.
| [Reprinted from Progress,
September-October, 2005] |
BUREAUCRATIC RENT: The extraction of unearned surplus by
government officials.
Bernstein, in Rural Livelihoods, defined Bureaucratic Rent as the state
extraction of surplus from peasants. In a particular African study, he
identified government officials as rent receivers through their control
of the marketing of export crops, with rent being the difference between
world market price and that received by the peasant. So, how important
is bureaucratic rent?
A World Bank report, Doing Business in 2005, presents a more general
example of bureaucratic rent. The report found that poor countries
impose on average three times the administrative costs and twice the
number of bureaucratic procedures as rich countries. Many of these
problems, says the report, are a legacy of European colonists'
bureaucracies designed to control a local population, not to encourage
growth. Often, independence from colonial masters simply meant a
transfer of bureaucratic rent from an old monopoly to a new one. And
these monopolies could be extended, for example to cream off the natural
resources rents from oil and mineral bonanzas.
The report concludes that foreign aid should be made conditional on
verifiable regulatory reforms. This would boost annual growth by 2.2
percentage points. But given the depth and breadth of bureaucratic
corruption, and the high mobility and low visibility of all the factors
involved, this seems somewhat optimistic. Far better to make foreign aid
conditional on the taxation of factors of low mobility and high
visibility - land and natural resources. In Third World intervention
- A New Analysis, this proposal was put to the World Bank in 1998,
along with calculations suggesting that it would boost annual growth by
at least 10 percentage points.
|