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| Proposition
13: What Happens When a State Radically Slashes its Property Tax |
| [Excerpts from a
paper, "Big Plans to Stir the Blood and Steer the Course,"
delivered at a conference on Land, Wealth and Poverty, Jerome Levy
Institute, 3 November 1995] |
California can show you 17 years of experience. Here is what has
happened since California passed Proposition 13 in 1978. The obvious
direct results have been to cut public services, raise other taxes, and
lose credit rating.
Our school support fell from #5, nationally, to #40 in 1985 when last
seen, still falling. County road maintenance is down to where my county
(Riverside) is repaving its roads at an annual rate of once every 130
years. Once in 20 years is recommended here, and up north you generally
need higher frequency. You can't just build infrastructure and then stop
paying for it, it's a perpetual commitment. Thanks to urban scatter, a
high fraction of our population now depends on these county roads.
In 1978 we had a surplus in Sacramento. Since then we have raised
business taxes, income taxes, sales taxes and gas taxes, but go broke
every June, even as other states are in the black again. Now our State
bond rating is last among the states. One of our richest counties
(Orange) has gone bankrupt; Los Angeles is on the brink of it, saving
itself by closing emergency rooms and hospitals that serve as a last
resort for the uninsured poor. We are ill-prepared for Congress' current
move (right or wrong) to shift more functions back to the states. The
private sector fares no better. Raising income taxes, business taxes,
and sales taxes is no way to stimulate an economy; each is a drag on
work and enterprise. Our income per capita was down from #7 to #12 among
the states by 1992, then fell more: from 1992-94, California was one of
three states where median household income fell. Our unemployment rate
is 9%, 50% higher than the national mean of 6%. Our poverty rate is 18%,
compared to 14.5% nationally. That helps explain why the only government
function that grows now is building and operating prisons. One of our
few rebounding industries is cinema. Another thriving trade is
auctioning off used machinery for export to the east.
In 1993 there was net outmigration (including international migration)
from this state that has symbolized American growth since time
immemorial. It is unheard of: 426,000 people were lost, nearly 2% of the
population. This is a watershed change: imagine, of all states
California, America's trend-setter, our El Dorado, The Golden State, our
Horn of Plenty, the safety-valve for job-seekers and retirees and
entrepreneurs from everywhere, the end of the rainbow, losing
population! It's enough to make a person ask "What are we doing
wrong?". The fall of our income per capita is greater than appears
from the purely monetary measure. Real pay (in constant $) has fallen
more, because of the drastic rise of shelter prices. In San Francisco,
shelter takes 50% of the median income, with many other cities,
especially coastal ones, not far behind. It is unusual to find livable
quarters for less than $600/month. The median home price rose 163%
during the 1980s, to $258,000 (that is just the median - the mean is
higher). These rises are part of the C.O.L. of all renters and new
buyers, a part not fully incorporated in standard CPI measures (for
various foolish reasons too technical to open up now).
Some cities are in desperate straits. San Bernardino in 1976 was chosen
an "All-America City, a City on the Go." Go it did: today, 40%
of its people are on welfare.
California has always been earthquake country, but has always renewed
itself, routinely. It was different after the Northridge quake in the
San Fernando Valley, January, 1994. This is the upper-middle
neighborhood of Los Angeles, but now large pockets of ruined buildings
remain, unreconstructed, inhabited only by vagrants and criminals: an
instant Bronx West. These blighted sections, ominous portents, spread
more blight around them.
It should give one pause. It is, however, if you think about it, the
expectable result of what the voters did. They turned property from a
functional concept into a sacred one; from a commission to be
enterprising, hire people, produce goods, and pay taxes into a welfare
entitlement. They rejected the concept of taxing inert wealth in favor
of the alternative: taxing liquidity, cash flow, work, production, and
commerce. The predictable result is to inhibit economic activity, and
encourage holding wealth inert and stagnant.
We had a construction boom in the 1980s, but it was not healthy. It was
marked by extreme scatter, and extreme instability. Downtown L.A. was to
become a great new financial capital, but now has nearly the highest
office vacancy rate in the U.S., with of course a high rate of builder
bankruptcies. Speculative builders were led on to overbuild, in part, by
anticipated higher land rents and prices. This Lorelei effect was
magnified by national income-tax provisions, luring on speculative
builders, but we have to ask why California fell harder than other
states, even with the object-lessons of the oil states in clear view.
David Shulman tersely summarized the distributive effects of Prop. 13
as he left us to become Chief Equity Strategist for Salamon Brothers in
Manhattan: "it breached the social compact." Alienation is the
result, and the results of alienation are the Rodney King riots, arson
and looting. The Watts riots, you may object, preceded Prop. 13, and you
are right.
However, the Watts riots were part of a national epidemic. By 1967
there were riots with arson and looting in 70 or more American cities.
The Rodney King riots were endemic to California, and they spread over a
much wider area of Los Angeles than the Watts riots did. The looters and
arsonists were not all black, and the targets were not all white, but
mainly Korean-Americans who just happened to be there minding their
stores.
Conventional wisdom now blames our California bust on the end of the
Cold War. Surely that is a factor, but as a causal explanation it is too
pat, too easy, and too convenient. It shifts the load off ourselves onto
impersonal historical forces - the Marxist worldview. Let us see if it
can survive analysis. Compare today with 1945.
Los Angeles' economy depended much more on The Hot War, 1940-1945, than
it ever did on The Cold War. Los Angeles' wartime boom had swelled its
population as no other great city, 1940-45. After 1945 the U.S. pulled
the plug on defense spending, more than today. Jane Jacobs, in The
Economy of Cities, tells us what happened to military spending in Los
Angeles after 1945. It lost 3/4 of its aircraft workers, and 80% of its
shipbuilders. It lost its military and naval overseas supply and
replacement businesses. Troops stopped funneling through. It got worse:
petroleum and cinema and citrus, its traditional exports, all declined.
Pundits then forecast a regional collapse, but Los Angeles boomed,
instead. The wartime immigrants stayed. They formed creative, innovative
small businesses in large numbers, giving L.A. its deserved reputation
for having the most dynamic, flexible, adaptable industrial base in the
nation. Besides exporting goods, L.A. also became more self-contained,
providing itself with more of the goods it previously imported. How
could this be? Angelenos had access to land, the basis of all supply and
demand in any economy.
1/8 of all new businesses started in the U.S. were in L.A., 1945-50.
These were small, creative, flexible, miscellaneous, and too varied and
dynamic to classify. No Linnaeus could sort them in static conventional
boxes; they were the despair of traditional economic geographers and
base theorists, who were at a loss to explain the region's thriving
economy. The new Angelenos stayed and startedproducing everything for
themselves, some things previously imported, and others never seen
before.
Eastern firms established branch plants here. Top eastern students came
to California's great university system, and stayed behind to make
careers and jobs here, and send their children through California's
excellent public schools. California became famous for supporting
outstanding higher education at three tiers, K-12 education, adult
education, highways, water supplies, public health, public safety, and
other public services, all without repelling business by taxation. There
was a kind of regional "El Dorado Effect," as demand and
supply grew together, and growing local demand allowed for economies of
scale serving local markets. Food and shelter were cheap and abundant.
Land for business was accessible, providing a basis for the whole
self-contained phenomenon. A "continental tilt" developed in
both interest rates and wage rates, drawing in eastern capital and
labor.
Why is that not happening today, 1995? An invisible, pervasive change
is Proposition 13, which makes it possible to hold land at negligible
tax cost. In 1945 land was taxed at 3% every year, building a fire under
holdouts to turn their land to use. Today that same tax cost is well
below 1%. Using Gwartney's Rule of Thumb (see below under #2,A, "Reassessing
Land Frequently") it is about 1/8 of 1%: a rate of 1% applied to
1/8 of the true value. Landowners are only taxed now if they use their
land to hire people and produce something useful. Then they meet the
drag of our high business and employment and sales taxes, necessitated
by the fall of property taxes. A handful of oligopolistic landowners
control most of the market; small businesses are squeezed out.
This helps us segue from being at the cutting edge of industrial
progress to a third-world economy - with little relief in sight.
What was different then? One obvious difference was the lower burdens
of sales tax, business tax, and income tax. We had high property tax
rates, but they were more focused on land than now, less on new
buildings. California was more hospitable to Georgist thinking than
perhaps any other state then, shown by its long run of Georgist
political action in the prior thirty years. Most people today are
totally numb on this subject, which has been blanked out of our history
books.
A Brief Historical Review
Several states had "single-tax" movements and initiatives,
1910-14, but most of them petered out. In California they continued
through 1924, and then popped up again in 1934-38. In 1934 the "EPIC"
campaign of Upton Sinclair included a strong Georgist element - he
proposed to set up new factories and farms on idle land. Meantime,
Jackson Ralston was pushing a pure land tax initiative, 1934-38.
Sinclair and Ralston lost, but the mere existence of such political
action in California, when the movement was torpid elsewhere, tells us a
lot. It reveals a large matrix of supportive voters and workers, with
effective leaders, to whom politicians (including elected County
Assessors) would naturally respond by focusing on land assessments.
Politicians survive by accommodating and absorbing dissident movements.
Even while "losing," such campaigns raise consciousness of the
issue. Thus, in California, 1917, land value constituted 72% of the
assessment roll for property taxation.
This remained the California tendency for years.
California was different. Even into the 1960s, Sacramento County
elected an avowed single-tax Assessor, Irene Hickman; San Diego County
harbored an active movement for raising land assessments. The Henry
George Schools of San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Sacramento
were the most active such schools in the country: four in one state,
when most had none. State Senator Al Rodda, Chair of the Senate Finance
Committee, held hearings and tried to push landtax legislation through
his Committee in the 1960s and early 1970s. He assigned a staffer, Jack
Massen, to spend a year working out the detailed effects on
intergovernmental relations. Assemblyman Dr. William Filante, from a
base of Georgist support in Marin County, picked up the torch, too.
California displayed amazing prosperity and growth up to 1978. It had
the resilience to shrug off the loss of war industries after 1945 and
still grow "explosively" (as Jane Jacobs put it). After 1978
we have had, instead, a string of reverses. The timing, along with a
priori causative analysis, plus various direct observations too numerous
for this time-slot, support an hypothesis that the reverses were
aggravated by Prop. 13.
Enforcing good laws we already have
A. Reassessing land frequently
It is important to assess land for tax purposes early and often,
especially on a rising market. (Landowners will see to it you do so on a
falling market.) Over time, land appreciates more years than not, while
buildings depreciate physically every year. Lagging assessments
therefore automatically overtax buildings relative to land.
New Hampshire Assemblyman Richard Noyes has circulated data on the
effect of reassessment in NH.
The land fraction of assessed value rises each time there is a
reassessment. Keene, NH, is in the lead, with frequent reassessments, a
high fraction of land in the mix, and a strong track record attracting
enterprise and jobs. In California, where we used to have good
assessment, we now have bad assessment legally mandated by Prop. 13. So
long as land is unsold, and/or not newly improved, its assessment rise
is capped at 2% a year, while market prices soar. Here is one example of
the results. This year the Metro Water District of Southern California
(MWD) condemned 410 acres for its new Domenigoni Reservoir to expand the
system (to accommodate land speculators in the desert boonies). The jury
hit them for $43 millions, which works out to about $1.95 a square foot.
The question occurred to me, how does that square with the assessed
value for property taxation? I asked Ted Gwartney, a professional
appraiser with the Bank of America, to check the assessed value. It is
about 7=9B a square foot. The condemnation price, supposedly based on
market value, is about 28 times the assessed value.
This is not the result of fractional assessment.
In California we assess property at 100% when land changes ownership,
or there is new building. Rather, this is the result of Prop. 13 and its
prohibition of market reassessment until land sells.
I thought that was startling, but Mr. Gwartney's reaction was "Ho-hum,
what else is new?" He, who works with such data every day, has a
rule of thumb that market land value in California today is about 8
times assessed value. That is important enough to repeat: our assessed
land values are routinely at 1/8 of true land value. I wouldn't dare say
that on my own authority, but Mr. Gwartney is here to confirm it. He is
a veteran appraiser; for many years he was Director of Assessments for
the entire Province of British Columbia.
Does this help you understand why California landowners are now so slow
to adapt to new demands, and respond so slowly to the withdrawal of old
military demands? In 1945 the assessors were building fires under them,
so they sought new uses to meet new needs.
Today there is only a weak such incentive: tax collectors mainly only
burn them if they move. Sit still, lie low, hire no one, hang on,
produce nothing, and your holding costs are negligible.
A little of the old magic lingers. In October, 1995, a 225 acre parcel
in Corona, the Chase Ranch, was sold to a builder, Coscan Davidson
Homes, for building 967 units. The previous owners, "GGS,"
including a Japanese insurance firm, were "seeking a way out. They
were behind in tax payments, and GGS was losing its staying power ..."
quoth Stephen Doyle, spokesman for the buyer. It is that "staying
power" that stifles land use and production. Coscan wants to build
immediately. Even so, though, they plan to take 5 years to build out the
project - if everything goes well. This is the new, post-Prop.13 meaning
of "immediately."
In spite of extreme under-assessment, the assessed value of taxable
land in California is 40% of the total real estate value. Imagine what
it would be if assessed values were real values, "marked-to-market,"
as the law used to stipulate. It would be over 70%, as in 1917. "Staying
power" would go down; land use, jobs and production would rise.
B. Using the building-residual method
It is equally important to use the "Building-Residual Method"
of allocating value between land and buildings. This means you value the
land first, as though it were vacant, based on highest and best use.
You subtract this land value from the total value of land-cum-building
as currently improved: the residual, if any, is building value.
Valuing one lot or parcel this way, you have information needed for
valuing neighboring and other comparable parcels. Using a map with value
contours, you can value a whole city this way with surprising ease and
speed. Using this method, I valued Milwaukee land in 1963 and 1967. The
building-residual method nearly tripled the land values reported by the
City Assessor, who was using the assessor's usual inconsistent mix of
various other methods. How's that again? Did I say tripled?
Yes, I really said "tripled." By his methods, buildings on
the eve of demolition were carrying values higher than their sites; by
the building-residual method these old buildings had no value at all,
which of course is why they were being torn down. Besides depreciation
and technological obsolescence, many buildings suffered severe "locational
obsolescence," owing to shifting demand patterns. The land was
re-usable, and had as much or more value without the extant buildings.
Using the building-residual method requires no change in present laws.
It is within the latitude of assessing officials. These worthies, in
turn, respond to public opinion. The conscientious citizens' move is to
raise consciousness and bring pressure, just as the old single-tax
campaigners like Jackson Ralston did.
In the process of "losing" they won over half of what they
sought, just by taking a stand and making the effort.
C. Federal income taxes
Assessors' problem today is that the strongest pressures they feel are
from owners wanting to allocate as much value as possible to buildings
that they may depreciate for federal income tax purposes. Here is where
we must study how the parts fit together to form the big picture in the
Big Plan we are limning; here is where federal and local tax policies
intersect. Some traditional Georgists have neglected or misunderstood
the income-tax treatment of land income, to their great oblivion,
myopia, insularity, and weakness. Let us see how this works.
Congress and the IRS let one depreciate buildings, but not land, for
income tax. This important distinction harks back to when the income tax
was new, and Georgist Congressmen like Warren Worth Bailey, from
Johnstown, PA, and Henry George Jr., from Brooklyn, were instrumental in
shaping it.
When a building is new, the depreciable value is limited to the cost of
construction. The non- depreciable land is the bare land value before
construction. So far, so good. Over time, however, building owners have
converted this into a tax shelter scheme. Owner A, the builder, writes
off the building in a few years, much less than its economic life, and
sells it to B. "A" pays a tax on the excess of sales price
over "basis." The basis is reduced by all depreciation taken,
so any excess depreciation is "recaptured" upon sale. It is
defined by Congress as a "capital gain," and given the
corresponding package of tax preferences: deferral of tax, lower rate,
step-up of basis at time of death, tax-free exchanges, etc.
Thus far, any tax preference goes to A, the builder, and may be seen as
a well-considered building-incentive. Watch, however, what happens next.
"A" sells to B, and B depreciates the building all over again,
from his purchase price. To do so, B must allocate the new "basis"
- i.e. his purchase price - between depreciable building and
non-depreciable land.
How shall B allocate the new basis? Enter the local tax assessor. Here
is where local assessment intersects with Federal income tax policy. The
IRS does not try to assess land and buildings. Instead, IRS instructions
tell taxpayers they may use locally assessed values to allocate basis
between depreciable buildings and non-depreciable land. The IRS accepts
this allocation as conclusive. As a result, local owners of income
property press their assessors to allocate as much value as possible to
buildings, and as little as possible to land. This does not affect their
local taxes, but lowers their federal taxes. It lets them depreciate
land.
Assessors don't care as much as they should: local revenues are not
immediately affected. Local assessors have little reason not to
accommodate their constituents, local landowners, to help them
depreciate land for federal and state income tax purposes. They have
little reason to use the correct "building-residual" method of
allocating value, and a compelling reason to use the wrong method that
understates land value. Thus they convert non-depreciable land value
into depreciable building value. It is modern version of "competitive
underassessment." In the process, they also convert the local
property tax from a land tax into a building tax.
After a while B sells to C, who in turn sells to D, so each building is
depreciated many times. So is a large part of the land under it, time
after time, although it should not be depreciated at all. This is
carried so far that real estate pays no federal or state income taxes at
all, a matter developed by Michael Hudson in his paper for this
conference.
The solution to this lies with the U.S. Congress.
The need is to limit depreciation to one cycle only.
It is a most urgent problem for both federal and local treasuries. We
all have Congressmen. Write them and raise their consciousness. They are
brokers who respond to public opinion, as they should. It is we who are
derelict: get on their cases.
Rich and poor
There are rich jurisdictions, and poor. Professor Tideman's paper in
this conference alludes to this matter in passing. Let us support his
point with some numbers.
In California, you might think that farm counties like Tulare have a
lot more taxable value per capita than cities, but au contraire. Tulare
County reports assessed values per capita of $38,100; the whole State
averages $60,000 per capita. Suburban Marin County weighs in with
$95,400; urban Los Angeles County has $59,000; Orange County has
$74,000.
You might also think that Tulare, being rural, has a lot higher
fraction of land value in its mix, but again, not so. The Land Share of
Real Estate Value (LSREV) in Tulare County is 28%, compared to a
statewide mean of 40%, and 47% in Orange County.
Grazing and mining counties like Inyo have high values of LSREV, but
they are a small share of the farm economy. Major farm counties with
intensive farms, like those of the San Joaquin Valley, have low values
of LSREV.
Within counties, disparities among cities and school districts are much
greater. In Tulare County, one pathetic little povertyville, the City of
Parlier, has just $10,000 of assessed value per capita. Here are some
assessed values per capita from different California cities in The
County of Los Angeles: Lynwood, $21,500; Beverly Hills, $294,000 (14
times Lynwood); City of Industry, $5,533,000 (257 times Lynwood).
This is why some critics call the property tax "regressive."
It has given some plausibility to the otherwise bizarre claim that
switching to a sales tax is less regressive than sticking with the
property tax.
Within each city a property tax is progressive, but when your data meld
cities like poor little Parlier and Lynwood with Beverly Hills you
sometimes find poor people paying more of their income in property taxes
than rich people, and getting less for it. Switching just the local
property tax to land ex buildings will do little or nothing to correct
such disparities, and therefore make little progress toward overall
social justice, and the wide support that will evoke. There is, in fact,
a natural cap on local property tax rates imposed by local
particularism: the City Council of Beverly Hills will not raise taxes in
Beverly Hills for the benefit of voters in Parlier.
To avoid such regressivity we must work out some formula for power
equalization. The most straightforward formula is simply a statewide
land tax.
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