.
Should the Senate Pass a Balanced
Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? |
[Reprinted from "Reducing
the Deficit: The Ongoing Balanced Budget Debate," Congressional
Digest, vol. 76, no. 3 (March 1997)]
|
The [U.S.] Chamber [of Commerce] strongly supports a balanced budget
amendment to the Constitution. Our members and their employees... have
long felt the effects of Federal fiscal mismanagement. Large, persistent
Federal deficits reduce saving and investment, stymie income and job
growth, and reduce our standard of living. They ultimately lead to
increased taxes, bigger government, and higher interest rates, all of
which reduce the global competitiveness of U.S. firms.
The balanced budget amendment would prohibit Federal outlays from
exceeding revenues, unless Congress approved a deficit by a three-fifths
vote of both the Senate and House. The amendment would require the same
three-fifths vote to increase the Federal debt limit and would require a
"constitutional majority" - 51 votes in the Senate and 218 in
the House - to raise Federal taxes.
The Chamber is convinced that the balanced budget amendment will place
renewed emphasis on fiscal discipline, forcing Congress to slow
government spending while constraining its ability to raise taxes. In
restoring the proper balance between spending and taxes, the balanced
budget amendment also would force government officials to prioritize
difficult spending choices.
The balanced budget amendment has been challenged on various grounds.
Including its economic effects, its appropriateness for the
Constitution, and the contention that it would needlessly involve the
court system in its enforcement. I would like to address each of these
issues, and share with the committee the conclusions reached by the
Chamber.
Critics of the balanced budget amendment contend that the negative
effects of deficits are overblown, that deficits really do not matter.
Others admit to some of the negative effects, but point to recent "improvements"
in the deficit, claiming that we have adequately addressed the problem.
Still others acknowledge the serious long-term ramifications of
deficits, but claim that correcting this situation carries too high a
social and political price.
Chronic government deficits, and the resulting accumulation of
government debt, reduce the level of savings and investment, lower
productivity growth, raise the specter of inflation, put upward pressure
on interest rates, encourage trade deficits, and lower our standard of
living.
Since the 1960s, we have seen the net national savings fall from about
10 percent of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] to consistently below 4
percent - too low to support the investment required for high
productivity growth. Because long-term productivity growth is the key to
rising standards of living, skimping on investment is dangerous.
First, chronic government borrowing tends to put upward pressure on
interest rates. Businesses seeking to raise capital and households
applying for mortgages have to compete with the Federal Government in
securing loanable funds. This increase in demand pushes interest rates
up. Consequently, fewer loans are made to the private sector, and those
that are made carry a higher interest rate. This is known as "crowding
out," since government borrowing displaces some private borrowing.
Second, because our economy is increasingly linked to the global
market, there are important international impacts related to the budget
deficit. Higher interest rates tend to precipitate an overvalued dollar,
meaning that our goods and services cost more to our trading partners.
This lowers our exports and pushes up our trade deficit. Many contend
that one of the major forces behind the huge trade deficits of the 1980s
was the Federal budget deficit.
Third, the amount we are paying to service our national debt has grown
since 1969 - from $43 billion to $240 billion in 1996. As a share of
total government outlays, interest payments on the debt have more than
doubled, from about 7 percent during the early 1970s to over 15 percent
currently. That means that for the same amount of revenue there is less
money for other government programs, whether for national defense, our
court system, Head Start, or environmental clean-up. No matter what the
budget priorities are, fewer funds are available.
Large persistent deficits and the accumulation of debt can also have
severe consequences for future generations. To the extent that
government debt is held by foreigners - currently about 15 percent -
there will be a net transfer from these future generations to foreign
bond holders to service or retire the debt. Even more important,
shifting funds from current private savings and investment to current
government consumption via government deficits can leave future
generations with inadequate investment, sluggish productivity growth,
poor, wage growth, and lower living standards.
Some critics charge that these negative effects of government are
largely overblown and that much government spending is really
investment. Some government spending can be regarded as "investment
spending," meaning that funds spent now will generate stronger
economic growth later. Spending on infrastructure-highways, bridges,
dams, and mass transit, for example - and other programs such as
education are often thought of that way because they provide benefits
over a longer period of time. But the bulk of government spending goes
to projects and programs that instead represent "current
consumption." While many of these programs are desirable, we need
to recognize that we should pay for them out of current income.
Many critics of the balanced budget amendment will acknowledge the
problem but claim that such a "drastic" solution is
unnecessary. They point to the 1993 OBRA [Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act] legislation and recent deficit reduction as evidence that we have
solved the problem. Unfortunately, this is an extreme form of denial. We
need only look to history and current CBO [Congressional Budget Office]
projections to see the fallacy in this argument.
Until about 1960 or so, running a balanced budget over time was an "unwritten"
constitutional amendment. The U.S. government ran deficits during the
War of 1812, the severe recession of 1837-43, the Civil War, and the
Spanish-American War, to name a few episodes. But in other periods, the
Federal Government ran surpluses to reduce its outstanding debt. On the
whole, only emergencies justified running a deficit.
But since 1960, this informal rule apparently has gone by the wayside.
In the past 36 years, the United States has avoided a deficit only once,
when in 1969 there was a surplus of $3 billion. Given the chronic
deficits we have grown to expect, it is time to make explicit through a
constitutional amendment the old implicit principle of government living
within its means.
While it is true that a combination of factors has lowered the current
deficit, the impact is likely to be transitory. The Congressional Budget
Office estimates that after bottoming out in 1966, the deficit will
begin to rise once again both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
GDP. What is even more discouraging is that despite all the rhetoric,
neither the Congress nor the Administration have been able to agree on a
statutory plan to balance the budget.
Some commentators have argued that a balanced budget requirement is a
mere rule of accounting, incompatible with the broad principles in the
Constitution. It is worth noting that the Constitution already contains
several narrowly focused economic and fiscal provisions, including the
Article I, Section 9 requirement of "a regular statement and
account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money" and
the Article I, Section 8 requirement that "duties, imports and
excises . . . [be] uniform throughout the United States."
Moreover, the balanced budget amendment embodies two principal themes
of the Constitution: limitation on Federal power, and protection of
politically under-represented groups against majoritarian abuse. Thomas
Jefferson, who perceived the inherent expansionist tendency of central
government, supported a constitutional prohibition of Federal borrowing
as a means of protecting individual liberty.
As I noted earlier, our Federal Government embraced the practice of
holding government spending in check to avoid deficits, except during
war or recession. In recent times, the erosion of this principle has
created persistent structural deficits, removed the need to limit and
prioritize programs, and led to an excessively large Federal sector. The
balanced budget amendment requirement that Federal operations be funded
from current revenues restores an important principle of fiscal
responsibility and limited government.
Statutory attempts to impose fiscal discipline upon the Federal
Government have failed, largely because Congress was able to change the
rules in mid-game. The ambitious deficit-reduction targets of the 1985
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law were repeatedly modified when they conflicted
with Congress's spending ambitions. Likewise, big-ticket items such as
unemployment compensation payments and disaster relief are customarily
designated as "emergency" spending, which exempts them from
spending caps. Between 1980 and 1990, each year's actual spending
exceeded the targets of that year's budget resolution by an average of
$30 billion (the excess was $85 billion in 1990).
Each statutory response to the deficit has shown the same
vulnerability: hard-won budget rules can be waived or modified by a
simply majority vote. Not surprisingly, a majority can usually be
assembled to support more spending. The key advantage of a
constitutional amendment is that tough budgetary rules can be placed
beyond the reach of simple congressional majorities.
Some lawmakers and commentators have raised questions about the
enforcement of a balanced budget amendment. A primary concern is that
congressional efforts to meet the balanced budget requirement would be
challenged in the courts, and the judiciary would be thrust into a
nonjudicial role of weighing policy demands, slashing programs, and
increasing taxes.
On the other hand, there is a legitimate and necessary role for the
courts in ensuring compliance with the amendment. Congress could
potentially circumvent balanced budget amendment requirements through
unrealistic revenue estimates, emergency designations, off-budget
accounts, unfunded mandates, and other gimmickry. It is our view that
the need to proscribe judicial policymaking can be reconciled with a
constructive role for the courts in maintaining the integrity of the
balanced budget requirement.
In general, the courts have shown an unwillingness to interject
themselves into the fray of budgetary politics. The New Jersey Supreme
Court observed that "it is a rare case. .. in which the judiciary
has any proper constitutional role in making budget allocation
decisions." The judiciary has remained clear of most budget
controversies.
A strong framework of accounting guidelines will emerge from
implementing legislation. Supporters in both the House and Senate have
indicated their intention that implementing legislation embrace
stringent accounting standards that will minimize the potential for
litigation. Should legitimate questions arise concerning the methods by
which Congress balances the budget, these standards will also provide
objective criteria which meet constitutional standards for judicial
intervention.
The implementing package is also likely to establish guidelines for
judicial involvement, defining those issues appropriate for litigation
and which parties have standing to litigate them. State budget officers,
for example, could be given standing to contest unfunded Federal
mandates. These enforcement procedures, coupled with budget process and
accounting guidelines, will operate against a backdrop of traditional
legal principles to rationally limit judicial action. The effect should
be to prevent judicial over-reaching into legislative functions, while
providing a check on congressional attempts to evade the requirements of
the balanced budget amendment through procedural and numerical
gimmickry.
|