Property taxes
are levied in relatively large sums once, twice or at best only a
few times each year, an inconvenience that may aggravate the
attitude more so than for taxes that are candy coated . But is there
something universally detrimental in this case? Or is the attitude
fostered by the holders of large properties who find other taxes
easier to escape? The architects of good government need to know.
The hard evidence supports the latter explanation But whatever the
explanation the electorate s prejudice where it exists, is
misconceived. The facts are clear enough. Where a large share of
fiscal revenue comes from property taxes, individual income tends to
be high. There is a clear propensity for the local economy to grow
faster than in those states which are less dependent upon the
property tax than on taxes linked to income or sales.
New Hampshire shows a strong and stable aversion to taxes on
income or consumption (Table 8:1), and a strong preference for the
property tax. It is the only state in the Union where more than half
of all government revenue, both state and local, comes from the
property tax. In fact, nearly two-thirds of all state/local revenue
is from that source.
But that is not the only distinctive feature about New Hampshire.
For example, it has been growing twice as fast as its neighbors -
such as Maine and Vermont - and that difference needs explanation.
Could there be a connection between the property tax and prosperity?
California's use of the property tax has diminished sharply since
the change known by its enactment: Proposition 13. Its tax history
has been more typical of the 50 states as a whole, during the two or
three decades when the unpopularity claim emerged. Limited sharply
in property tax use, it has turned of necessity to taxes on both
sales and income. Its once vigorous growth rate has been slowed.
Could there be a connection between the decline of the property tax
and the slump in the state s economic prosperity?
The two states differ in other ways, too, so we have looked at a
wider number of states, grouping them by a range of differences, in
search of valid conclusions.
As unpopularity was charged against the property tax, voters came
to oppose it sharply enough to make political leaders propose, as
alternatives, new taxes on labor, industry, trade and money flow.
The property tax, once the principal source of money to fund state
and local governments, dwindled in the latter half of the 20th
century. Having provided some 80% of all state-local revenue until
the early 1920s, [it] was providing only 45% of that total in the
mid- 1950s and had fallen to about 30 % at the start of the 1980s
(Netzer 1983: 222).
Some states shifted away from it sooner than others. New Hampshire
refused to make the shift at all. The results make it possible, by a
comparison of tax structures in the 50 United States, to draw some
conclusions about cause and effect.
Table 8: 1
Rates of Three Major Taxes
Selected States, USA, 1992: %
|
Individual income tax (range) |
Corporation income tax (range) |
General sales taxes |
| New Hampshire |
(a) |
8.0 |
0.0 |
| California |
1.0 - 11.0 |
9.3 |
6.0 |
| Maine |
2.1 - 9.89 |
3.5 - 8.93 |
6.0 |
| Vermont |
(b) |
5.5 - 8.25 |
5.0 |
| New Jersey |
2.0 - 7.0 |
9.0 |
6.0 |
| New York |
4.0 - 7.87 |
9.0 |
4.0 |
| Pennsylvania |
2.95 |
12.25 |
6.0 |
SOURCE: Tanzi 1995:21, Table 3-1, which drew from data furnished
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR).
Note (a):
New Hampshire has only a twilight shadow of a personal income tax. A
5% tax on income from interest and dividends is a left-over from the
earlier revision of personal property taxes on securities. Local
assessors had found it hard to keep up-to-date information on them, so
the state imposed the tax on income. The total income subject to it in
1995 was only 2.5% of all individual personal income.
Note (b):
Vermont s income tax was pegged at from 28% to 34% of federal
income tax liability. California s basic state rate for sales taxes
is 7% (1997), but counties may add to it. The top combined rate in
San Francisco county is 8.5%. Ever since Proposition 13, sales taxes
have risen to make up for the losses.
There is no clear pattern to the new taxes adopted by states as
the property tax waned. Texas, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Washington
are among states which have no personal income tax but do have
general sales taxes. Oregon has no sales tax, but a personal income
tax ranging from 5% to 9%. Several states have corporate income
taxes. Most states have added many Sundry nuisance taxes like a
surtax on hotel rooms, tuition hikes at state universities, sin
taxes, etc.
All things taken into account, New Hampshire s state tax burden is
the lightest for any of the 50 states when measured as a percentage
of per capita income. When local taxes are included, the total
burden moves up a little in the rankings, but the essential fact is
that those local taxes are on property. And by a number of different
measures, the state is among the most prosperous states.
Could this correlation be due to its heavy dependence on the
property tax, coupled with a low dependence on other taxes?
California, by contrast, has been running down its use of the
property tax as a revenue-raiser. Can we accurately see, as a result
of this, the relative collapse of its economic prosperity and the
quality-of-life of its citizens?
Figures published by ACIR in its two-volume Significant Features
of Fiscal Federalism (SFFF) for 1994 provide some data that will
help. They are for the year 1992.
Since the search is for evidence of cause and effect, it is
necessary to be concerned with relationships. This explains the fact
that many of the numbers in what follows are ratios: a measure of
relationship.
It makes sense to examine the relationship between the property
tax and all state and local taxes, taken together. We start at the
top and at the bottom of the list, with New Hampshire and Alabama,
comparing them with the average for the nation. And because the
population of the 50 states varies so greatly, it is not total
dollars that interest us, but dollars per capita.
Table 8:2
Taxes Per Capita ($)
|
Property Tax |
All state/local taxes |
Ratio |
| United States |
699 |
2178 |
.32 |
| New Hampshire |
1344 |
2098 |
.64 |
| Alabama |
174 |
1435 |
.12 |
The top and bottom are highly suggestive. They accurately
symbolize our more general findings. However, we need to look at the
figures for more states, and to the ratios between more of the
factors under consideration. We start by grouping those states with
high ratios of property tax use and those states with low such use
ratios, so as to compare those highs and lows, and other factors
(Table 8:3).
The top five states in this Property Tax/All Taxes ratio have
higher per capita incomes than the bottom five states. It means
extra columns; the three in Table 8:2, plus one for personal income
(PI) per capita, and another for the per capita income ranking
within the whole country.
Table 8: 3
States Ranked by Property Tax per capita ($)
| TOP FIVE |
Property Tax |
All Taxes |
Ratio |
Income Per Capita ($
000s) |
Rank |
| New Hampshire |
1344 |
2098 |
.64 |
21.9 |
8 |
| New Jersey |
1268 |
2926 |
.43 |
26.1 |
2 |
| Connecticut |
1198 |
3061 |
.39 |
27.2 |
1 |
| New York |
1178 |
3534 |
.33 |
24.1 |
3 |
| Alaska |
1069 |
3835 |
.28 |
22.1 |
7 |
| (Unweighted Mean) |
1211 |
3091 |
.41 |
24.3 |
4.2 |
| BOTTOM FIVE |
|
|
|
|
|
| Louisiana |
277 |
1654 |
.17 |
15.9 |
45 |
| Arkansas |
261 |
1518 |
.17 |
15.6 |
46 |
| Oklahoma |
243 |
1635 |
.15 |
16.4 |
42 |
| New Mexico |
217 |
1788 |
.12 |
15.5 |
49 |
| Alabama |
174 |
1435 |
.12 |
16.5 |
41 |
| (Unweighted Mean) |
234 |
1606 |
.15 |
16.0 |
44.6 |
Source: ACIR, 1994, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism
(SFFF). Data refer to 1992.
The New Hampshire five have high property tax per capita as the
sum of two reasons: first, higher taxes per capita; and second, a
higher ratio of property tax to all state and local taxes. Of the
two reasons, the second is stronger. Here are the ratios for the
means above: first, 3091/1606 = 1.92; second, .41/.15 = 2.73
Do the top five levy higher taxes per capita because of higher
per capita income? The ratio for the means here are 24.3/16.0 =
1.52. This direction of causation would require that a 52% rise of
income per capita caused a 92% rise of all taxes, and a 173% rise of
property taxes. That seems extreme, and therefor implausible. It is
more plausible that the heavier dependence on property taxes caused
the rise of personal income per capita. We explore this further
below.