.
An Unassailable Case Against
Government Planning |
| [John Jewkes was at
the time of this article Professor of Economic Organisation,
University of Oxford. Reprinted from Land & Liberty,
August-September, 1965] |
IF EVER the history of economic hallucinations comes to be written, the
idea that governments possess the knowledge and power positively to
determine the rate of economic growth through the technique of central
economic planning will be revealed as one of the most widespread,
tenacious and harmful of errors. In the long-term, experience will
doubtless make this clear; in the interim, the damage likely to be done
by it may be considerable, depending upon the scale on which the fallacy
gains a hold over public opinion and the persistency of the designers
and operators of the economic plan in the face of failure.
Some tragic cases immediately come to mind. The present parlous
economic condition of India is attributable in no small degree to
government planning which has led to massive misdirection of resources
into grandiose schemes for capital investment, to the relative neglect
of the primary task of food production, to the erosion of international
reserves and the dependence of India each year upon the charitable whims
of the West. In Russia, such planning has, since 1917, been enforced at
untold cost in the shape of human freedom and now, after half a century
of economic vicissitudes, Russia is generally recognised as a country
still of low general standards of living.
In Western countries, with their better informed public opinion and
free comment, matters are not likely to reach such a pass. Even here,
however, wrong economic ideas may result in loss and disillusionment
that were better avoided. And in Britain particularly, in my opinion, we
are now in danger of economic decline not so much because of incompetent
management, lazy workers, lethargic salesmen, unimaginative
technologists or unequipped scientists, but much more because successive
Governments have in recent years naively aspired to determine our
general standard of living although lacking the knowledge or the
competence to do so.
It is fortunate that this subject can now be discussed without
reference to politics or personalities. It was a Labour Government
which, in 1945, gave Britain its first peace-time experience of central
economic planning; an experiment in which aims and methods were so
grotesquely unrelated and the failure so complete that no one now ever
refers to it. It was a Conservative Government which, in 1962, set out
upon the second course of central planning, and no one, least of all
those who initiated it, is prepared to claim it as a success. It is a
Labour Government which is now engaged upon a third effort in the same
direction, with new groups of planners, new committees and new words for
very old ideas.
It is well to remember that it was not organised Labour in 1962 that
was pressing most strongly for central planning; it was British
businessmen through their Federations. It has been suggested that this
melancholy record over the past twenty years in itself should relieve us
of anxiety. Will not time itself quickly check these aberrations of
thought? Where the impossible is being attempted, can any harm arise
except to those foolish enough to waste their time on hopeless quests? I
cannot help but feel that this attitude is escapist. For if, as I shall
try to show later, central planning does positive harm, then the sooner
it is checked the better. Beyond that, it is by no means certain that,
in the future, the failure of central planning will so readily lead to
its abandonment as in earlier days. Vested interests are now growing up
around it. The careers of many public servants depend upon its
continuance. Many economists have reached the conclusion that the only
function of their science is to improve the methods by which governments
can enlarge their activities and take a stronger grip upon the economy.
The road back from central economic planning may not be so easy as in
the past.
There is one thought that should be ever-present in any discussion of
the part that the State can play in encouraging economic growth. It is
the simple, central and, to my mind, unchallengeable fact that while the
various forces and conditions which are more or less intimately
associated with economic growth can be listed, yet there is not (and it
may be there never can be) any adequate understanding of the exact way
in which these forces act together to bring about the results observable
after the event. Of course, it is known that the scale of investment,
the rate of innovation, the level of knowledge, the skill of the
workman, the ability of the entrepreneur, the level of demand and many
other major or minor factors will help to determine whether a country is
to be rich or poor. But to assume that those who draw up such a list
have thereby equipped themselves with the power systematically to
determine or even sensibly to influence the rate of economic growth is
as grave an over-simplification as it would be to list the different
parts of the human body and then assume that the secret of human life
itself had been revealed.
The intellectual error that in the economic system are to be found
certain key points at which governments can bring pressure to bear and
thereby determine economic growth has led to much waste and confusion in
recent years. For example, in many undeveloped, and in some not so
undeveloped countries, public policy has been based on the principle
that there was a well-established and reasonably reliable connection
between the scale of investment and output, and that to increase the
former might fairly confidently be expected to produce an expansion of
the latter. But the work of Colin Clark and others has shown that the
theory based on the capital-output ratio is something of a myth, that
the ratio varies from time to time and from country to country, and that
to press on with investment when other conditions are not favourable can
be a potent cause of waste.
Great devotion, enormous energy and almost endless ingenuity have been
shown by economists in recent years in their efforts to solve the riddle
of economic growth. This is all to the good and does much credit to the
profession, always provided it is recognised that, as in any other
science, about 95 per cent of the hypotheses will prove to be without
foundation. The standards of living of whole communities are too
important to be entrusted to the latest untried ideas of back-room boys
fascinated by the elegance of their latest economic models or to
politicians feigning powers of controlling economic affairs.
This article, however, is mainly concerned with another device for
stimulating economic growth. As employed in Britain in recent years it
falls into three stages. First, some general rate of growth for the
whole economy is fixed upon. Then the implications of this general
growth are worked out; for example, what rate of growth of exports or
imports is consistent with the general figure. Then, if it appears that
some of the implications are not likely to be achieved, special efforts
may be made to bring about at these points a better performance than
would otherwise be expected.
Now at each one of these stages the government may make mistakes. It
may fix upon a general rate of growth higher than is really attainable.
(It must always fix upon a rate higher than it thinks could be attained
in the absence of a central economic plan, otherwise there would be no
point in going to the trouble of preparing such a plan.) Or it may make
mistakes in working out the implications of the general rate; in which
case its own actions may contribute to a surplus of some goods or lead
to a shortage of others which, in itself, will endanger the achievement
of the general rate of growth. Or it may miscalculate the possibility of
improving performance at the point where the implications seem to demand
it, in which case once again the general rate will not be achieved. But
errors at the second and third stages, although by no means to be ruled
out, are perhaps less likely than at the first crucial stage and what
happens at this stage can conveniently be studied in the light of
experience in Britain since 1962 under first a Conservative and then a
Labour Government.
When in 1962 the Conservative Government set forth its first five-year
economic plan, it declared that this was centred on an annual average
rate of growth in the economy of 4 per cent. Those most closely
associated with the design and the carrying out of the plan declared
that this procedure amounted to a revolution in thought, based upon what
was described as the "dynamic concept of change." But, despite
these sweeping claims, the nature, purpose and function of this figure
of 4 per cent has always remained shrouded in mystery. What was meant by
the figure? Was it an increase which it was thought would occur; or was
hoped would occur; or was feared would not be achieved unless the
Government itself engaged in these special measures? In the early days
of 1962, the National Economic Development Council would go no further
than to say that "the implications of a 4 per cent rate of growth
should be studied." Later we were informed that "Britain's
economic policy is geared to a 4 per cent rate of growth." Clearly,
unless the choice of one figure rather than another was a wholly
capricious act and the study of its implications a matter of idle
curiosity, it ought to have been possible to describe the peculiar
significance of this figure. But this was never done. In fact, it came
to be widely accepted that this rate of growth could be achieved, would
be achieved, and should be generally accepted by everybody in the
community as what would occur.
The choice of the figure of 4 per cent seems to have been oddly
arbitrary and unscientific. It represented a rate of growth half as fast
again as that which had occurred in the United Kingdom in the 1950s, and
twice as fast as the average for the first half of the century. Why then
was a figure chosen which was so out of line with past experience? Could
any new factors be pointed to which were likely to make history in these
matters irrelevant? Nothing of that kind was indicated by the
Government. A further mystery was that apparently it did not matter
whether the central economic plan was wrong or right in this respect.
For as the Director-General of NEDC put it:
"Deviations will occur and it does not reduce the
value of forward assessments that market conditions may produce
results different from those expected. An examination of the reasons
for the difference between the result and the expectation can be of
great value in helping to overcome difficulties."
The forward assessments must either have had some influence or no
influence on the actions of people. If they had no influence, could
there be any purpose in the plan? If they had some influence, would the
existence of an incorrect forward assessment not have tended to lead
people to behave in a wrong way and thus have contributed to economic
distortion?
In fact, as we now know, the 4 per cent increase was not achieved and
had fallen into disrepute by the time the Conservative Party lost power.
This plan had covered a period which had seen a most serious balance of
payments crisis; yet the plan had given no indication that this was
likely to happen.
Strictly speaking, it is not possible to say that the economic planning
of the Conservative Government failed, since, in the absence of any
clear-cut idea of what purpose the plan was intended to serve, no
obvious test of success of failure presents itself. But it can at least
be said that the plan was abortive in the sense that it proved to be out
of step with reality. If the plan had done no positive harm little more
would need to be said about it. But, to my mind, the plan can be held to
have been harmful, and to have contributed to the economic troubles of
1963 and 1964.
When the Labour Party came to power the Conservative economic plan was
scrapped. New and more elaborate administrative machinery for economic
planning was created. The Government declared its intention of issuing,
as soon as possible, a new plan. But, subject to the one qualification
mentioned below, no new plan has yet been presented to the public. The
intention seems to be that a new final economic plan will be presented
in the "late summer or the autumn." On these more recent
events, therefore, it is possible only to make general comments.
The nation presumably is to be without a published plan for nearly a
year, from October 1964 to the "late summer or autumn" of
1965. But if the country can carry on for such a long period without a
plan, does this not throw doubt upon the need for it at all?
The qualification to be made to this first point is that, early in
February 1965, Mr. Brown suggested that "we should aim at a 25 per
cent growth in national product by the year 1970." At that time he
deprecated the breaking down of this long-period figure into annual
targets, but he did point out, what indeed is the simple arithmetic of
the matter, that since 25 per cent in five years represents on average
about 4.25 per cent each year and since growth at the present time is
running at less than 4 per cent, his figure of 25 per cent implied that
towards the end of 1970 the annual rate of growth would be in excess of
4.25 per cent.
One ominous reaction, which might well have been foreseen, of the use
of this planning device is that the exercise may cease to be an effort
rationally to examine the economic system and its potentialities and
become more of a field for political manoeuvring. For if the
Conservative Government offered the country a 4 per cent annual rate of
increase, even though it failed in its aim, is it not likely that the
public will regard the offer of anything less than 4 per cent by the
present Government as something of a confession of failure? Already
cynical observers of the present scheme, who regard a 4 per cent rate of
increase as beyond the national capacity, are beginning to feel a morbid
fascination in watching what will happen when the party in power finds
it politically impossible to withdraw from a position that is
economically untenable. This is perhaps the most dispiriting consequence
of this kind of economic experimentation. It is launched with the claim
to be a revolutionary and more scientific approach to the handling of
economic affairs and it gradually degenerates into the defence of myths
and into political casuistry.
The moral to be drawn is not complicated; nor is it dependent upon
complex and highly sophisticated economic analysis. It is simply that
the cure for bad planning of this type is not better planning but no
planning.
Of course, it will be objected that such an attitude is negative and
outmoded, that not to accept economic planning is to reject a purposive
and coherent design enabling men to be masters of their destiny, in
favour of a neutralist, not to say nihilist, conception of the working
of the economic machine. Nothing, however, could be further from the
truth. Does anyone really believe that in Britain the period 1962-65,
with its economic bolts from the blue and the babble of conflicting
theories about the cause of economic growth, was one of purposive and
coherent economic planning?
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