| The
Relation of Credit To Rent and Interest |
| [Reprinted from the
Henry George News, September, 1953] |
PART 1: CREDIT AND THE
RENT-INTEREST INDEX
The Georgist analysis of depressions is frequently countered with
the concept that depressions are caused by the over-extension of credit.
The wide-spread acceptance in today's idea market of this point of view
demands an interpretation of credit in terms of rent and interest.
The usual starting point of most new or expanded production in the
present American economy is the obtaining of credit -- a sum of money
representing calls on wealth that the lender expects to he converted to
a larger sum at a later date. The borrower (labor) uses these funds to
obtain or maintain the tools (capital) and production sites (land) for
carrying out production at an increased rate.
The term credit is used to include all transactions in which transfer
of physical entities of value or claims to value are made from one
(economic person to another for disposal, without immediate payment for
the value received. The characterizing criterion of credit lies in a
time lapse between value received and payment therefor. Examples of
credit situations are charge accounts, commercial bank loans, government
bonds, railroad bonds, installment purchases, etc.
During good times only casual thought is given to problems of political
economy and the relations of rent, wages and interest to the servicing
of credit commitments. However only when the increased yield gained by a
lender from a particular producer-borrower is derived from expanded
production that also gives the borrower an increased yield, can the
particular enterprise be considered successful enough to endure.
The period in the business cycle called "boom" is
characterized by an upward movement in total production that generally
provides both lenders and borrowers with increased yields. Since bad
times can only originate in natural processes occurring in good times,
credit-extenders, business men and politicians would do well to examine
prevailing economic thinking which is still rooted in concepts that have
not been distinguished by any ability to solve the problem of recurring
depressions. If they wait until hard times begin, then the urgency to do
something, will, as it did in 1933-39, compel economic practices which
serve to postpone, re-arrange and compound the distress rather than
relieve it permanently.
During any "boom," the natural action of the tools and the
commodities comprising active capital is to increase per capita
production. The natural action of land as production proceeds to
inferior sites is to decrease per capita production. Interest, i.e.,
wealth accruing to the use of capital, is a measure therefore of the
increased productivity induced by the use of current capital. Rent,
i.e., wealth accruing to the use of better land, is a measure of the
decreased productivity induced by the use of poorer sites.
When the effect on the total labor force of the productivity of capital
compensates for the decreased productivity of inferior lands called into
use, production must be expanding. Those who labor are provided with
increased real wages. At the same time, there is available a Rent and
interest may be spoken of as existing in a favorable ratio towards each
other.
As the increased productive state proceeds into "boom" times,
land speculation increases rent faster than production and so prevents
capital from compensating for the inferior land called into use. An
adverse "rent-interest index" comes into being and production
must shrink. Not enough surplus funds are available to service all
credit commitments.
Many producers can meet all their commitments only by depriving labor
of some of its wages through wage cuts or layoffs, by liquidating some
of their capital, or by cutting production schedules. Trade being the
exchange of production for production, any shrinkage thereof means
further reduction in wages and, of course, demand. New opportunities for
the profitable employment of labor and capital are kept low by the rent
line remaining very high. Some disemployed workers stay idle causing
further reduction in demand and production.
The reduced production, employment, demand and consumption are
conspicuously reflected at the entrepreneurial level by commercial loan
and bond defaults, foreclosure of mortgages, assignee and bankruptcy
sales. If all of these cross-aggravating retardations of production
remain unchecked, the inevitable result is the period called "bust"
or depression.
The increased number of failures to pay credit liens accumulating and
occurring at the same time gives a situation superficially describable
as originating in the "over-extension of credit." It is
impossible to believe that these defections are derived from the
epidemic appearance among most credit lenders of a peculiar virus that
prompts them, after years of successful lending practices, to
concurrently make the same technical blunder of lending to inefficient
producer-borrowers.
The phrase "over-extension of credit" is actually descriptive
only in character and devoid of the attribute of causality. The
necessary causality can be supplied only by the concept of insufficiency
of the credit-servicing surplus owing to the speculative rise in rents
beyond the ability of capital to compensate. In terms of price
equilibria, this means an inability of the active producers of wealth
(labor and capital) to buy back what they produce. When inventories
over-accumulate in stores and warehouses, other superficial thinkers are
led to loudly proclaim that depressions are caused by "overproduction."
The "rent-interest index" reasoning can easily be applied to
demonstrate the speciousness of this concept much in the same manner as
can the idea of "over-extension of credit" be refuted. If one
wishes to oversimplify and to indulge in a generality that glitters as
much as "overproduction" and "overextension," the
only plausible one to use is "underproduction as being the cause of
depression.
There is a considerable uncertainty prevailing in theoretical and
practical circles about the immediate economic future. This uncertainty
might be relieved by a statistical investigation of the suggested "rent-interest
index." Perhaps it can give us a barometer capable of presaging
swings in the business cycle. Such a barometer would fill the acute need
of the Georgist economic perspective for a statistical corroboration of
the concept that rising land values acting to diminish wages and
interfere with the appropriate use of capital causes depressions and
that falling land values accompanied by capital innovations initiate
recovery.
PART 2: THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT AND
INFLATION ON THE RENT-INTEREST INDEX
There are two forces which may temporarily counteract the effect of a
rise in the rent line and the presence of an adverse "rent-interest
index." Their success in so doing provides illusory solutions to
the problems of the cyclical production pattern.
One force is the drawing into the active labor pool, during times of
compulsive production or steeply rising costs of living, of individuals
who under optimum conditions of plenty should not be working at all. A
conspicuous example is currently found in the necessity of young mothers
to go back to work in order to live at a happy level of consumption. The
use of more workers intensifies the use of land and capital so as to
increase total production and temporarily permit continued debt
servicing. The upward effect of this extra exertion is self-limited by
the consequent lowering of the margin. In addition land holders are
quick to exploit the association of more people with particular
productive sites by speculatively increasing rents where and when
possible.
With rents still rising, a continuous fear of falling behind the
concomitant rising cost of graceful living pervades the population. This
economic anxiety, combined with disruption in proper family relations
due to the need for mothers to work, can act only to aggravate the
mental illness, juvenile delinquency, marital tension and other social
evils so widespread in the current scene. This is a state of affairs
that can hardly be described as progress.
The "Full Employment" Hoax
The phrase "60,000,000 jobs" was a bit of word magic supposed
to banish the threat of depression forever. Despite our now having more
than this number employed, the menace of economic distress in the near
future is disturbing the thinking of all.
The success of inflation in causing temporary bursts of increased
production undoubtedly depends on increasing the labor force. The
decreased capacity of capital funds to supply the tools and commodities
for production due to the rising price level leads to a lower
productivity that can be compensated only by extra exertion. When a pool
of new workers is available, this compensation takes place.
When the labor pool is exhausted, the momentum of the increased
production level must run down. Further inflation can only lead to the
economic woes of runaway inflation, in which the economy is featured by
full employment and a retarded standard of living.
The policy of making jobs through controlled inflation is the
wages-fund theory in modern dress. The vigor of revival can be seen in
the recent request of the head of one of the labor federations for the
government to provide one and a half to two millions new jobs.
That the funds to supply tools to these workers comes from the
organized state robbery called taxation, and deficit financing seems of
no moment to this person. But this is to be expected in these days when
double standards of morality are so commonplace in American
civilization.
The Balloon Ascends
The other and more important force which serves to mask an adverse "rent-interest
index" is inflation, i.e., increasing the quantity of money in
circulation without increasing directly the supply of civilian goods.
Widespread subsidies and war expenditures via deficit financing are
favored techniques for so doing.
With the expansion of the money supply it becomes easier to obtain
credit for production or consumption and easier to make credit
repayments. Because of price rises which accompany all money expansions,
the repayments are made in currency of lower commodity value. Holders of
surplus funds are thus induced to invest further in production in order
to protect the commodity value of the principal. Any lag in the rise of
the rent line owing to prior contracts permits the "easy-money"
production and the "surplus-investment production to rise fairly
rapidly. This persuades many people that a little bit of inflation is a
good thing.
In time, however, the rent line catches up. Land holders acting
intelligently, quickly learn to include the factor of inflated currency
in their speculative anticipations. This increased rent line combined
with the decreased capacity through price rises of surplus funds to
provide tools for production must ultimately give a "rent-interest
index" that leads to a depressed rate of production.
This new period of retarded production is called variously deflation,
recession and readjustment. These generalities are useful to
politicians, professors and economists for they obscure mountains of
confusion and ignorance.
Governments, true to centuries-old form, then try to counteract the
detrimental effects of the inflation-deflation pattern with more
inflation. Here in the United States the presence of vast land resources
combined with an expanding population and accumulated capital operating
in a free trade area have prevented the arrival of runaway inflation
such as that now being experienced in Greece, Argentina and France, but
we may be approaching it.
A tight money situation is now prevailing in the investment and credit
market despite production being at an all-time high for conditions not
marked by all-out war. In a healthy private-enterprise economy, the
greater the production, the greater should be the surplus held by
individuals and available for investment. The scarcity of investment
funds is a symptom on the financial level of the inability of capital
and labor to reach production sites at rent costs profitable to all
participants. Surpluses can or will not he invested in risky times
without risk insurance in the form of higher yields. These extra credit
costs can only deter production.
What's "Normal"
Pronouncements by various politicoes, professors and economic writers
have already been articulated to the effect that any recession that may
appear shortly is merely a downward adjustment of the economy to normal
production levels. The dominant economic philosophy of today seems to
have the curious concept that normal economic times exist when less than
the full labor force seeking work, is at work, and less than the full
associated productive capacity is in operation. They regard as normal
for any particular period an average somewhere between crest and trough
of the contemporaneous section of their graphs of production activity.
The word "normal" has a connotation of healthful and optimum
functioning; The only plausible meaning to the phrase "normal
economic times" is a period of expanding production when there are
enough dignified employment opportunities for all who seek employment.
Associated therewith is a frequent turn-over of capital actuated by
rapid advances in technology, and the presence of large quantities of
surplus funds seeking investment. In short, normal times are "boom"
times.
The present administration in attacking inflation does not seem to be
taking any cognizance of the speculative rent line. A down-trend may
appear if the indicated inability of capital to circumvent or compensate
for the combined effects of the rent line and inflation continues. This
would put the administration in the embarrassing position of being
accused of having caused the slowdown.
The Pressure for Control
If the level of production goes fairly low it will win many people to
the belief that only controlled inflation can maintain prosperity.
Washington will then feel compelled to continue in some measure the easy
money policies of the five previous administrations, while praying that
any respite so achieved does not precipitate a severer downturn.
Exhortative pep talks and hyperbole about the need for confidence,
salesmanship, enterprise, liberty and initiative cannot stop the
inexorable working of the laws of rent, wages and interest nor
counterbalance the pernicious effects of land speculation on production.
When are businessmen, politicians, college professors and ordinary
citizens who ask the silly question, "what state agency enforces
natural laws," going to realize that the terrible crises of war,
depression and runaway inflation are the natural enforcement agencies of
natural laws? It better be soon!
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