[An essay included in
an historical series published by
the Henry George School of Social
Science, New York, NY - 1967]
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Depressions and recessions have been occurring so regularly
through our history that economists have reported variously on the
resulting mass unemployment and countless business failures. Shortly
after the War of Independence the United States witnessed the first of a
series of depressions. After the panic of 1785 there was another slump
followed by a third period of economic dislocation, but neither of these
compared in intensity with the 1837 panic, which lasted four years, with
many fortunes made and lost.
Martin Van Buren was elected to the Presidency amidst rumors that the
economy was entering a period of stagnation. Politicians and economists
joined forces in an effort to analyze the causes and determine the
extent to which government should control the economy. Steady financial
decline plagued the Democratic administration. Some of the reasons
offered were incurrence of large state debts due to the construction of
canals and railroads; expansion of credit by numerous banks and the
subsequent availability of easy money; an unfavorable balance of trade
in which the imports exceeded exports resulting in a loss of specie;
crop failures in 1835 and 1837 and the frenzy that was caused by the
avalanche of land speculation. It is the latter point that is of major
importance in the panic of 1837 and is closely linked with many of the
other causes.
During the 1830's the growth of state and wildcat banks had offered
many the opportunity to borrow money with great ease, and a sizeable
portion was invested in the purchase of land. As a result, and this
represents only one factor, government land sales soared, causing
serious concern to the succeeding President, Andrew Jackson.
The land offices recorded that in 1836 the sales were ten times greater
than they had been five years earlier. In order to limit the speculative
fever Andrew Jackson, in opposition to the prevailing sentiment, issued
the Specie Circular, which ordered land offices to accept only gold or
silver in payment of public lands. Many state banks did not have specie
backing and this caused a decline in borrowers, a drop in land sales to
one quarter of the previous year, numerous defaulted payments and a
financial crisis.
Urban real estate values increased at such an abnormally high velocity
that a Hartford speculator tells of making 75 percent annually on an
investment of $1,000 in Michigan where the boom was in high gear. Philip
Hone, a parvenu in New York society, recalls a farm near Brooklyn that
was offered for $20,000 in 1831 with no takers and sold in 1835 for
$102,000.
The boom that preceded the panic was not limited to government land but
included city lots, urban acreage, swamps and agricultural areas. Wild
speculation, fraud and corruption prevailed in tile timber lands of
Maine and extended inland from New England to western and southern
sections. Purchases by an "American land company" form a
chapter by themselves in the explosive history of mounting fortunes.
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