.
In Defense of Freedom of Religion |
Thomas Babington Macaulay |
| [From a speech made
in the House of Commons, 1833, arguing for an end to the ban on
individuals of the Jewish faith from holding public office in
England] |
. . My honorable friend, the Member for the University of Oxford, began
his speech by declaring that he had no intention of calling in question
the principles of religious liberty. He utterly disclaims persecution,
that is to say, persecution as defined by himself. It would, in his
opinion, be persecution to hang a Jew, or to flay him, or to draw his
teeth, or to imprison him, or to fine him; for every man who conducts
himself peaceably has a right to his life and his limbs, to his personal
liberty and his property. But it is not persecution, says my honorable
friend, to exclude any individual or any class from office; for nobody
has a right to office: in every country official appointments must be
subject to such regulations as the supreme authority may choose to make;
nor can any such regulations be reasonably complained of by any member
of the society as unjust. He who obtains an office obtains it, not as
matter of right, but as matter of favour. He who does not obtain an
office is not wronged; he is only in that situation in which the vast
majority of every community must necessarily be. There are in the United
Kingdom five and twenty million Christians without places; and, if they
do not complain, why should five and twenty thousand Jews complain of
being in the same case? In this way my honorable friend has convinced
himself that, as it would be most absurd in him and me to say that we
are wronged because we are not Secretaries of State, so it is most
absurd in the Jews to say that they are wronged because they are, as a
people, excluded from public employment.
Now, surely my honorable friend cannot have considered to what
conclusions his reasoning leads. Those conclusions are so monstrous that
he would, I am certain, shrink from them. Does he really mean that it
would not be wrong in the legislature to enact that no man should be a
judge unless he weighed twelve stone, or that no man should sit in
parliament unless he were six feet high? We are about to bring in a bill
for the government of India. Suppose that we were to insert in that bill
a clause providing that no graduate of the University of Oxford should
be Governor General or Governor of any Presidency, would not my
honorable friend cry out against such a clause as most unjust to the
learned body which he represents? And would he think himself
sufficiently answered by being told, in his own words, that the
appointment to office is a mere matter of favour, and that to exclude an
individual or a class from office is no injury? Surely, on
consideration, he must admit that official appointments ought not to be
subject to regulations purely arbitrary, to regulations for which no
reason can be given but mere caprice, and that those who would exclude
any class from public employment are hound to show some special reason
for the exclusion.
My honorable friend has appealed to us as Christians. l.et me then ask
him how he understands that great commandment which comprises the law
and the prophets. Can we be said to do unto others as we would that they
should do unto us if we wantonly inflict on them even the smallest pain?
As Christians, surely we arc bound to consider, first, whether, by
excluding the Jews from all public trust, we give them pain; and,
secondly, whether it be necessary to give them that pain in order to
avert some greater evil. That by excluding them from public trust we
inflict pain on them my honorable friend will not dispute. As a
Christian, therefore, he is bound to relieve them from that pain, unless
he can show, what I am sure he has not yet shown, that it is necessary
to the general good that they should continue to suffer.
But where, he says, arc you to stop, if once you admit into the House
of Commons people who deny die authority of the Gospels? Will you let in
a [Muslim]? Will you let in a Parsee? Will you let in a [Hindu], who
worships a lump of stone with seven heads? I will answer my honorable
friend's question by another. Where does he mean to stop? Is he ready to
roast unbelievers at slow fires? If not, let him tell us why: and I will
engage to prove that his reason is Just as decisive against the
intolerance which he thinks a duty as against the intolerance which he
thinks a crime. Once admit that we arc bound to inflict pain on a man
because he is not of our religion; and where are you to stop? Why stop
at the point fixed by my honorable friend rather than at die point fixed
by die honorable Member for Oldham, who would make the Jews incapable of
holding land? And why stop at the point fixed by the honorable Member
for Oldham rather than at the point which would have been fixed by a
Spanish Inquisitor of the sixteenth century? When once you enter on a
course of persecution, I defy you to find any reason for making a halt
till you have reached the extreme point. When my honorable friend tells
us that he will allow the Jews to possess property to any amount, but
that he will not allow them to possess the smallest political power, he
holds contradictory language. Property is power. The honorable Member
for Old ham reasons better than my honorable friend. The honorable
Member for Oldham sees very clearly that it is impossible to deprive a
man of political power if you suffer him to be the proprietor of half a
county, and therefore very consistently proposes to confiscate the
landed estates of the Jews. But even the honorable Member for Oldham
does not go far enough. He has not proposed to confiscate the personal
property of the Jews. Yet it is perfectly certain that any Jew who has a
million may easily make himself very important in the state. By such
steps we pass from official power to landed property, and from landed
property to personal properly, and from property to liberty, and from
liberty to life. In truth, those persecutors who use the rack and the
stake have much to say for themselves. They are convinced that their end
is good; and it must be admitted that they employ means which are not
unlikely to attain the end. Religious dissent has repeatedly been put
down by sanguinary persecution. In that way the Albigenses were put
down. In that way Protestantism was suppressed in Spain and Italy, so
that it has never since reared its head. But I defy any body to produce
an instance in which disabilities such as we are now considering have
produced any other effect than that of making the sufferers angry and
obstinate. My honorable friend should either persecute to some purpose,
or not persecute at all. He dislikes the word persecution, I know. He
will not admit that the Jews are persecuted. And yet I am confident that
he would rather be sent to the King's Bench Prison for three months, or
be fined a hundred pounds, than be subject to the disabilities under
which the Jews lie. How can he then say that to impose such disabilities
is not persecution, and that to fine and imprison is persecution? All
his reasoning consists in drawing arbitrary lines. What he does not wish
to inflict he calls persecution. What he does wish to inflict he will
not call persecution. What he takes from the Jews he calls political
power. What he is too good-natured to take from the Jews he will not
call political power. The Jew must not sit in parliament: but he may be
the proprietor of all the ten pound houses in a borough. He may have
more fifty pound tenants than any peer in the kingdom. He may give the
voters treats to please their palates, and hire bands of gipsies to
break their heads, as if he were a Christian and a Marquess. All the
rest of this system is of a piece. The Jew may be a jury-man, but not a
judge. He may decide issues of fact, but not issues of law. He may give
a hundred thousand pounds damages; but he may not in the most trivial
case grant a new trial. He may rule the money market: he may influence
the exchanges: he may be summoned to congresses of Emperors and Kings.
Great potentates, instead of negotiating a loan with him by tying him in
a chair and pulling out his grinders, may treat with him as with a great
potentate, and may postpone the declaring of war or the signing of a
treaty till they have conferred with him. All this is as it should be:
but he must not be a Privy Councillor. He must not be called Right
Honorable, for that is political power. And who is it that we are trying
to cheat in this way? Even Omniscience. Yes, Sir; we have been gravely
told that the Jews are under the divine displeasure, and that if we give
them political power God will visit us in judgment Do we then think that
God cannot distinguish between substance and form? Does not He know
that, while we withhold from the Jews the semblance and name of
political power, we suffer them to possess the substance? The plain
truth is that my honorable friend is drawn in one direction by his
opinions, and in a directly opposite direction by his excellent heart.
He halts between two opinions. He tries to make a compromise between
principles which admit of no compromise. He goes a certain way in
intolerance. Then he stops, without being able to give a reason for
stopping. But I know the reason. It is his humanity. Those who formerly
dragged the Jew at a horse's tail, and singed his beard with blazing
furze-bushes, were much worse men than my honorable friend; but they
were more consistent than he....
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